Pro Se Chicago's Weblog

June 26, 2011

Jurors can refuse to convict


The power of a juror is one of the greatest powers a  person can have in the United States.  If they believe a law is unjust they can ignore it and the state can take no action against them. For example:  If a juror believes that marijuana possession should be legal then they can refuse to vote for a guilty verdict in a possession case.

Article about juror power to just say no.

Law  professor’s opinion and detailed long instruction manual for jurors.

I believe that jurors should use their powers more often as a message to our  corrupt police, prosecutors, politicians, and judges in Cook County, IL.

January 19, 2010

Massive federal memorandum of law proving IL Attorney General Lisa Madigan & judges lack immunity – liable for malicious prosecution


The civil rights suit against Lisa Madigan, Jorge Alonso, Kathleen Pantle, John Fearon, Patrick Murray, William Reibel, Patrick Keenan, Nicholas Cozzolino, Julia Lovett, Charlene Wells can be read at this link.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

 

LINDA SHELTON v. ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL LISA MADIGAN et al.

Case Number 06 C 4259

before Honorable Judge Joan H. Lefkow        

MEMORANDUM OF LAW – JURISDICTION

 

                Defendant, Pro Se, respectfully presents to this Honorable Court the following memorandum of law concerning statutes and case law regarding total and complete lack of prosecutorial and judicial jurisdiction of sham prosecutors and judges in this case.

Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity unless they totally lack subject-matter or personal jurisdiction in the case. A judge acting without subject-matter jurisdiction is acting without judicial authority. Cohens v. Virginia,  19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution”, he "comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States." [Emphasis supplied in original].

State officials may be sued as individuals in § 1983 actions. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutors and judges sued in this case totally lacked subject matter jurisdiction and therefore pursued this prosecution and presided over this prosecution without any legal authority as individuals and trespassers of the Constitution of the United States. The sham prosecutors had no constitutional or statutory authority or jurisdiction to bring the Medicaid vendor fraud charge. The court had no subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment was legally insufficient and failed to state a charge, the charges were void as a violation of the Supremacy clause, the charges were void due to vagueness, and therefore there was a total and complete failure to charge a crime.

[The following are the subtitles in the document. See link for full document of 42 pages. A limited number of excerpts are included as follows:]

INDICTMENT LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

            A Judge may not claim jurisdiction by fiat. All orders or judgments issued by a judge in a court of limited jurisdiction must contain the findings of the court showing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, not allegations that the court has jurisdiction. “. . . in a special statutory proceeding an order must contain the jurisdictional findings prescribed by statute.” In re Jennings, 68 Ill.2d 125, 368 N.E.2d 864 (1977) A judge’s allegation that he has subject-matter jurisdiction is only an allegation. Lombard v. Elmore,  134 Ill.App.3d 898, 480 N.E.2d 1329 (1st Dist. 1985), Hill v. Daily, 28 Ill.App.3d 202, 204, 328 N.E.2d 142 (1975). Inspection of the record of the case is the controlling factor. If the record of the case does not support subject-matter jurisdiction, then the judge has acted without subject-matter jurisdiction.  “If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, – it had no authority to make that finding.” The People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) Without the specific finding of jurisdiction by the court in an order or judgment, the order or judgment does not comply with the law and is void. The finding can not be merely an unsupported allegation.

The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. “Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal.” Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,  254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920)

           A court has no jurisdiction where the public policy of the State of Illinois is violated [a crime must be alleged and state ALL the elements of the offense for the complaint to be valid], People v. Meyers, 158 Ill.2d 46, 51 (1994);  Martin-Tregona v. Roderick, 29 Ill.App.3d 553, 331 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1975).

            Courts may not attempt to resolve controversies which are not properly presented to them for, if they should do so, it would violate not only the precepts of Constitutional due process, but would fly in the face of the American tradition of adversary litigation. In Re Custody of Ayala, 344 Ill.3d 574, 800 N.E.2d 524, 534-35 (1st Dis. 2003); Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill.App.3d 701, 637 N.E.2d 633, 639 (1st Dis. 1994); In re Estate of Rice, 77 Ill.App.3d 641, 656-57, 396 N.E.2d 298, 310 (1979)

            The Constitutional source of a circuit court’s jurisdiction does not carry with it a license to act in ways inconsistent with controlling statutory law. In re D.W. (People v. Lisa M.), 214 Ill.2d 289, 827 N.E.2d 466, 480 (Ill. 2005); In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 529, 670 N.E.2d 710, (Ill. 1996), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75, 619 N.E.2d 702, (Ill. 1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.)

            A void judgment, order, or decree is one in which the rendering court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, lacked personnel jurisdiction, lacked the inherent power or authority to make or enter or enforce the particular order involved. In re D.W. (People v. Lisa M.), 214 Ill.2d 289, 827 N.E.2d 466, 480 (Ill. 2005); People v. Thompson, 209 Ill.2d 19, 23, 805 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ill. 2004); Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill.2d 95, 103, 776 N.E.2d 195, (Ill. 2002), quoting Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135, 63 N.E.2d 858 (1945).  A judge should not proceed in any action in which the judge does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, since she has no lawful authority to act. Any acts made without jurisdiction are void.

FRAUD UPON THE COURT BY PROSECUTOR OR COMPLAINANT

INVALIDATES ALL ORDERS OF COURT

            Fraud upon the court in obtaining a complaint, information, or indictment invalidates all orders of the court and causes the case to be null and void ab initio.  “Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to “embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.” Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.”

 It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit “fraud upon the court” vitiates the entire proceeding. People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) (“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions.”); Moore v. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) (“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters …”); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) (“It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything.”); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
        Under Illinois and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed “fraud upon the court”, the orders and judgment resulting from such fraud on that court are void, of no legal force or effect.

In this case the fraud consisted of the Illinois Attorney General fraudulently claiming to have the authority to prosecute vendor fraud without the at least minimal participation and knowledge of the States Attorney of Cook County, the State fraudulently presenting the law to the court and ignoring the Supremacy clause as well as the State Codes and Rules, the State fraudulently claiming Defendant had committed a crime, the State fraudulently claiming that the indictment was legally sufficient, the State fraudulently claiming that the statute of limitations had not run out, the State fraudulently agreeing with the court that Federal Medicaid Code was not applicable in this case of Medicaid vendor fraud,

JUDICIAL TRESPASSERS OF THE LAW

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that "if the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers." Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870)

Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers." Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

The Illinois Supreme Court held that if a court "could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, - it had no authority to make that finding." The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928). The judges listed below had no legal authority (jurisdiction) to hear or rule on certain matters before them. They acted without any jurisdiction.

When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law,and are engaged in treason (see below).

The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse."

When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judge’s orders are void, of no legal force or effect.

By law, a judge is a state officer. The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).

VIOLATION OF JUDGE’S OATH OF OFFICE

In Illinois, 705 ILCS 205/4 states "Every person admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law shall, before his name is entered upon the roll to be kept as hereinafter provided, take and subscribe an oath, substantially in the following form:

'I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability.'"

In Illinois, a judge must take a second oath of office. Under 705 ILCS 35/2 states, in part, that "The several judges of the circuit courts of this State, before entering upon the duties of their office, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, which shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State:

'I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of judge of ______ court, according to the best of my ability.'"

Further, if the judge had enlisted in the U.S. military, then he has taken a third oath. Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 502 the judge had subscribed to a lifetime oath, in pertinent part, as follows: "I, __________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; ...".

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.". Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).

Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.

Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below).

If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.

TREASON BY A JUDGE

Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)

        The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.
        Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

ATTORNEY GENERAL WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION TO

INDEPENDENTLY PROSECUTE VENDOR FRAUD

            Statutes and case law regarding constitutional and statutory authority of Illinois Attorney General do not allow the Illinois Attorney General to prosecute Medicaid Vendor Fraud without the invitation, consent, or participation of the Cook County State’s Attorney.

            The Illinois Constitution, Article V, Section 15 states: “The Attorney General shall be the legal officer of the State, and shall have the duties and powers that may be prescribed by law.”

     15 ILCS 205/4 (from Ch. 14, par. 4) states:

 
“The duties of the Attorney General shall be:

Fourth – To consult with and advise the several State’s Attorneys in matters relating to the duties of their office; and when, in his judgment, the interest of the people of the State requires it, he shall attend the trial of any party accused of crime, and assist in the prosecution…

Fifth – To investigate alleged violations of the statutes which the Attorney General has a duty to enforce and to conduct other investigations in connection with assisting in the prosecution of a criminal offense at the request of a State’s Attorney…”

            People v. Massarella, 53 Ill. App. 3d 774 (1977)” states:

“Although a court may request that the Attorney General act in place of the State’s Attorney if he is sick, absent, uninterested, or unable to attend, Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 14, para. 6 (1973), in the absence of such circumstances, even the court may not substitute one official for the other. Moreover, since the State’s Attorney has the duty to take charge and prosecute all criminal offenses in his county, the attorney general has no power to interfere while that duty is being honestly, intelligently, and carefully discharged.

            Nowhere in the Illinois Statutes does it state that an Attorney General may initiate

and pursue a prosecution, independent of the State’s attorney, in a category of crimes not specifically assigned to the Attorney General by Statute, but which falls under the duties of the State’s attorney according to the following Statute:

55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a) states:

“The duty of each State’s attorney shall be: (1) To commence and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county…”

            The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Massarella, 72 Ill.2d 531, 382 N.E.2d 262 (1978), held that the Illinois Attorney General has authority to prosecute any crime with acquiescence of and absent of objection by State’s Attorney. The key is that the state’s attorney had knowledge of the case and actively acquiesced or failed to make an objection. It also held that the Illinois Attorney General has authority to appear before the grand jury without prior approval of the State’s Attorney.

            In People v. Buffalo Confectionery Co., 78 Ill.2d 447, 36 Ill.Dec. 705, 401 N.E.2d

546 (1980) the Illinois Supreme Court, under common law, found that “duties of the Attorney General…include the initiation and prosecution of litigation on behalf of the people.” They state that this power “may be exercised concurrently with the power of the State’s Attorney to initiate and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments, and prosecutions in his county as conferred by statute.”

However, they also ruled that the State’s Attorney is the only official whom by statute can initiate and prosecute criminal charges in that county (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 14, § 5) and that the Illinois Constitution gives the Attorney General only the “duties and powers that may be prescribed by law.” They also ruled that the statutes prescribe the Attorney General’s duties to include to “attend…and assist in the prosecution.” (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 14 § 4). Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that:

As we have previously stated, the aforementioned duties and powers of the two officers are concurrent. Thus, the Attorney General lacks the power to take exclusive charge of the prosecution of those cases over which the State’s Attorney shares authority. (People v. Flynn (1941), 375 Ill. 366, 368, 31 N.E.2d 591.) However, where the statute so provides, the Attorney General has exclusive authority to institute and prosecute. See, e.g., Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 120 par. 453.16 (Cigarette Tax Act prosecution); Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch 38, par. 60-6 (Illinois Antitrust Act prosecution). [They explained that since Illinois Revenue Laws do NOT give the Illinois Attorney General exclusive authority to prosecute violation of revenue laws, the Illinois Attorney General may NOT prosecute these violations without the acquiescence of the State’s Attorney – in the revenue violation case in Buffalo Confectionery Co., the State’s Attorney was deemed to have acquiesced because he had been named to the grand jury, he had signed the indictments, he had attended the arraignments and he had filed certain pretrial discovery motions.)

They also found that an indictment is not invalidated because the Illinois Attorney General appears before the grand jury without approval of the State’s Attorney.

            The court then stated that there was no statute prescribing the duties of the Attorney General to include prosecuting revenue claims to the exclusion of the State’s Attorney. (People v. Buffalo Confectionery, Co., Ibid at page 549 [4].) Analogously, in the above captioned case, there is no state statute that grants the Attorney General exclusive authority to prosecute cases of CRIMINAL vendor fraud. The statutes do however, proscribe the duties of the Attorney General to include exclusive prosecution of CIVIL vendor fraud. (305 ILCS 5/8A-7I.)

            In Buffalo Confectionery, Co. (Ibid at page 548) the court noted that in that case the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) told the grand jury that he had obtained permission of a named Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) to prosecute the case. The named ASA was present at the arraignment and filed a motion for pretrial discovery. The signature of the Cook County State’s Attorney appeared on the indictment. In the case at bar the AAG told the grand jury he had permission of the State’s Attorney, but does not name any such person. The ASA has not appeared at any hearing or before the grand jury in this case and has filed no motions. A signature stamp for SA Richard Divine on the indictment is the only documentation of involvement of the state’s attorney. This signature stamp does not verify that ANY person from the State’s Attorney’s office ever was consulted about this case, was shown evidence  about this case, decided what charges should be filed, and consented to the prosecution of this case by the Attorney General with exclusion of ANY involvement of the State’s Attorney in this case.

            In Buffalo Confectionery, Co. (Ibid at page 548 and 550) the court noted that there was an “obvious acquiescence by the State’s Attorney”, who was present at the arraignment and made a motion for pretrial discovery. In that case, it was clear that the State’s Attorney had considered the case and had decided to allow the AAG to proceed with prosecution without the ASA.

            In, Shelton v. Brown, 126 S.Ct. 51, 163 L.Ed.2d 472, certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed with Cook County State’s Attorney Dick Devine stated in his Illinois Appellate Court response brief page 12,

“It is clear that in Illinois, even the Attorney General, a constitutionally created prosecuting office, cannot invade the exclusive jurisdiction of the State’s Attorney to bring charges absent some evidence of abuse by the state’s attorney, or a conflict of interest.

            This issue in this case was whether or not citizens can file criminal complaints with the court clerk, without the approval or signature of police or the state’s attorney. The clerk had refused to accept criminal complaints by Shelton against corrupt State and County officials, including the State’s Attorney and police. The Appellate Court ruled that this refusal was proper and that citizens had no standing to file such complaints. The reasoning agreed with Cook County State’s Attorney Richard Divine who opined that the Attorney General has no statutory authority to indict and prosecute a person absent consent and participation of the State’s Attorney. This is binding precedent, so much so that any criminal prosecution of vendor fraud by the AG is null and void if the AG did not have the invitation, consent, and participation or acquiescence of the SA.

            This position was later re-iterated in People v Dosaky,  303 Ill.App.3d 986, 709 N.E.2d 635 Ill.App. 1 Dist., 1999, where the court ruled:

Attorney General lacks the power to take exclusive charge of the prosecution of those cases over which the State’s Attorney shares authority, but is authorized to consult with and advise the several State’s Attorneys and attend the trial of any party accused of a crime and assist in the prosecution.

            Illinois statutes and case law are explicit in that an Attorney General, in Illinois, can only initiate and prosecute a criminal offense if they are invited to do so by the states attorney and the states attorney participates at hearings and at trial, if the State’s Attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, taken some initial steps towards prosecution and acquiesces to the Illinois Attorney General prosecuting without the State’s Attorney’s participation, or if statutory authority is granted, as it is in CIVIL prosecution of vendor fraud (after approval by OIG-DHHS), in certain environmental crimes or in certain cases involving drug crimes  and other statutorily specified crimes.

            Medicaid vendor fraud is not such a special statutory category subject to independent and exclusive prosecution by the Attorney General and cannot be criminally prosecuted by the Illinois Attorney General without the written approval of the OIG-DHHS and the request, and at least initial participation of the States Attorney, after the State’s Attorney has evaluated the evidence and determined which offense with which offender should be charged.

            More recently, in People v. Knippenberg, 325 Ill.App.3d 251, 757 N.E.2d 667 Ill. App. 3 Dist., 2001, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the “Attorney General has exclusive authority to initiate and prosecute cases only when a statute so provides.”

            The court in People v. Mitchell, 1971, 131 Ill.App.2d 347, 268 N.E.2d 232 states:

It is the responsibility of State’s attorney of county to appraise evidence against accused and determine offense with which he should be charged.

The court in People v Rhodes, 1967, 38 Ill.2d 389, 231 N.E.2d 400 states:

 

State’s attorney as a representative of the people has responsibility of evaluating evidence and other pertinent factors and determining what offense can properly and should properly be charged.

Therefore, without a specific statute giving the Illinois Attorney General authority to exclusively prosecute criminal Medicaid vendor fraud, the Illinois Attorney General may not prosecute anyone including Defendant in case at bar if there has been no review of evidence by the State’s Attorney, no determination of the charges by the State’s Attorney, no initial participation by the State’s Attorney, and no acquiescence by the State’s Attorney.

            Without the authority of the Attorney General to prosecute the charges, the charges were not properly before the court and the case was void ab initio.

PROSECUTORS ACTING OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THEIR PROSECUTORIAL DUTIES DO NOT ENJOY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

            The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals in McGhee v. Pottawattamie Co., 547 F.3d 922 (2008) ruled that malicious and willful acts to fabricate  probable cause are substantive due process violations and subject the prosecutor who fabricated probable cause to liability under § 1983. This is because the United States Supreme Court in Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) took a functional approach as to the role of a prosecutor. If his acts were not intimately tied to the prosecution of the case, but were tied to the investigation, the prosecutor was not immune. This is consistent with Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428, 430 (1971) where the court held that prosecutors are absolutely immune for acts intimately tied to the prosecution.

            In this case prosecutorial absolute immunity does not attach to a prosecutor who never had statutory or constitutional authority to prosecute the alleged crime; does not attach to an Illinois Police investigator prior to the charging of the crime; does not attach to Illinois Medicaid Office of Inspector General nurses serving as investigators; does not attach to Defendant AAG Murray who served as an investigator gathering evidence and later joined the prosecution team; and does not attach to an Attorney General or her staff who willingly and intentionally ignore Illinois Code and Rules as well as Federal Medicaid Code in order to bring false charges to whistle blowers, who are witnesses to their corruption, as is Defendant and the persons the Illinois Attorney General have prosecuted for Medicaid Vendor fraud using virtually identical fraudulent indictments, using the same investigator and witnesses (Inv. Reibel and Lovett), and fraudulently presenting the same false information about the law to the multiple grand juries. These persons have included Dr. Maisha Hamilton Bennett, Vernon Glass, M.S., and Naomi Jennings R.N., as well as Plaintiff.

            Therefore, the Illinois Attorney General, her staff, and her investigators are not immune from liability.

VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

            It is impermissible to prosecute a person, per due process requirements, for a crime if it relies on a vague, ambiguous, or conflicting legal requirement. As the Seventh Circuit Court recently emphasized in Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000), criminal penalties require a “high degree of clarity.” Id. at 908. A year earlier, the Seventh Circuit Court also held:

The vagueness doctrine holds that a person cannot be held liable for conduct he     could not reasonably have been expected to know was a violation of law.  It is well-settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions is void for vagueness. [United States v. Brierton, 165 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (7th Cir. 1999) (as amended)]

            The Supreme Court has emphasized this same principle on numerous occasions. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court held that:

The constitutional requirements of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonable understand to be proscribed. [Id.at 617 (citations omitted)]

See also Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 229 (1985) (reversing a conviction because “Congress has not spoken with the requisite clarity” and affirming the “‘time-honored interpretive guideline’ that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity’”) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) and United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812), inner quotations omitted.)

            Even if the Illinois regulation per the Administrative Code is upheld to deny reimbursement for these counseling services to the poor, all defendants in any similar vendor fraud cases indictments and prosecutions cannot be sustained amid the uncertainty and vagueness created by the federal-state conflict. Indictment and prosecution of any defendant under a similar theory to this case of substitute billing run afoul of the Seventh Circuit Court’s holdings in Gresham and Brierton, and the Supreme Court precedents following Harriss.

            “It is well known that ‘no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.’” United States v. Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897 (E.D. Pa Sept. 5, 2001). *12 (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey,  306 U.S. 451 (1939)). The Ward court then detailed the rigorous threshold test necessary for criminalizing conduct in the regulatory arena:

Especially where a regulation subjects a private party to criminal sanctions, ‘a regulation cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but did not           adequately express.’ Diamond Roofing Co., Inc. v OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir 1976). As Bethlehem Steel made clear, ‘if the language is faulty, the Secretary has the means and obligation to amend.’ [Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897, *19 – *19 (quoting Bethlehem Steel v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 573 F.2d 157, 161 (3rd Cir. 1978)).]

            The Ward Court cited a legion of precedents requiring dismissal of the indictment, which likewise require dismissal of the indictment in the vendor fraud case against Plaintiffs. “[I]t is our view that courts should not defer to an agency’s informal interpretation of an ambiguous statute or regulation in a criminal case.” Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897, *22. See United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987),

In the criminal context, courts have traditionally required greater clarity in draftsmanship than in civil contexts, commensurate with the bedrock principle that in a free country citizens who are potentially subject to criminal sanctions should have clear notice of the behavior that may cause sanctions to be visited upon them.[;]

See also United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc.,  132 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of indictment because the conduct was not clearly forbidden by the regulations); United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 (2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994) (in criminal cases, “a court will not be persuaded by cases urging broad interpretation of a regulation in the civil-penalty context”). See also, United States v. Whiteside, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4610, *18 – *19 (11th Cir. Mar. 22, 2002) (“The government cannot meet its burden in this case because, despite its contention to the contrary, no Medicare regulation, administrative ruling, or judicial decision exists that clearly “proscribes defendants’ conduct.)

            The indictments in the vendor fraud case against defendant and all defendants in similar cases fail to cite violation of any binding federal rule. Accordingly, the indictments directly contravene Supreme Court teaching in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and over 150 decisions that have relied on it. Defendant and similarly situated defendants in other cases administered much-needed services to the poor under the federally funded Medicaid program, in full compliance with all applicable federal laws and formal regulations. It is contrary to Christensen and its progeny to sustain Defendant’s and similarly situated defendants’ indictments for conduct that did not violate any clear and binding rules.

            The Medicaid program has been recognized to constitute one of the most complex and intractable regulatory systems in our country. See Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265 (1982) Burger, J., dissenting) (observing that ‘the Medicaid program is a morass of bureaucratic complexity.”) Medicaid generally provides the lowest level of reimbursement, and requires treatment of the most ill and difficult patients. Physicians who participate in the low-paying Medicaid program should not be imprisoned based on a game of “gotcha”. See United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d at 1132 (“If the obligation . . . is sufficiently in doubt, willfulness is impossible as a matter of law, and the ‘defendant’s actual intent is irrelevant.’”) (citing Garber, 607 F.2d at 98, quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974)). Indictment and/or conviction of Medicaid physicians based on regulatory gamesmanship is both unjust to defendants and catastrophic to the needy patients, because it drives small practitioners out of Medicaid.  Courts are increasingly dismissing these types of fraud charges against physicians, and dismissal is appropriate in the vendor fraud case against Plaintiffs. See, e.g State v. Vainio, 2001 MT 220, 35 P.3d 948 (Mont. 2001) (reversing a Medicaid conviction because it was based on an improperly promulgated state regulation); Siddiqi v. United States, 98 F.3d 1427, 1429 (2nd Cir. 1996) (reversing Medicare fraud convictions for “claim[s] for services rendered by somebody else”); id. at 1438 (“It takes no great flash of genius to conclude that something is wrong somewhere.”)

            The vendor fraud case against Defendant and similarly situated defendants is void for vagueness, similar to the Siddiqu and the Vainio cases as explained in the precedent setting and controlling cases such as Harriss, Gresham, and Brierton. “Void for vagueness” means criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. Chandler, 66 F. 3d 1460 (8th Cir. 1995) The vendor fraud case against Defendant and similarly situated defendants clearly falls under the void for vagueness doctrine and should have been dismissed ab initio. Therefore, the trial court never had subject matter jurisdiction.

SUBSTITUTE BILLING NOT A CRIME

Alleged vendor fraud crime outside of statutory authority and

barred by Supremacy Clause

            This is not a matter of an unconstitutional statute. There is no statute or administrative rule in Illinois barring this allegedly criminal act of substitute billing in the case at bar as fraudulently charged. This act is specifically authorized by the federal Medicaid Code, Federal Code of Regulations, State Statutes, and State Administrative Code. Therefore, this case is a matter of enforcing federal code, which is being violated by this fraudulent prosecution, and not a matter of constitutionality of a state statute.

FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES FUNDING OF NON-PHYSICIAN EMPLOYEES OF

PHYSICIANS SERVICES TO THE POOR

 SUMMARY

            In summary, a prosecutor who acts without State or Constitutional authority as a prosecutor, who then generates legally insufficient indictments, using illegally impaneled grand juries, to charge a person with a crime despite the Supremacy clause providing that the act is NOT a crime under federal law, and the fact that the charge is void due to vagueness has failed to state a claim and is not properly before the trial court. The sham prosecutor, her assistants, and their investigators are acting as individuals without legal authority and are all personally liable under § 1983 and state tort law.

            All judge who act on such an indictment, despite the fact it was not properly before the court, especially when they ignore extensive motions by the defendant about these issues, are committing acts of treason and are grossly violating their oaths of office as well as the United States and Illinois Constitutions.

            Therefore, none of the Defendants in this case are immune from liability as prosecutors or judges.

Respectfully submitted by:

__________________________                               

Linda L. Shelton, Pro Se                                           


[1] People v. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d 724 (1996): The defendant was charged by information with disorderly conduct based on transmitting a false report of sexual misconduct to the Department of Children and Family Services. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 727. The reviewing court held that the information was insufficient because it did not specify the contents of the false report, and basic fairness required the State to identify the allegedly false statements. Foxall, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 727.

Davis: The reviewing court found that the indictment was insufficient when the defendant was charged with official misconduct based on “disseminat[ing] information,” but the indictment did not identify the contents of the alleged communication. Davis, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 990.

People v. Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d 124 (1990): The reviewing court held that a complaint that charged defendant with resisting a police officer was insufficient when the complaint stated that the officer was engaged in the execution of his official duties but did not identify the authorized act the officer was performing. Stoudt, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 128.

People v. Leach, 279 N.E.2d 450 (Ill.App.1st, 1972): The defendant in Leach was charged with resisting or obstructing a police officer. The charging instrument was insufficient because it only stated that the defendant committed the above offense by knowingly obstructing a police officer. Id. at 453-454

United States v. Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir, 2003): The indictment was insufficient because it failed to specify the nature of the scheme used by the defendant to defraud the State of Alabama and the United States.

United States v. Nance, 533 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir., 1976): The indictment was insufficient because it failed to apprise the defendant of the nature of the false pretenses by which the defendant gained unauthorized control over money.

People v. Gerdes, 527 N.E.2d 1310 (Ill.App.5th, 1988): The defendant in Gerdes was charged with obstructing justice by giving false information to the police. The charging instrument did not specify the nature of the allegedly false information. The defendant was therefore left to wonder which of many statements to the police the basis for the charge against him was, so the appellate court dismissed the indictment. Id. 

June 10, 2009

Sample Appeal of Wrongful Conviction


I have now filed my Illinois Appellate Court appeal of my wrongful conviction for aggravated battery of a correctional officer. Sgt. Anthony Salemi had attacked me, falsified his records, committed perjury, and with the help of Nifong-like prosecutorial misconduct of ASAs Andrew Dalkin and John Maher and extreme judicial misconduct by Judge Joseph Kazmierski, I was convicted and sentenced to two years in the Illinois Dept. of Corrections plus one year of mandatory supervised release.

I served the minimum 6 months and the full supervised release and was not able to appeal due to illegal conduct of staff at the Cook County Dept. of Corrections and Illinois Dept. of Corrections where I was held and due to damage to my health requiring several hospitalizations within the last year since my release on March 27, 2008 from prison. The damage to my health was a result of torture at the CCDOC and IDOC by ignorant, sociopathic, poorly trained officers and incompetent medical staff (with the exception of Dr. Baker). The social workers even told me they purposely were told not to allow me to use the law library. My medications were withheld in illegal acts of willful indifference to medical needs.

I have informed the FBI and asked them to prosecute for felony conspiracy to violate rights under color of law, etc.

I will never forget the comment to me at CCDOC by Sgt. Molevetti “We got you on one made charge so I can write anything I want and get you on another.” Officer Levy said the same thing. It appears that falsification of records is common practice at CCDOC. We need to take him down and jail him too!

As soon as I win this one, the mother of all civil rights suits will be filed against these creeps. Any officer who has aided and abetted this wrongful conviction is a target in my book to be arrested, removed as an officer, and jailed for felony conspiracy to violate rights under color of law under federal law.

I strongly suggest that ANY officer or CCDOC staff who has knowledge about this wrongful conviction march over to the FBI on Roosevelt Road, ask for a duty agent and confess and turn in the corupt officers and sergeants. The time is NOW to clean up the CCDOC and get rid of decayed and dead wood! If you don’t turn them in, you are part of the corruption and are condoning it! I have no sympathy for you!

You can read my appeal and the evidence of innocence and Sgt. Salemi’s guilt along with the incomptence of Inv. Sofus, as well as the prosecutorial misconduct at: Appeal-of-Wrongful-Conviction-Battery-Shelton-Illinois-2009

Note that the appeal exceeds the 50 pages allowed by the Appellate Court. I have written a motion for leave to file this 82 page appeal due to the extreme prosecutorial and judicial misconduct resulting in 18 different issues justifying appeal and overturning verdict.

Note that the appendix has case law on spoilation of or failure to produce critical evidence, self-representation, and insufficient indictments – all what I have already posted on this site elsewhere.

October 25, 2008

Defendant Arrested for Pretending to be “Counsel” [Attorney Code 99500 = Pro Se Counsel]


In C[r]ook County Circuit Court, Dishonorable Judge Thomas Donnelly and the C[r]ook County State’s Attorney Devine have charged a pro se defendant with fraudulently presenting himself as an attorney because at the bottom of a pleading he wrote the attorney code 99500.  Court Clerk Dorothy Brown’s office uses this code to designate pro se counsel. The appearance form which is filed in every case in the Court’s Law Division specifically states that the “attorney code” for “pro se” = 99500. Someone needs to inform the judges about this. Divine and Donnelly should have their ignorant, incompetent faces plastered all over the press for this one.  When this case is resolved I’ll add to this post.

Please help Mr. Moore by writing and complaining to:
Hon. Timothy C. Evans
Chief Judge Circuit Court of Cook County
50 W. Washington, Rm 2600
Chicago, IL 60602

Hon. E. Kenneth Wright
Presiding Judge Municipal 1
Circuit Court of Cook County
50 W. Washington, Rm 1303
Chicago, IL 60602

States Attorney Richard Divine
Cook County States Attorney
50 W. Washington, Rm 500
Chicago, IL 60602

Please inform the press and urge them to cover this story! It proves how incompetent, corrupt, and unethical is our states attorney. It proves that he wastes government money harassing activists and whistle blowers such as myself and Mr. Moore.

October 21, 2008

More Outrageous Conduct Judge Maria Kuriakos Ciesil and Judge Angela Petrone


Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.

                                                                                                October 8, 2008

 

Honorable Judge E. Kenneth Wright, Jr.

Presiding Judge

First Municipal District

Circuit Court of Cook County

1303 Richard J Daley Center

50 W. Washington

Chicago, IL  60602

 

            IN RE: Outrageous and illegal conduct of Judge Maria Kuriakos Ciesil

 

Dear Honorable Judge Wright:

 

            She’s done it again and you failed to address my issues from previous complaints. Dishonorable J. Ciesil charged an acquaintance of mine, Mr XXX, with impersonating an attorney because he wrote on a pleading the attorney code 99500. Please inform DisHon. J. Ciesil that this number is the CLERK”S CODE FOR PRO SE COUNSEL! Please remove Ciesil from her misdemeanor courtroom and re-assign her to traffic court. Better yet! Remove her from the bench. Also be aware that Mr. XXX is a legal savant – in that he knows more law than any judge I know or attorney. His writings are excessively verbose, religious, and poorly formatted, but his knowledge is formidable. DisHon. J. Ciesil is an arrogant, incompetent, knee-jerk talk before thinking, stuck-on-herself, IDIOT!

 

Some one needs to tell her a judge is NOT omnipotent, a judge SHALL follow the law, a judge SHALL treat ALL litigants with RESPECT, raising bail from $1000 I-Bond on two cases to $25,000 D-Bond on two cases is EXCESSIVE –especially when it was totally unjustified, if a litigant brings up an issue which she may not be aware of like the number 99500, or the fact that my hearing on September 26, 2007 was scheduled at 10:00 a.m. and not 9:00 a.m., and that an attorney is an officer of the court and a judge SHALL NOT refuse to honor his word!

 

I will be filing 1401 Petitions in the cases that involved DisHon. J. Ciesil to dismiss my cases Nunc Pro Tunc as the judges refused to hear my motions to dismiss, and then later dismissed my cases by motion of State nolle prosequi. The nolle prosequi was based on a FRAUDULENT statement by the State that they enhanced my sentence on a felony conviction using these cases. I will also be filing, due to this fraud, a Petition for Adjudication of Criminal Contempt against the State’s Attorney and a Petition to Strike this fraudulent statement from the record. This fraudulent statement prevents me from filing a suit for unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution because it fraudulently makes it look like the case was NOT dismissed in my favor. A dismissal on my legitimate motions nunc pro tunc would solve this problem. If the court denies these petitions, they WILL be appealed to the IL Supreme Court and great publicity will follow.

 

I am aware that you have returned DisHon. J. Ciesil to the bench at 555 Harrison. BIG MISTAKE! She HAS NOT CHANGED!. Her arrogance and incompetence remains. SHE WILL RECUSE HERSELF ON MY PETITIONS. YOU WILL ACT APPROPRIATELY THIS TIME AND MAKE SURE THAT THE ORDERS TO TAKE ME INTO CUSTODY AND RAISE BAIL TO $25,000 X 2 FROM SEPT. 26, 2007 ARE STRICKEN AND VACATED AND THAT AN ORDER IS ISSUED TO THE CLERK TO RETURN THE $250 SHE RETAINED FROM THE BOND!

 

In addition, I am filing a 1401 Petition for the case from an arrest of me on October 10, 2007 where I was falsely arrested for trespass to state supported land when deputies at 555 Harrison said I bypassed security when entering the building. The video clearly shows me successfully going through security.  DisHon. J. Petrone REFUSED TO LOOK AT THE VIDEO! The Judge on the bench for my soon to be filed petition WILL VIEW THE VIDEO, VACATE THE DISMISSAL NOLLE PROSEQUI, HEAR MY MOTION TO DISMISS, AND DISMISS THE CASE NUNC PRO TUNC FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE.  Failure to act fairly and with justice as described will result in bad press and Complaints to the IL Supreme Court.

 

The judges in C[r]ook County make me PUKE!  WE WILL NO LONGER STAND FOR THIS INJUSTICE. A BARAGE OF LEGAL ACTIONS AND INTERNET POSTINGS ARE INEVITABLE UNLESS WE OBTAIN JUST REMEDIES TO OUR GRIEVANCES!  I am also in discussions with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The sum total of this misconduct, along with the misconduct of DisHon. J. Maddux in illegally denying indigency petitions and in presiding over the illegal black line system where cases are DWP without legal notice and where Law Division cases are assigned to two judges simultaneously without legal authority, in our opinion now arises to the level of federal felony conspiracy to violate rights under color of law. This HAS TO BE EXPOSED TO THE PUBLIC AND PROSECUTED BY THE FEDS.

 

            I’ve started a new Internet Blog – IllinoisCorruption.blogspot.com. She will be prominently profiled in great detail under the category “Corrupt Judges”, as I have already posted her misconduct on a web site “Rumor Mill News Agency Reading Room” under the title: “Corrupt, Incompetent, Wacko, C[r]ook County Circuit Court Judges.” If you want expanded publicity for these kind of judges in Illinois and your refusal to deal with them appropriately, then do nothing and I will act not only in the press, but with Supreme Court Complaints for Supervisory Action. The Pro Se Community/Club in Chicago is no longer willing to stand by and watch the result of the “Myth of American Justice.”

 

            I always am willing to listen to reasonable options.  You as presiding judge have certain powers to discipline judges and force justice to prevail. Failure to do so is an administrative liability. I suggest that the judges in the misdemeanor courtroom at 555 Harrison and at Kedzie and Harrison recall my cases sue sponte and vacate their orders as outlined above. This may be a start to having a meeting of the minds. The case numbers of my cases are: 2007- 5-000072-01,   2007-1-206817-01,  2007-1-272967-01,  2007-5-000072-01, and 2006-1-221401-01. Some were not in Municipal 1.  ALL WERE UNLAWFUL ARRESTS, MALICIOUS PROSECUTIONS, WHERE POLICE LIED AND FALSIFIED RECORDS, AND WERE RETALIATORY FOR MY WHISTLE BLOWER ACTIVITES! As a handicapped individual, I was abused, beaten black and blue by bullies and sociopathic officers in the Sheriff’s and police departments, and medically neglected to the point of requiring medical care.

 

I now have one wrongful conviction for felony battery to an officer. My doctors testified that I am PHYSICALLY UNABLE to have committed the crime of kicking an officer in the chest due to my physical disabilities stemming from a congenital spinal cord injury and other illnesses. The gross judicial misconduct of DisHon. J. Kazmierski and the Nifong-like prosecutorial misconduct of SA Andrew Dalkin and John Maher will be exposed, has been posted on the Internet, will be in my book entitled “The Myth of American Justice” and is the basis of my appeal to overturn the verdict. I was sentenced to two years in IDOC and recently was released – an unconstitutional and illegal sentence by a malicious and dishonorable judge in violation of the U.S .Supreme Court decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) and Illinois Statutes. I was tortured in prison in the most unbelievable and sick ways. This will be exposed.

 

 My life has been destroyed. My health has been damaged. My family and patients have been irreparably harmed. I WILL BE VINDICATED, COMPENSATED, AND THE TRUE CRIMINALS (corrupt, arrogant, incompetent, negligent, and malicious government officials, police, judges, and prosecutors who have unclean hands) WILL BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. THIS IS GROSSLY UNCONSCIOUNABLE AND FOR THE COURTS TO CONDONE THIS IS AN OUTRAGE. Those of you who condone, or aid and abet this grotesque and unethical system WILL BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PUBLIC, IN THE PRESS, AND IN THE COURTS! I and our group have endless patience, tenacity, skill, and resolve.

 

Please enjoy reading the Internet about corrupt Illinois judges:

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=105561

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=106578

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=106967

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=108546

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=108548

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=110067

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=110069

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=110070

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=110980

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=111013

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=111017

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?noframes;read=111038

 

http://www.rumormillnews.com/cgi-bin/forum.cgi?/noframe;read=123330

 

 

 

 

 

 

            Thank you for your consideration of these matters. I’m simply informing you so you cannot claim ignorance. I expect nothing from this criminal enterprise of which you are a player.

 

                       

                                                Sincerely with disgust and despair over this tyranny,

 

 

                                                Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.

 

Cc:

Chief Judge Evans

Cook County Commissioners

FBI

Posted and published on Internet

 

 

 

 

 

October 17, 2008

Lawless, Corrupt, Incompetent, Wacko C[r]ook County Judge Kuriakos Ciesil Jails Defendent for Being 40 min Early for Hearing


Despite the following letter to the presiding judge of Municipal 1 District of the Circuit Court of Cook County, the only action taken was to temporarilty re-assign Judge Ciesil. I will petition the court post-trial to vacate all her orders which were illegal and refund the 10% of the bond money held by the Clerk for costs after bond was refunded. I should not have to pay for the gross judicial misconduct of Dishonorable Judge Ciesel.

October 4, 2007 LETTER

Honorable Judge E. Kenneth Wright, Jr.
Presiding Judge
First Municipal District
Circuit Court of Cook County
1303 Richard J Daley Center
50 W. Washington
Chicago, IL 60602

IN RE: Outrageous and illegal conduct of Judge Maria Kuriaskos Ciesil

Dear Honorable Judge Wright:

I am writing to you to inform you of the inappropriate, unethical, and frankly lawless conduct of Judge Ciesil and ask for your immediate intervention by removing her from any duties on the bench involving defendants and reassigning her to a desk job until she is completely evaluated by you and perhaps the JIB. This should include a psychiatric examination because her behavior and rulings are so inappropriate and bizarre that it must be considered that she has a severe personality disorder making her unable to make fair judgments and causing her to boost her ego by irrational attacks against defendants and attorneys. If she is found not to be unfit for duty then, at the very least, you should order direct and constant supervision and tutoring by a senior judge for at least 3 months before she is allowed to return to the bench unsupervised.

I am a defendant in several misdemeanor cases as a result of retaliation against me by corrupt county and state officials, as well as a result of police brutality and unlawful arrests. In Branch 46, before Judge Sheehan, I was able without an attorney to have six (6) bogus cases dismissed against me. As you know, I at first was before Judge Ballard, who proved to have inappropriate conduct (being in great need of training on demeanor, the law, judicial procedure, etc.) and you have reassigned him elsewhere.

Judge Sheehan replaced Judge Ballard on my cases. She is an outstanding judge, who is intellectually honest, attempts to be unbiased and fair, does not show preference to the prosecution, treats defendants with respect assuming they are innocent until proven guilty, clearly follows the rulings of higher courts, takes a step back and does not make knee-jerk decisions when she is unsure of the law during a hearing, and has potential to be one of the finest judges on the bench in the Circuit Court of Cook County because her demeanor, actions, and ethics are of the highest judicial level, besides the fact that her IQ is clearly very high.

Then when Judge Sheehan was reassigned to juvenile court there has been a succession of judges on my remaining two cases in branch 46. One Judge, Kenneth Fletcher also proved to be unfortunately ignorant of the law and inappropriate. I wrote a motion for SOJ for cause and he recused himself.

Judge Katz replaced him and his conduct was very appropriate and judicial. All the judges have been ordering that my pretrial hearings be held at either 11:00 a.m. or 10:00 a.m., because I have brought up motions that are quite advanced legally, appropriate, and challenging to the court.

Almost every continuance was set for 10:00 a.m. or later. I have throughout all these cases always arrived early to court or on time except for several days where I was hospitalized. My attorney, J. Nicolas Albukerk (I have decided to allow donors to pay for an attorney on my remaining cases as my health has deteriorated and the stress of representing myself is now too much), instructed me to meet him at 9:30 a.m. outside courtroom 304 at 555 Harrison St. My attorney told me this court date was at the usual time and I should be outside the court by 9:30 to talk with him. On 9/26/07 I arrived in the area around 9:00 a.m. and was unable to find a parking space at a meter due to construction in the surrounding area. I therefore parked in the lot next to the courthouse. I avoid parking there because of financial difficulties and I don’t want to keep borrowing money to pay the parking fees. I cannot take public transportation due to my disabilities [severe reactions to perfumes and fumes]. I walk with a cane due to spinal problems.

I arrived in the courthouse around 9:15 a.m. and up to the courtroom at 9:20 a.m. There were no seats in the courtroom so I sat on the bench outside of court. There was a crowd outside the courtroom including about six CPD officers. I had a pleasant conversation with one of them. At about 9:40 a.m. Sgt. Rankus came out of the courtroom and asked me where was my attorney, that the “judge wanted to call my case.” I told her that he had two other cases in 401 and 404 and he told me to wait for him. She told me to go find him and I slowly walked to the fourth floor and was unable to find him. I arrived back at courtroom 304 about 5-10 minutes later and went in and sat on a bench in the gallery because a seat had opened up and Sgt. Rankus was telling everyone to come into the courtroom.

After several other cases were called, my case was called and I stood up in the gallery and told the judge that Mr. Albukerk was involved in several other cases upstairs and told me to ask for the judge to hold my case until he arrived. Judge Ciesil very firmly told me to come stand before the bench. I did that. Then she took a paper out of one of the files and announced that she had issued an arrest warrant because I “was late” and told the Sheriff to execute the warrant. She raised my bail on each of the two cases from a $1,000 I-Bond to $25,000 D-Bond (total of $50,000 D-Bond)! This is an outrageous and unconstitutional excessive bail, especially for a disabled, indigent person!

I was stunned. She didn’t want to listen to a word I said and was very rude. She did not ask for any explanation or attempt to discuss the issue. I rapidly and frantically told her that my hearing was not scheduled until 10:00 a.m. and that I was not late, while the deputies were trying to drag me to the lock-up. I told her I arrived at 9:20 a.m. and had a conversation with a CPD officer in the hall [these 6 or so officers were seated in the courtroom in the front row of seats] as the courtroom had no seats available. I told her Sgt. Rankus had told me to find my attorney. I pleaded with the CPD officers and Sgt. Rankus to speak up and they remained silent. The judge was OBLIGATED to question the officers, read the file, which details that almost every other court date started at 10:00 a.m. or later. Instead she yelled that her court starts at 9:00 a.m. and that she had issued the warrant at 9:05 a.m. because I was “late”. She made NO EFFORT to read the previous file orders or to contact Judge Katz.

I was taken to the lock-up and not allowed to use medication. I have been fighting a virus for a week and asthma attacks that are not well controlled. I had been in the emergency room at Mt. Sinai Hospital all day on 9/21/07 with a severe asthma attack. I then went into an asthma attack and the deputies called an ambulance and I was taken to the U. of I. ER in custody and remained there under treatment until about 5:00 p.m., when I was returned to 555 Harrison lock-up and then transported to CCDOC.

My attorney arrived as I was being transported by the paramedics out of the courthouse, in custody, accompanied by several deputies, fully restrained [in a wheelchair]. I was released on bond from the jail at 3:00 a.m. and immediately, at the exit to the CCDOC had someone call an ambulance, which took me back to the hospital because I was so ill. I was unable to attend the hearing ordered by Judge Ciesil the next day, 9/27/07 at 9:00 a.m. because I had to be hospitalized and was released from the hospital on 10/2/07. My attorney has written a motion for Substitution of Judge for Cause which is attached and was filed the next day when he appeared on my behalf before Judge Ciesil.

Mr. Albukerk, my attorney, told me that after I was removed by paramedics as he arrived at court, Judge Ciesil refused to read the court file to see that the other dates were at 10:00 a.m. or later, so he read them into the record. He said the judge refused to quash the warrant and threatened him with contempt. He said he stepped back from the bench, put his hands behind his back and stated firmly to her that he was fully prepared to be taken into custody if the Judge thought that pointing out the truth and making arguments constituted contempt.

Please contact Mr. Albukerk at 773 847-2600 for further details. He told me that on 9/27/07 Judge Ciesil refused to transfer the case to you and insisted she would do nothing until I appeared in her courtroom, setting the next status date for 10/24/07 at 9:00 a.m. Judge Ciesil’s interaction with Mr. Albukerk is so unbelievable and outrageous that you cannot ignore it. Mr. Albukerk is writing an amended SOJ for cause motion, to include a lot more of what happened and it is all too astonishing to explain indirectly. Please get the facts directly form Mr. Albukerk and from the transcripts, which he has ordered and should be available shortly.

Mr. Albukerk also stated to me that Judge Ciesil used also as an excuse to issue the arrest warrant that I had refused to cooperate with a limited BCX [mental fitness exam] ordered. When Dr. Lourgos of FCS told me to sit in a back corner behind a table in a small interview room, I refused to do so and reminded him he was under written orders of Judge Sheehan to accommodate my disabilities [flashbacks of being attacked induced by small rooms] and he replied that he didn’t have to follow that order. I asked to sit by the door or to be interviewed in a larger room and he then said “the interview is over, leave.”

Please note the limited BCX was ordered upon MY request in a motion that I had filed for a forensic clinical exam for the issue of temporary insanity during the alleged “crime” possibly resulting from post-traumatic stress disorder – see attached motion. As temporary insanity was a possible defense because I have a lack of memory of some of this incident where I am alleged to have battered a lock-up aide by “kicking her” it was necessary to determine if temporary insanity due to a flashback related to a post-traumatic-stress disorder from which I suffer occurred at the time of the alleged “crime.” This flashback was induced by an illegal attack on me by a lock-up aide during this incident – see motion.

Judge Ciesil said that the report from FCS said I refused to cooperate with the exam. Judge Ciesil should know that statutes state that a defendant may choose to refuse to answer questions and bail cannot be changed or revoked due to this refusal.

725 ILCS 5/104‑14

       (c) The court shall advise the defendant of the limitations on the use of any statements made or information gathered in the course of the fitness examination or subsequent treatment as provided in this Section. It shall also advise him that he may refuse to cooperate with the person conducting the examination, but that his refusal may be admissible into evidence on the issue of his mental or physical condition.
Mr. Albukerk pointed out that I refused to cooperate because Dr. Lourgos from FCS refused to obey Judge Sheehan’s order to accommodate my disability (see order in file) by allowing me to sit by the door in a small room or interviewing me in a large room with a window. Mr. Albukerk read this order into the record and Judge Ciesil stated “that’s not my understanding.” I am unable to tolerate discussions of the life-threatening and terrifying incidents causing the flashbacks except with these accommodations and end up becoming out of touch with reality, unresponsive, frozen, crying, with a look of terror on my face, often frantically hiding under a table or cowering against a wall.

Please replace her immediately as the judge in that courtroom and quash the arrest warrant, expunge the warrant, and order that the entire $5,000 bond be immediately returned. Judge Ciesil’s order for a warrant and increase in bail is null and void due to judicial error and outrageous conduct.

I and my attorney are initiating ALL appropriate legal actions in response to this outrage and lawlessness with the Illinois Appellate Court, the JIB, and if necessary with the press.

Please respond to this letter ASAP, if not to me to my attorney. Judge Ciesil has illegally harmed me in ways that are too upsetting for me to describe – other than to say I was attacked by a correctional officer after being taken into custody and medically neglected at the CCDOC resulting in hospitalization from the moment I was released on 9/27/07 to 10/2/07 and my health has been damaged. Please contact Mr. Albukerk for details. I have been under treatment by a psychiatrist to help diminish the symptoms of PTSD.

I REFUSE TO APPEAR IN COURTROOM 304 AGAIN UNTIL THIS MENTALLY UNSTABLE, UNETHICAL, LAWLESS, AND DANGEROUS JUDGE IS REPLACED! I will come to court on 10/24/07 but will remain seated outside the courtroom unless I see that there is a different judge on the bench. You may consider this contempt. I CONSIDER THIS MY CIVIC PATRIOTIC DUTY, LIKE THE FOUNDERS OF OUR COUNTRY, TO STAND AGAINST TYRANNY. Judge Ciesil has brought the court into disrepute and is unethically filling up the jail with unfortunate defendants who are five minutes late and have good excuses! Judge Ciesil made knee-jerk, rash, and unethical decisions without reading the file pleadings, orders, or attempting to verify anything. She clearly is biased and assumes all defendants are worthless scum who should be slammed.

Sincerely with utter despair over this tyranny and with utter determination to fight it,

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.

Cc: Chief Judge Evans

Cook County Commissioners

Posted and published on Internet

Attachment:
Mr. Albukerk’s Motion for SOJ for Cause
Pro Se Motion for Forensic Clinical Exam

With reasonable men, I will reason;
with honest men, I will plead;
but to tyrants, I will give no
quarter, nor waste arguments where
they will certainly be lost.

William Lloyd Garrison

In a time of deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.

George Orwell

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT, FIRST MUNICIPAL DISTRICT,
CRIMINAL SECTION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Plaintiff V. LINDA SHELTON, Defendant, Case No 06-221401, Honorable Colleen Sheehan Presiding

MOTION FOR FORENSIC CLINICAL EXAM

NOW COMES, the Defendant, Linda L. Shelton, Pro Se who respectfully requests that this court order a forensic clinical exam of defendant concerning state of mind during alleged act and in support of this motion states as follows:
1. Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct on March 4, 2006 [charges later dismissed] and brought to the 1st District Woman’s lock-up for processing.
2. As she was being released on a personal recognizance bond she was brought out of a cell to her possession, sealed in plastic bags on a table.
3. [Chicago Police Department] Detention Aide Shell ripped open the bags, when defendant was too weak to do so and told her to organize her possessions.
4. As defendant organized her possessions back into her briefcase she noticed her bottle of prednisone, prescribed by a physician. She takes an extra dose of this medication when stressed due to a relative steroid deficiency to prevent an asthma attack and to prevent complications of neurocardiogenic syncope.
5. Defendant opened her bottle and attempted to take a dose of medication.
6. Detention Aide Shell then violently grabbed defendant and body slammed her against the table causing contusions and yelling that she was not allowed to take any medication. Several other aides and/or officers ran at defendant and aided and abetted this felony attack on the handicapped defendant.
7. This caused defendant to attempt to pull away in self-defense and struggle while she yelled to stop assaulting her.
8. Then defendant went into a flashback due to her illness post-traumatic-stress disorder.
9. This illness has resulted from several previous attacks on her by officers at the First District causing injuries and great fear.
10. Defendant remained in this altered state of consciousness and next found herself being dragged to a cell and then beaten in a cell by a female aide or officer. Defendant is unable to remember much of the incident when she was in an altered state of consciousness due to the PTSD.
11. Defendant will use the defenses of self-defense, temporary insanity and outrageous government conduct (due to the history of repeated false arrests, beatings and medical neglect by First District Chicago Police).
12. Defendant is indigent and requires an exam by a forensic psychiatrist regarding the defense of temporary insanity.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Pro Se, respectfully requests this honorable court to
order a psychiatric exam of defendant by Forensic Clinical Services regarding the issue of temporary insanity during this alleged act.

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true and correct.

Dated: October 17, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

Linda L. Shelton

Pro Se Defendant

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