Pro Se Chicago's Weblog

October 31, 2008

Legally Insufficient Indictment-Failure to State Specific Means by Which Alleged Crime Accomplished – Illinois / Felonious Conduct of Judge Pantle and Judge Alonso in Obstructing Justice by Denying Defense Access to Evidence


The first thing I do if I am indicted or charged is look at the charging instrument – complaint, information, or indictment. I ask does it include all the elements of the alleged crime? If not, it is legally insufficient and voids the charge and case. There are other reasons it may be insufficient and I will discuss that in later posts. The motion in this post goes over the relevant controlling case law. Please enjoy it! I hope you find it useful. This is my motion in one case where the indictment is constitutionally legally insufficient basically because it fails to state the SPECIFIC MEANS of the alleged crime – in this case the specific allegedly fraudulent invoices, naming the specific dates of service, name of patient, service billed for, provider of the service, provider who is billing, and WHAT SPECIFICALLY is fraudulent about the invoice. It also states there is a “single intention or design” (i.e. scheme) but gives NO CLUE as to what the scheme involves or who are the alleged perpetrators other than me. The US Supreme Court as well as higher courts in Illinois have ruled in similar cases that this is a void indictment and therefore the entire case is void, not just voidable.
This is a case where in 2004 I was charged with felony Medicaid fraud by the Illinois Attorney General with a fraudulent grand jury indictment by an illegally impaneled special grand jury. The trial is still pending. If you want to attend, please e-mail me and I will inform you of the date when scheduled. Contributions to my legal defense fund may also be given to my attorney – made out to: “Shelton Legal Defense Fund” C/O J. Nicolas Albukerk, 3025 W 26th St., Chicago, IL 60623. The IL AG has absolutely no legal authority to indict anyone (with the exception of about six crimes specified by statute giving AG authority) without the invitation, review, and at least minimal participation of the State’s Attorney. This never happened in mycase. The law was mistated to the grand jury, only perjured testimony was given to grand jury, extensive exculpatory evidence was withheld from grand jury. No crime is actually alleged in indictment as act is specifically authorized by the Federal Medicaid Act if one guesses that the alleged crime is billing Medicaid for services of employees who are statutorily qualified to provide services – i.e. psychologists and counselors. I will post all the other motions to dismiss that the court has illegally refused to hear later.
UPDATE: I tried to file this pro se. It is still my position that I am being illegally denied the right to self-representation – more on this later. My attorney is considering adopting this motion and filing it under his name. In the meantime, Judge Alonso refused to hear it because it did not come from my attorney, who is now representing me over my objection. I did this not because he is a bad attorney, he is very good, but I believe at this point I need to represent myself – more on this later. The judge allowed this motion to be filed as an offer of proof only.

 

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CRIMINAL DIVISION

 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS       )

                        Plaintiff,                                    )          

                        v.                                             )           No. 04 CR 17571

                                                                        )

LINDA SHELTON                                         )           Jorge Alonso

            Defendant                                 )           Judge Presiding

 

 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR INSUFFICIENT INDICTMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE AN OFFER OF PROOF

 

NOW COMES Defendant, Linda Shelton, Pro Se, who respectfully moves this court to dismiss case due to insufficiency of indictment, or in the alternative offer this motion as an offer of proof that the indictment is insufficient and therefore the case is void ab initio. In support of this motion Defendant states as follows:

1.      In Illinois, an indictment must be reasonably certain enough to apprise a defendant of the charges against him, enable him to prepare a defense, and permit a conviction or acquittal to serve as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. People v. Greico, 255 N.E.2d 897, 898-899 (Ill. 1970)

2.      A defendant has a fundamental right to be informed of the “nature and cause” of the charges against him or her. People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (1994).

3.      In Illinois this fundamental right is given substance by statute and incorporated into section 111-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/111–3 (West 1998)). 725 ILCS 5/111‑3 states: “111‑3. Form of charge. (a) A charge shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by: . . . . (3) Setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged;” [emphasis added] See Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d at 51; People v. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d 984, 987 (1996). When the sufficiency of a charging instrument is challenged in a pretrial motion, the inquiry upon review is whether the instrument strictly complies with section 111–3. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 987.

4.      When the language of a statute which constitutes a charge against the defendant defines the acts prohibited, no further particularity is necessary. People v. Kamsler, 214 N.E.2d 562, 566 (Ill. 1966)

5.      An indictment is not flawed because the overt act could be described in greater detail. City of Chicago v. Powell, 735 N.E.2d 119, 125 (Ill.App.1st Dist, 2000) CITING People v. Meyers, 630 N.E.2d 811 (Ill. 1994). Rather an indictment is sufficient so long that it would enable a defendant to prepare a defense. Id.

6.      Ordinarily, the requirements of section 111-3 are met when the counts of a complaint follow the statutory language in setting out the nature and elements of an offense. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 987. The relevant inquiry is not whether a charging instrument could have described an offense with more particularity, but whether there is sufficient particularity to allow the defendant to prepare a defense. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d at 54. A charging instrument is a preliminary pleading, and it need not contain more than a cursory statement of the facts. People v. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 497. However, it must state some facts.

7.      If the charging instrument meets the minimum requirements of section 111–3(a) but (combined with any discovery the State furnishes) is insufficient to allow the defendant to prepare a defense, he or she can–and should–seek a bill of particulars. Smith, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 498; People v. Intercoastal Realty, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 964, 971 (1986).

8.      An indictment need not state the exact means used in committing a charged offense if that means is not an integral part of the offense. Grieco, 255 N.E.2d 899; SEE People v. Brogan, 816 N.E.2d 643, 654 (Ill.App.1st, 2004) (defendant’s argument that the indictment failed to apprise him of the details of how the overt act was carried out failed because the argument focused on the nature of the proof rather than the nature of the offense.) However, if the means is an integral part of the offense, the indictment needs to state these means.

9.      When the language of a statute does not articulate a specific offense, the indictment must articulate a specific overt act. People v. Potter, 125 N.E.2d 510 (Ill. 1995) In Potter, the defendant was charged with reckless driving. The indictment specifically stated that the defendant drove recklessly by speeding. The defendant was therefore not left to question whether the reckless conduct was running a red light, driving at night without his lights on, or one of a myriad of other possibly dangerous driving manners. However, there are numerous cases where the reviewing courts ruled that the indictment did not articulate a specific overt act[1], and therefore, these indictments were fatally defective.

10.  In the case at bar, the indictment states defendant is alleged to have “in furtherance of a single intention and design, … by means of false statements and representations, . . . caused false billing invoices to be submitted to the Illinois Department of Public Aid.”

11.  The indictment does NOT SPECIFY any details of this “single intention and design” so the Defendant cannot prepare a defense because she must guess at what kind of scheme and with whom she schemed in order to commit the alleged crime. As she is innocent, she has no knowledge of any scheme to which to prepare a defense.

12.  The indictment does NOT SPECIFY what false statements or what false representations she is accused of having made. She cannot prepare a defense and is forced to guess that the false statements have something to do with the large amount of different types of information on an invoice (Exhibit A), such as patient name, patient Medicaid number, date of service, type of service, diagnosis, or provider name.

13.  Defendant must also guess at which step is fraudulent in a complicated series of steps necessary to submit an invoice, from agreeing to work for the business, to signing the contract with the billing agent, to giving a patient encounter form to the business assistant when a patient is seen in clinic, to the billing agent setting up the business for electronic submission and registering the business and provider for billing, to signing a power of attorney form, electronic partner trading agreement, and alternate payee form, in order to generate an electronic invoice from the patient encounter form, to submitting the invoice over the wire, and to documenting hours worked on chart review and teaching therapist or setting medical policies.

14.  She further has to guess which dates of service for which of thousands of patient’s names in remittance advices given to her in discovery by the state, for the large time period of the indictment, June 2000 through April 2002, are involved so she can examine each of these invoices and guess at what is allegedly fraudulent about them.

15.  The above involves pulling out each of the thousands of charts in storage, examining each date of service record and comparing them with the invoices, after obtaining access to medical charts not under her control or possession until June 2008. It also involves examining all business and bank records related to billing and payroll, after obtaining access to them, as they were not under her control or possession until June 2008.

16.  As Defendant was not owner of the practice and did not have access to these documents after she left the practice in 2003, until June 2008, when she received Power of Attorney over all documents of the practice, at the request of XXXX, the owner, who is now medically incapacitated and dying of XXXXXX, Defendant is supposed to figure all this out and develop a defense using this material in only a couple of months. This is a Herculean task that no one could possibly be expected to accomplish. The Court for four (4) years has negligently and/or willfully interfered with and prevented Defendant from obtaining banking and billing records or compulsory process and prevented Defendant from legitimately seeking details of alleged offense.

17.  The State does not specify if Defendant is alleged to have ghost-billed by listing patients and Medicaid numbers of persons who never came to the practice, upcoded by listing a code for a higher degree of service than provided, substitute-billed for a provider who was not eligible to bill, schemed with the business owner, the biller, the office assistants, or whomever, for any of this. In addition, no specific acts (specific patients, specific dates of services, or specific services) are described in indictment, and no specific dates of service or specific services billed for are described in Bill of Particulars.

18.  No reasonable person can be expected to prepare a defense under the above circumstances, where the State, in the indictment has utterly failed, as required by law, to specify the overt acts which constitute the alleged criminal acts.

19.  The State, in discovery, has provided a list of approximately 54 patients which are family groups with approximately 30 adults. They claim that this discovery material represents the State informing the Defendant of the means of the illegal acts she is alleged to have committed. This, along with a Bill of Particulars, however does not cure the fatally defective and insufficient indictment. The 30 or so adults were provided in a witness list. If each psychiatric patient is seen an average of 20 visits, then these 54 patients represent about 1080 visits. Defendant, without the indictment specifying which patients and which visits are allegedly fraudulent and how they are fraudulent is left to guess about this information for each of these 1080 office visits. The State’s bill of particulars and answer to discovery states that Medicaid received bills for services for these 54 patients and lists inclusive dates of service and total amounts billed for, but does not state specific dates of service and patients for which they claim that services were billed fraudulently or what was fraudulent about the bill, except that the bills were for services “not provided by the physician,”  which could mean several different types of overt acts or omissions.

20.  Defendant is now in a situation, ordered by this Court, and produced by the State, analogous to someone being indicted and charged with murder, but not being told who she murdered, where and on what continent the murder took place, what was the nature of the alleged weapon, or even what year the murder took place. This is the ultimate injustice and sham proceeding, that should have been dismissed several years ago. This is a continuing four (4) year act of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct. There is no specific Who, What, Where, or When! These proceedings are therefore, a travesty of justice and beyond any semblance of legitimate American jurisprudence. This case brings this Court, this State, and its legal system into disrepute based on the unconstitutional, illegal, and unethical actions of this Court and this State against Defendant that run counter to every due process principle guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

21.  The State has also provided in discovery thousands of the practice’s “remittance advices” that cover an approximately two year period. Remittance advices are documents generated by Illinois Medicaid sent to the medical provider which list the names of patients billed for, the recipient’s Medicaid number, the date of the service, the code for the service claimed, the invoiced amount, and the amount paid to the provider or alternate payee by Medicaid. Defendant must guess at which of these dates of services and patients may be added to the witness list and what is fraudulent about each and every one of the invoices submitted that Medicaid used to generate the remittance advices. Defendant would have to examine each invoice, if available, examine each chart for each date of service, and determine if there was a scrivener’s error, or a somehow fraudulent invoice and determine what was fraudulent about the invoice, and who was responsible for this act. Only in July 28, 2008, four (4) years after the indictment has this Court began to enforce discovery rules and order the State to clearly identify all witnesses to be used against Defendant, although the Court still has not ordered the State to identify the acts (dates of service and details of invoice that they allege are fraudulent) that constitute the alleged crime.

22.  It appears that the State is forcing the Defendant to perform their investigation and figure out what, if anything, she should be charged with concerning these thousands of patient encounters, not just by her, but by every physician and provider in the practice during the broad indictment period, four years after the indictment was handed down.

23.  Of note, a bill of particulars does not cure a faulty indictment. People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 53 (1994). The indictment must stand on its own in stating facts sufficient to support all elements of the offense. The indictment, even with discovery materials, fails to inform Defendant of the alleged means of the crime or the alleged specific acts constituting this crime, four (4) years after indictment.

24.  The indictment in this case is fatally insufficient in failing to specify the acts that allegedly constitute the crime charged. Therefore, no  crime has been legally charged and the case is null and void ab initio.

25.  Under 725 ILCS 5/114-4(e), if the State, due to lack of due diligence, fails to bring Defendant to trial within one (1) year, following the indictment, after one additional hearing scheduled 14 –30 days after this motion is filed, then the case must be dismissed with prejudice for lack of due diligence.

26.  Defendant has previously moved for dismissal, 17 months after the indictment, due to lack of due diligence and this has been unconstitutionally denied. Defendant renews her request for dismissal for lack of due diligence. After four years or 48 months post-indictment, the State clearly should have provided the Defendant discovery, including all allegedly fraudulent invoices and a bill of particulars to address the above, even if this court erroneously rules that the indictment is valid.

27.  The court has placed Defendant’s subpoenas on hold for several years and denied Defendant counsel for nine (9) months in 2005-2006. The law only requires the billing agent and practice to keep invoices for three (3) years. The billing agent now claims the invoices no longer exist. The State failed to produce any invoices for the indictment period despite repeated specific orders of Judge Pantle several years ago. It claims to have microfiche of some invoices, but these cannot include most of invoices produced by Ms. Moore, as the State only make microfiche of paper claims. State has not admitted to having or denied having in their possession copies of electronic invoices from indictment period, but has failed to produce them (the actual alleged means of the alleged crime) despite orders of the Court in 2006 to do so. Ms. Moore, by law was allowed to destroy all invoices and computer records of them before 2006.

28.  In addition, banks are only required to keep records for five (5) years. Due to physical incapacity and lack of funds, Mr. XXXX, the sole proprietor of RFOM during the indictment period, has not been able to preserve all his business and bank records. Citizen’s Bank has now informed Defense attorney Albukerk that the practice’s bank records no longer exist as it is now beyond this five (5) year period. The State has failed to ask for, subpoena, or proffer the practice’s bank records in discovery while the case has been pending for four (4) years.

29.  Therefore, the Court and State have caused Defendant to be deprived of the “instruments of the alleged crime,” (the allegedly fraudulent electronic and then paper invoices) as well as exculpatory business and bank records, and therefore, materially and intentionally prevented Defendant from preparing a defense. This is not just lack of due diligence by the State. This is active interference with the defense, as well as violation of the judges’ oaths of office.

30.  The defense cannot have invoices inspected by an expert for forgery of Defendant’s signature by someone unknown person regarding paper claims, nor inspect the electronic partner trading agreement from the third-party adjudicator, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois (”BC/BS”), which allows BC/BS to accept electronic claims from Medicaid providers, for forgery of Defendant’s signature.  

31.  These acts of withholding and failing to preserve evidence by the Court and the State, in themselves should cause this case to be immediately dismissed as a sanction against the State and the Court and because it now is more difficult, if not impossible to definitively prove that Defendant did not produce or cause to be produced most of the invoices in question, nor receive most of the money given the practice by Medicaid or have any part in deciding its distribution. This is the main element and the nature of the alleged crime, stated in general terms in indictment, without description of overt acts. With the physical incapacity of Co-Defendant and his written statement that he is invoking the Fifth Amendment and has refused to give a dying declaration, Defendant is put in the impossible position of proving a negative without the help of any evidence.

32.  Defendant was UNCONSTITUTIONALLY prohibited by the court from filing any pleadings pro se by a written order of Judge Pantle, dated July 6, 2005, that has not been rescinded, and DENIED at the same time an attorney from May 2005 to January 2006, a period of nine (9) months. All Defendant’s subpoenas were put on hold by the court. Defendant has repeatedly requested to present argument to the court on her many outstanding and fully briefed motions and to represent herself and fire attorneys, initially hired by her family without her consent and then hired by her when it became clear that this court was going to continue its lawlessness and deny her all due process, right to an attorney of her choice, and right to a speedy trial. ALL her reasonable requests have been unconstitutionally denied by outrageous and dishonorable conduct of this court.

33.  Denial of her Faretta rights has been baseless, and the reasons stated on the record by Judge Pantle are legally insufficient, lacking details and only conclusory; not properly documented by this court in a manner necessary to deny Faretta rights. Speedy trial has been violated as de facto removing Defendant as pro se counsel between July 6, 2005, when the court prohibited her from filing pleadings, while at the same time denying appointment of an attorney, until Defendant hired an attorney on January 19, 2006, means defense could not have agreed to any continuance during that time and therefore, all continuances during these seven (7) months must be charged to the State, and therefore case must be dismissed for speedy trial reasons.

34.  Therefore, Defendant has been unconstitutionally barred from this court from filing or presenting this motion and many other motions, many of which have been fully briefed since February 2005. Attorneys acting on her behalf, against her wishes, have not fully presented all issues stated in Defendant’s pro se pleadings to the court. She therefore, is requesting her attorneys, denied their request to withdraw by the court and forced to continue to represent Defendant, and therefore appointed by the court over her objection, to file a motion to vacate July 6th, 2005 order preventing Defendant from filing pleadings, as well as adopt this motion and enter this motion, or in the alternative let Defendant pro se argue this motion. If the court won’t allow Defendant to argue it, Defendant requests that it be entered as an Offer of Proof, so that on appeal arguments and defenses she would have presented are preserved on the record.

            WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to dismiss this case with prejudice for a fatally flawed indictment, or in the alternative for lack of due diligence or speedy trial violation. If this motion is not allowed to be filed for argument, then Defendant requests it be entered as an offer of proof.

                                                                        Respectfully Submitted,

                                                                        _______________________

                                                                        Linda Shelton, Pro Se

 

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.

Pro Se Defendant

 

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct.

                                                                        __________________________

                                                                        Linda Shelton, Pro Se

 

Dated: August 4, 2008

[1] People v. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d 724 (1996): The defendant was charged by information with disorderly conduct based on transmitting a false report of sexual misconduct to the Department of Children and Family Services. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 727. The reviewing court held that the information was insufficient because it did not specify the contents of the false report, and basic fairness required the State to identify the allegedly false statements. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 727.

 

Davis: The reviewing court found that the indictment was insufficient when the defendant was charged with official misconduct based on “disseminat[ing] information,” but the indictment did not identify the contents of the alleged communication. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 990.

 

People v. Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d 124 (1990): The reviewing court held that a complaint that charged defendant with resisting a police officer was insufficient when the complaint stated that the officer was engaged in the execution of his official duties but did not identify the authorized act the officer was performing. Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 128.

 

People v. Leach, 279 N.E.2d 450 (Ill.App.1st, 1972): The defendant in Leach was charged with resisting or obstructing a police officer. The charging instrument was insufficient because it only stated that the defendant committed the above offense by knowingly obstructing a police officer. Id. at 453-454

 

United States v. Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir, 2003): The indictment was insufficient because it failed to specify the nature of the scheme used by the defendant to defraud the State of Alabama and the United States.

 

United States v. Nance, 533 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir., 1976): The indictment was insufficient because it failed to apprise the defendant of the nature of the false pretenses by which the defendant gained unauthorized control over money.

 

People v. Gerdes, 527 N.E.2d 1310 (Ill.App.5th, 1988): The defendant in Gerdes was charged with obstructing justice by giving false information to the police. The charging instrument did not specify the nature of the allegedly false information. The defendant was therefore left to wonder which of many statements to the police the basis for the charge against him was, so the appellate court dismissed the indictment. Id.

 

 

 

 


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October 17, 2008

Lawless, Corrupt, Incompetent, Wacko C[r]ook County Judge Kuriakos Ciesil Jails Defendent for Being 40 min Early for Hearing


Despite the following letter to the presiding judge of Municipal 1 District of the Circuit Court of Cook County, the only action taken was to temporarilty re-assign Judge Ciesil. I will petition the court post-trial to vacate all her orders which were illegal and refund the 10% of the bond money held by the Clerk for costs after bond was refunded. I should not have to pay for the gross judicial misconduct of Dishonorable Judge Ciesel.

October 4, 2007 LETTER

Honorable Judge E. Kenneth Wright, Jr.
Presiding Judge
First Municipal District
Circuit Court of Cook County
1303 Richard J Daley Center
50 W. Washington
Chicago, IL 60602

IN RE: Outrageous and illegal conduct of Judge Maria Kuriaskos Ciesil

Dear Honorable Judge Wright:

I am writing to you to inform you of the inappropriate, unethical, and frankly lawless conduct of Judge Ciesil and ask for your immediate intervention by removing her from any duties on the bench involving defendants and reassigning her to a desk job until she is completely evaluated by you and perhaps the JIB. This should include a psychiatric examination because her behavior and rulings are so inappropriate and bizarre that it must be considered that she has a severe personality disorder making her unable to make fair judgments and causing her to boost her ego by irrational attacks against defendants and attorneys. If she is found not to be unfit for duty then, at the very least, you should order direct and constant supervision and tutoring by a senior judge for at least 3 months before she is allowed to return to the bench unsupervised.

I am a defendant in several misdemeanor cases as a result of retaliation against me by corrupt county and state officials, as well as a result of police brutality and unlawful arrests. In Branch 46, before Judge Sheehan, I was able without an attorney to have six (6) bogus cases dismissed against me. As you know, I at first was before Judge Ballard, who proved to have inappropriate conduct (being in great need of training on demeanor, the law, judicial procedure, etc.) and you have reassigned him elsewhere.

Judge Sheehan replaced Judge Ballard on my cases. She is an outstanding judge, who is intellectually honest, attempts to be unbiased and fair, does not show preference to the prosecution, treats defendants with respect assuming they are innocent until proven guilty, clearly follows the rulings of higher courts, takes a step back and does not make knee-jerk decisions when she is unsure of the law during a hearing, and has potential to be one of the finest judges on the bench in the Circuit Court of Cook County because her demeanor, actions, and ethics are of the highest judicial level, besides the fact that her IQ is clearly very high.

Then when Judge Sheehan was reassigned to juvenile court there has been a succession of judges on my remaining two cases in branch 46. One Judge, Kenneth Fletcher also proved to be unfortunately ignorant of the law and inappropriate. I wrote a motion for SOJ for cause and he recused himself.

Judge Katz replaced him and his conduct was very appropriate and judicial. All the judges have been ordering that my pretrial hearings be held at either 11:00 a.m. or 10:00 a.m., because I have brought up motions that are quite advanced legally, appropriate, and challenging to the court.

Almost every continuance was set for 10:00 a.m. or later. I have throughout all these cases always arrived early to court or on time except for several days where I was hospitalized. My attorney, J. Nicolas Albukerk (I have decided to allow donors to pay for an attorney on my remaining cases as my health has deteriorated and the stress of representing myself is now too much), instructed me to meet him at 9:30 a.m. outside courtroom 304 at 555 Harrison St. My attorney told me this court date was at the usual time and I should be outside the court by 9:30 to talk with him. On 9/26/07 I arrived in the area around 9:00 a.m. and was unable to find a parking space at a meter due to construction in the surrounding area. I therefore parked in the lot next to the courthouse. I avoid parking there because of financial difficulties and I don’t want to keep borrowing money to pay the parking fees. I cannot take public transportation due to my disabilities [severe reactions to perfumes and fumes]. I walk with a cane due to spinal problems.

I arrived in the courthouse around 9:15 a.m. and up to the courtroom at 9:20 a.m. There were no seats in the courtroom so I sat on the bench outside of court. There was a crowd outside the courtroom including about six CPD officers. I had a pleasant conversation with one of them. At about 9:40 a.m. Sgt. Rankus came out of the courtroom and asked me where was my attorney, that the “judge wanted to call my case.” I told her that he had two other cases in 401 and 404 and he told me to wait for him. She told me to go find him and I slowly walked to the fourth floor and was unable to find him. I arrived back at courtroom 304 about 5-10 minutes later and went in and sat on a bench in the gallery because a seat had opened up and Sgt. Rankus was telling everyone to come into the courtroom.

After several other cases were called, my case was called and I stood up in the gallery and told the judge that Mr. Albukerk was involved in several other cases upstairs and told me to ask for the judge to hold my case until he arrived. Judge Ciesil very firmly told me to come stand before the bench. I did that. Then she took a paper out of one of the files and announced that she had issued an arrest warrant because I “was late” and told the Sheriff to execute the warrant. She raised my bail on each of the two cases from a $1,000 I-Bond to $25,000 D-Bond (total of $50,000 D-Bond)! This is an outrageous and unconstitutional excessive bail, especially for a disabled, indigent person!

I was stunned. She didn’t want to listen to a word I said and was very rude. She did not ask for any explanation or attempt to discuss the issue. I rapidly and frantically told her that my hearing was not scheduled until 10:00 a.m. and that I was not late, while the deputies were trying to drag me to the lock-up. I told her I arrived at 9:20 a.m. and had a conversation with a CPD officer in the hall [these 6 or so officers were seated in the courtroom in the front row of seats] as the courtroom had no seats available. I told her Sgt. Rankus had told me to find my attorney. I pleaded with the CPD officers and Sgt. Rankus to speak up and they remained silent. The judge was OBLIGATED to question the officers, read the file, which details that almost every other court date started at 10:00 a.m. or later. Instead she yelled that her court starts at 9:00 a.m. and that she had issued the warrant at 9:05 a.m. because I was “late”. She made NO EFFORT to read the previous file orders or to contact Judge Katz.

I was taken to the lock-up and not allowed to use medication. I have been fighting a virus for a week and asthma attacks that are not well controlled. I had been in the emergency room at Mt. Sinai Hospital all day on 9/21/07 with a severe asthma attack. I then went into an asthma attack and the deputies called an ambulance and I was taken to the U. of I. ER in custody and remained there under treatment until about 5:00 p.m., when I was returned to 555 Harrison lock-up and then transported to CCDOC.

My attorney arrived as I was being transported by the paramedics out of the courthouse, in custody, accompanied by several deputies, fully restrained [in a wheelchair]. I was released on bond from the jail at 3:00 a.m. and immediately, at the exit to the CCDOC had someone call an ambulance, which took me back to the hospital because I was so ill. I was unable to attend the hearing ordered by Judge Ciesil the next day, 9/27/07 at 9:00 a.m. because I had to be hospitalized and was released from the hospital on 10/2/07. My attorney has written a motion for Substitution of Judge for Cause which is attached and was filed the next day when he appeared on my behalf before Judge Ciesil.

Mr. Albukerk, my attorney, told me that after I was removed by paramedics as he arrived at court, Judge Ciesil refused to read the court file to see that the other dates were at 10:00 a.m. or later, so he read them into the record. He said the judge refused to quash the warrant and threatened him with contempt. He said he stepped back from the bench, put his hands behind his back and stated firmly to her that he was fully prepared to be taken into custody if the Judge thought that pointing out the truth and making arguments constituted contempt.

Please contact Mr. Albukerk at 773 847-2600 for further details. He told me that on 9/27/07 Judge Ciesil refused to transfer the case to you and insisted she would do nothing until I appeared in her courtroom, setting the next status date for 10/24/07 at 9:00 a.m. Judge Ciesil’s interaction with Mr. Albukerk is so unbelievable and outrageous that you cannot ignore it. Mr. Albukerk is writing an amended SOJ for cause motion, to include a lot more of what happened and it is all too astonishing to explain indirectly. Please get the facts directly form Mr. Albukerk and from the transcripts, which he has ordered and should be available shortly.

Mr. Albukerk also stated to me that Judge Ciesil used also as an excuse to issue the arrest warrant that I had refused to cooperate with a limited BCX [mental fitness exam] ordered. When Dr. Lourgos of FCS told me to sit in a back corner behind a table in a small interview room, I refused to do so and reminded him he was under written orders of Judge Sheehan to accommodate my disabilities [flashbacks of being attacked induced by small rooms] and he replied that he didn’t have to follow that order. I asked to sit by the door or to be interviewed in a larger room and he then said “the interview is over, leave.”

Please note the limited BCX was ordered upon MY request in a motion that I had filed for a forensic clinical exam for the issue of temporary insanity during the alleged “crime” possibly resulting from post-traumatic stress disorder – see attached motion. As temporary insanity was a possible defense because I have a lack of memory of some of this incident where I am alleged to have battered a lock-up aide by “kicking her” it was necessary to determine if temporary insanity due to a flashback related to a post-traumatic-stress disorder from which I suffer occurred at the time of the alleged “crime.” This flashback was induced by an illegal attack on me by a lock-up aide during this incident – see motion.

Judge Ciesil said that the report from FCS said I refused to cooperate with the exam. Judge Ciesil should know that statutes state that a defendant may choose to refuse to answer questions and bail cannot be changed or revoked due to this refusal.

725 ILCS 5/104‑14

       (c) The court shall advise the defendant of the limitations on the use of any statements made or information gathered in the course of the fitness examination or subsequent treatment as provided in this Section. It shall also advise him that he may refuse to cooperate with the person conducting the examination, but that his refusal may be admissible into evidence on the issue of his mental or physical condition.
Mr. Albukerk pointed out that I refused to cooperate because Dr. Lourgos from FCS refused to obey Judge Sheehan’s order to accommodate my disability (see order in file) by allowing me to sit by the door in a small room or interviewing me in a large room with a window. Mr. Albukerk read this order into the record and Judge Ciesil stated “that’s not my understanding.” I am unable to tolerate discussions of the life-threatening and terrifying incidents causing the flashbacks except with these accommodations and end up becoming out of touch with reality, unresponsive, frozen, crying, with a look of terror on my face, often frantically hiding under a table or cowering against a wall.

Please replace her immediately as the judge in that courtroom and quash the arrest warrant, expunge the warrant, and order that the entire $5,000 bond be immediately returned. Judge Ciesil’s order for a warrant and increase in bail is null and void due to judicial error and outrageous conduct.

I and my attorney are initiating ALL appropriate legal actions in response to this outrage and lawlessness with the Illinois Appellate Court, the JIB, and if necessary with the press.

Please respond to this letter ASAP, if not to me to my attorney. Judge Ciesil has illegally harmed me in ways that are too upsetting for me to describe – other than to say I was attacked by a correctional officer after being taken into custody and medically neglected at the CCDOC resulting in hospitalization from the moment I was released on 9/27/07 to 10/2/07 and my health has been damaged. Please contact Mr. Albukerk for details. I have been under treatment by a psychiatrist to help diminish the symptoms of PTSD.

I REFUSE TO APPEAR IN COURTROOM 304 AGAIN UNTIL THIS MENTALLY UNSTABLE, UNETHICAL, LAWLESS, AND DANGEROUS JUDGE IS REPLACED! I will come to court on 10/24/07 but will remain seated outside the courtroom unless I see that there is a different judge on the bench. You may consider this contempt. I CONSIDER THIS MY CIVIC PATRIOTIC DUTY, LIKE THE FOUNDERS OF OUR COUNTRY, TO STAND AGAINST TYRANNY. Judge Ciesil has brought the court into disrepute and is unethically filling up the jail with unfortunate defendants who are five minutes late and have good excuses! Judge Ciesil made knee-jerk, rash, and unethical decisions without reading the file pleadings, orders, or attempting to verify anything. She clearly is biased and assumes all defendants are worthless scum who should be slammed.

Sincerely with utter despair over this tyranny and with utter determination to fight it,

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.

Cc: Chief Judge Evans

Cook County Commissioners

Posted and published on Internet

Attachment:
Mr. Albukerk’s Motion for SOJ for Cause
Pro Se Motion for Forensic Clinical Exam

With reasonable men, I will reason;
with honest men, I will plead;
but to tyrants, I will give no
quarter, nor waste arguments where
they will certainly be lost.

William Lloyd Garrison

In a time of deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.

George Orwell

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT, FIRST MUNICIPAL DISTRICT,
CRIMINAL SECTION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Plaintiff V. LINDA SHELTON, Defendant, Case No 06-221401, Honorable Colleen Sheehan Presiding

MOTION FOR FORENSIC CLINICAL EXAM

NOW COMES, the Defendant, Linda L. Shelton, Pro Se who respectfully requests that this court order a forensic clinical exam of defendant concerning state of mind during alleged act and in support of this motion states as follows:
1. Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct on March 4, 2006 [charges later dismissed] and brought to the 1st District Woman’s lock-up for processing.
2. As she was being released on a personal recognizance bond she was brought out of a cell to her possession, sealed in plastic bags on a table.
3. [Chicago Police Department] Detention Aide Shell ripped open the bags, when defendant was too weak to do so and told her to organize her possessions.
4. As defendant organized her possessions back into her briefcase she noticed her bottle of prednisone, prescribed by a physician. She takes an extra dose of this medication when stressed due to a relative steroid deficiency to prevent an asthma attack and to prevent complications of neurocardiogenic syncope.
5. Defendant opened her bottle and attempted to take a dose of medication.
6. Detention Aide Shell then violently grabbed defendant and body slammed her against the table causing contusions and yelling that she was not allowed to take any medication. Several other aides and/or officers ran at defendant and aided and abetted this felony attack on the handicapped defendant.
7. This caused defendant to attempt to pull away in self-defense and struggle while she yelled to stop assaulting her.
8. Then defendant went into a flashback due to her illness post-traumatic-stress disorder.
9. This illness has resulted from several previous attacks on her by officers at the First District causing injuries and great fear.
10. Defendant remained in this altered state of consciousness and next found herself being dragged to a cell and then beaten in a cell by a female aide or officer. Defendant is unable to remember much of the incident when she was in an altered state of consciousness due to the PTSD.
11. Defendant will use the defenses of self-defense, temporary insanity and outrageous government conduct (due to the history of repeated false arrests, beatings and medical neglect by First District Chicago Police).
12. Defendant is indigent and requires an exam by a forensic psychiatrist regarding the defense of temporary insanity.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Pro Se, respectfully requests this honorable court to
order a psychiatric exam of defendant by Forensic Clinical Services regarding the issue of temporary insanity during this alleged act.

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct.

Dated: October 17, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

Linda L. Shelton

Pro Se Defendant

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