Pro Se Chicago's Weblog

September 18, 2017

Complaint for mandamus & civil rights relief from incompetent judges


When judges or officials are incompetent, malicious, or plain mean and violate your civil rights there are two other means that the public usually doesn’t realize by which they can obtain relief even during the case. The judge or official must have a mandatory (non-discretionary) duty under the law or constitution to do a particular act, must have failed to do it, and must be able to do it if ordered to do so in order to use a mandamus complaint. Civil rights law is very complicated.  Both types of complaints should be handled by an attorney, but as a starting place if you are interested in such complaints then this is an example that was filed by me, a non-attorney pro se. Look up the  case law and look up cases regarding mandamus or civil rights in the circuit courts and under your states’ laws.

  1. Mandamus – this is where you ask a court to order an official (including a judge) to perform a task that is mandatory and not discretionary like set a bail when no bail was set in violation of the law – in Illinois no bail is allowed only on murder cases, cases where the sentence may be life, or cases where a due process hearing was held and the defendant is proven to be a danger to the public or himself.
  2. Civil rights complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Suppose a court refuses to allow you to put any witnesses on the stand, refuses to allow you to subpoena documents or refuses to accommodate your disabilities, even when you discussed them with the disability coordinator and followed the court procedures. Under the federal civil rights act section 1983 you can ask a different court (either state or federal) under federal law to declare the judge’s acts or orders in violation of law or the constitution (declaratory relief) and order the judge to follow the law and allow you compulsory process or force the judge to accommodate your disabilities (injunctive relief).
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August 1, 2014

Federal Petiton proving corrupt judges, sheriff, & state’s attorney in Cook County


SIC color_edited-1

PLEASE come to court and show support for Shelton at the next court date on Jan 13, 2016, 10am, 2600 S California, Chicago IL, courtroom 506. Write letters to the U.S. Attorney, Sen. Durbin, Sen. Kirk, your senator, Rep. Lipinsky or your representative, and the press. Some addresses are at end of post. Spread the word through social media that Shelton needs public support to continue these blogs and fight unlawful attacks against her in retaliation for them and for helping so many with pro se litigation and defense.

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the federal district court in Chicago. The Cook County Sheriff in retaliation for Shelton filing civil rights suits has been falsely arresting Shelton repeatedly and maliciously prosecuting her for battery to officers. Of NOTE: She is never charged with battering anyone else and has a lifelong history of non-violent pacifism.  For more information go here.  Also read Shelton’s other blogs: http://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com  http://chicagofbi.wordpress.com   http://cookcountysheriffdeputies.wordpress.com   http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com and search them for posts about Madigan in particular. They have beaten her so many times and so viciously that she now has post-traumatic-stress disorder and when aggressively approached by officers goes into a flashback where she cries, screams, tries to protect herself from imagined blows swinging her arms randomly (as she is reliving attacks) and cowers. If she is pushed, carried, or dragged, due to disabilities and severe balance problems she grabs at things to steady herself – all the while being out of touch with reality during these brief PTSD flashbacks. She has been arrested and charged with FELONY battery to an officer with a possible sentence of 3-14 years for “touching an officers ear and pulling her hair until her hand slipped off”. She has been held in jail one year on no bail and only recently released on $300,000 bail. This is unconstitutional excessive bail She has been denied notice, counsel of choice, discovery of evidence, and has been fraudulently accussed of being psychotic and unfit for trial, illegally without notice or jury trial, without any professional saying she was psychotic or unfit, sent to a secure mental health facility who after a few months said in court she was never unfit and is not psychotic and sent her back to jail. As a result of this lawlessness Shelton has now filed at Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Federal District Court asking for relief and presentment of the criminal conduct of judges, sheriff staff, state’s attorney, court clerk, and other corrupt persons to the U.S. Attorney for  prosecution. You can read it here: (download will be 24 pages) fed habeas 6-12-14 final Full Petition with evidence (download will be 400+ pages) Habeas Petition Asst. US Attorney Zachary T. Fardon United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 Phone: (312) 353-5300 ______________________ FBI,Special Agent in Charge – Chicago Robert J. Holley 2111 W. Roosevelt Road Chicago, IL 60608 Phone: (312) 421-6700 Fax: (312) 829-5732/38 E-mail: Chicago@ic.fbi.gov _________________________ Senator Durbin WASHINGTON, D.C. 711 Hart Senate Bldg. Washington, DC 20510 9 am to 6 pm ET (202) 224-2152 – phone (202) 228-0400 – fax ____________________ Senator Kirk Washington, DC 524 Hart Senate Office Building Washington DC, 20510 Phone: 202-224-2854 Fax: 202-228-4611 ___________________ Congressman Lipinsky Washington, D.C. Office 1717 Longworth HOB Washington, DC 20515 P (202) 225 – 5701 P (866) 822 – 5701 F (202) 225 – 1012

August 9, 2012

Family Law – U.S. Consumer Protection Act limits amount of garnishment for child support


The consumer protection act REQUIRES that no more than 65 % of you income go towards paying back child support (this 65% includes  payment of taxes first, then child support, then any other garnishment of wages – total garnishment can be no more than 65 % if in arrears and 60 % of wages if not in arrears for child support).

From “Big Divorce Book” I Compiled:

11. “Title III, Consumer Protection Act”  Summary of authority and purpose of 15 USC § 1671 et seq. and 29 CFR Part 870 regarding maximum payments that may Be withheld under federal law from Obligor …………………………………………….  50-51

12. 15 USC § 1671 et seq. Federal Wage Garnishment Law (Title III of the Consumer Protection Act) & corresponding 29 CFR Part 870 …………………………………….  51-56

Mandates that when child support is an issue that federal and State taxes have priority over child support or other debts. Provides that child support has priority over other debts except for taxes. Provides that if the Obligor is not living with and supporting a spouse or child that no more than a total of 60% of net wages may be withheld from a paycheck and no more than 65% of net wages may be withheld from a paycheck if Obligor is more than 12 weeks in arrears ………………………………..   52-54

TITLE 15 > CHAPTER 41 > SUBCHAPTER II > § 1671. = 15 U.S.C. § 1671      Congressional findings and declaration of purpose

(a) Disadvantages of garnishment The Congress finds:

(1) The unrestricted garnishment of compensation due for personal services encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit. Such extensions of credit divert money into excessive credit payments and thereby hinder the production and flow of goods in interstate commerce.

(2) The application of garnishment as a creditors’ remedy frequently results in loss of employment by the debtor, and the resulting disruption of employment, production, and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce.

(3) The great disparities among the laws of the several States relating to garnishment have, in effect, destroyed the uniformity of the bankruptcy laws and frustrated the purposes thereof in many areas of the country.

(b) Necessity for regulation On the basis of the findings stated in subsection (a) of this section, the Congress determines that the provisions of this subchapter are necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying into execution the powers of the Congress to regulate commerce and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.

15 U.S.C. § 1672. Definitions

For the purposes of this subchapter:

(a) The term “earnings” means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.

(b) The term “disposable earnings” means that part of the earnings of any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld.

(c) The term “garnishment” means any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt.

15 U.S.C. § 1673. Restriction on garnishment

(a) Maximum allowable garnishment Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 1675 of this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed

(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or

(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section 206 (a)(1) of title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable,

whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2).

(b) Exceptions (1) The restrictions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply in the case of (A) any order for the support of any person issued by a court of competent jurisdiction or in accordance with an administrative procedure, which is established by State law, which affords substantial due process, and which is subject to judicial review.

(B) any order of any court of the United States having jurisdiction over cases under chapter 13 of title 11.

(C) any debt due for any State or Federal tax.

(2) The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subject to garnishment to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not exceed— (A) where such individual is supporting his spouse or dependent child (other than a spouse or child with respect to whose support such order is used), 50 per centum of such individual’s disposable earnings for that week; and

(B) where such individual is not supporting such a spouse or dependent child described in clause (A), 60 per centum of such individual’s disposable earnings for that week;

except that, with respect to the disposable earnings of any individual for any workweek, the 50 per centum specified in clause (A) shall be deemed to be 55 per centum and the 60 per centum specified in clause (B) shall be deemed to be 65 per centum, if and to the extent that such earnings are subject to garnishment to enforce a support order with respect to a period which is prior to the twelve-week period which ends with the beginning of such workweek.

(c) Execution or enforcement of garnishment order or process prohibited No court of the United States or any State, and no State (or officer or agency thereof), may make, execute, or enforce any order or process in violation of this section.

15 U.S.C. § 1674. Restriction on discharge from employment by reason of garnishment

(a) Termination of employment No employer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.

(b) Penalties Whoever willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

15 U.S.C. § 1676. Enforcement by Secretary of Labor

(If someone violates this law you should complain to the U.S. Dept of Labor)

The Secretary of Labor, acting through the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, shall enforce the provisions of this subchapter.

29 C.F.R. 870 et seq.

Title 29: Labor

PART 870—RESTRICTION ON GARNISHMENT Section Contents

Subpart A—General

29 U.S.C. § 870.1   Purpose and scope. § 870.2   Amendments to this part. Subpart B—Determinations and Interpretations

29 U.S.C. § 870.10   Maximum part of aggregate disposable earnings subject to garnishment under section 303(a). § 870.11   Exceptions to the restrictions provided by section 303(a) of the CCPA and priorities among garnishments.

Subpart A—General § 870.1   Purpose and scope. (a) This part sets forth the procedures and any policies, determinations, and interpretations of general application whereby the Secretary of Labor carries out his duties under section 303 of the CCPA dealing with restrictions on garnishment of earnings, and section 305 permitting exemptions for State-regulated garnishments in certain situations. While the Secretary’s duties under section 303 include insuring that certain amounts of earnings are protected, such duties do not include establishing priorities among multiple garnishments, as such priorities are determined by other Federal statutes or by State law.

(b) Functions of the Secretary under the CCPA to be performed as provided in this part are assigned to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division (hereinafter referred to as the Administrator), who, under the general direction and control of the Assistant Secretary, Wage and Labor Standards Administration, shall be empowered to take final and binding actions in administering the provisions of this part. The Administrator is empowered to subdelegate any of his duties under this part. Any legal advice and assistance required for administration of this part shall be provided by the Solicitor of Labor.

29 U.S.C. § 870.2   Amendments to this part. The Administrator may, at any time upon his own motion or upon written request of any interested person setting forth reasonable grounds therefor, amend any rules in this part.

Subpart B—Determinations and Interpretations § 870.10   Maximum part of aggregate disposable earnings subject to garnishment under section 303(a). (a) Statutory provision. Section 303 (a) of the CCPA provides that, with some exceptions,

the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed

(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or

(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, in effect at the time the earnings are payable.

whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2).

(b) Weekly pay period. The statutory exemption formula applies directly to the aggregate disposable earnings paid or payable for a pay period of 1 workweek, or a lesser period. Its intent is to protect from garnishment and save to an individual earner the specified amount of compensation for his personal services rendered in the workweek, or a lesser period. Thus:

(1) The amount of an individual’s disposable earnings for a workweek or lesser period which may not be garnished is 30 times the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage. If an individual’s disposable earnings for such a period are equal to or less than 30 times the minimum wage, the individual’s earnings may not be garnished in any amount. (When the minimum wage increases, the proportionate amount of earnings which may not be garnished also increases.) On April 1, 1991, the minimum wage increased to $4.25. Accordingly, the amount of disposable weekly earnings which may not be garnished is $127.50 effective April 1, 1991. (For the period April 1, 1990 through March 31, 1991, the amount that may not be garnished is $114 (30×$3.80).)

(2) For earnings payable on or after April 1, 1991, if an individual’s disposable earnings for a workweek or lesser period are more than $127.50, but less than $170.00, only the amount above $127.50 is subject to garnishment. (For earnings payable during the period April 1, 1990, through March 31, 1991, when the Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage was $3.80, this range computes to more than $114.00, but less than $152.00.)

(3) For earnings payable on or after April 1, 1991, if an individual’s disposable earnings for a workweek or lesser period are $170.00 or more, 25 percent of his/her disposable earnings is subject to garnishment. (The weekly figure was $152.00 (40×$3.80) for the period April 1, 1990 through March 31, 1991.)

(c) Pay for a period longer than 1 week. In the case of disposable earnings which compensate for personal services rendered in a pay period longer than 1 workweek, the weekly statutory exemption formula must be transformed to a formula applicable to such earnings providing equivalent restrictions on wage garnishment.

(1) The 25 percent part of the formula would apply to the aggregate disposable earnings for all the workweeks or fractions thereof compensated by the pay for such pay period.

(2) The following formula should be used to calculate the dollar amount of disposable earnings which would not be subject to garnishment: The number of workweeks, or fractions thereof, should be multiplied times the applicable Federal minimum wage and that amount should be multiplied by 30. For example, for the period April 1, 1990 through March 31, 1991 when the Federal minimum wage was $3.80 per hour, the formula should be calculated based on a minimum wage of $3.80 ($3.80 multiplied by 30 equals $114; $114 multiplied by the number of workweeks (or fractions thereof) equals the amount that cannot be garnished). As of April 1, 1991, the $4.25 Federal minimum wage replaces $3.80 in the formula (and the amount which cannot be garnished would then be $127.50 multiplied by the number of workweeks (or fractions thereof)). For purposes of this formula, a calendar month is considered to consist of 41/3workweeks. Thus, during the period April 1, 1990 through March 31, 1991 when the Federal minimum hourly wage was $3.80 an hour, the amount of disposable earnings for a 2-week period is $228.00 (2×30×$3.80); for a monthly period, $494.00 (41/3×30×$3.80). Effective April 1, 1991, such amounts increased as follows: for a two-week period, $255.00 (2×30×$4.25); for a monthly period, $552.50 (41/3×30×$4.25). The amount of disposable earnings for any other pay period longer than 1 week shall be computed in a manner consistent with section 303(a) of the act and with this paragraph.

(3) Absent any changes to the rate set forth in section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, disposable earnings for individuals paid weekly, biweekly, semimonthly, and monthly may not be garnished unless they are in excess of the following amounts:

Date Minimum amount Weekly amount Biweekly amount Semi-monthly amount Monthly rate Jan. 1, 1981 $3.35 $100.50 $201.00 $217.75 $435.50 Apr. 1, 1990 3.80 114.00 228.00 247.00 494.00 Apr. 1, 1991 4.25 127.50 255.00 276.25 552.50

(4) Absent any changes to the rate set forth in section 6(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, if the disposable earnings are less than the following figures, only the difference between the appropriate figures set forth in paragraph (c)(3) of this section and the individual’s disposable earnings may be garnished.

Date Minimum amount Weekly amount Biweekly amount Semi-monthly amount Monthly rate Jan. 1, 1981 $3.35 $134.00 $268.00 $290.33 $580.67 Apr. 1, 1990 3.80 152.00 304.00 329.33 658.67 Apr. 1, 1991 4.25 170.00 340.00 368.33 736.67

For example, in April of 1990, if an individual’s disposable earnings for a biweekly pay period are $274.00, the difference between $228.00 and $274.00 (i.e., $46.00) may be garnished.

(5) If disposable earnings are in excess of the figures stated in paragraph (c)(4) of this section, 25% of the disposable earnings may be garnished.

(d) Date wages paid or payable controlling. The date that disposable earnings are paid or payable, and not the date the Court issues the garnishment order, is controlling in determining the amount of disposable earnings that may be garnished. Thus, a garnishment order in November 1990, providing for withholding from wages over a period of time, based on exemptions computed at the $3.80 per hour minimum wage then in effect, would be modified by operation of the change in the law so that wages paid after April 1, 1991, are subject to garnishment to the extent described in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section on the basis of a minimum rate of $4.25 per hour. This principle is applicable at the time of the enactment of any further increase in the minimum wage.

29 U.S.C. § 870.11   Exceptions to the restrictions provided by section 303(a) of the CCPA and priorities among garnishments. top (a)(1) Section 303(b) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act provides that the restrictions in section 303(a) do not apply to:

(i) Any debt due for any State or Federal tax, or

(ii) Any order of any court of bankruptcy under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.

(2) Accordingly the Consumer Credit Protection Act does not restrict in any way the amount which may be withheld for State or Federal taxes or in Chapter XIII Bankruptcy Act proceedings.

(b)(1) Section 303(b) provides the following restrictions on the amount that may be withheld for the support of any person (e.g. alimony or child support):

(A) Where such individual is supporting his spouse or dependent child (other than a spouse or child with respect to whose support such order is issued), 50 per centum of such individual’s disposable earnings for that week; and

(B) Where such individual is not supporting such a spouse or dependent child described in clause (A), 60 per centum of such individual’s disposable earnings for that week; except that, with respect to the disposable earnings of any individual for any workweek, the 50 per centum specified in clause (A) shall be deemed to be 55 per centum and the 60 per centum specified in clause (B) shall be deemed to be 65 per centum, if and to the extent that such earnings are subject to garnishment to enforce a support order with respect to a period which is prior to the twelve week period which ends with the beginning of such workweek.

(2) Compliance with the provisions of section 303(a) and (b) may offer problems when there is more than one garnishment. In that event the priority is determined by State law or other Federal laws as the CCPA contains no provisions controlling the priorities of garnishments. However, in no event may the amount of any individual’s disposable earnings which may be garnished exceed the percentages specified in section 303. To illustrate:

(i) If 45% of an individual’s disposable earnings were garnished for taxes, and this garnishment has priority, the Consumer Credit Protection Act permits garnishment for the support of any person of only the difference between 45% and the applicable percentage (50 to 65%) in the above quoted section 303(b).

(ii) If 70% of an individual’s disposable earnings were garnished for taxes and/or a Title XIII Bankruptcy debt, and these garnishments have priority, the Consumer Credit Protection Act does not permit garnishment either for the support of any person or for other debts.

(iii) If 25% of an individual’s disposable earnings were withheld pursuant to an ordinary garnishment which is subject to the restrictions of section 303(a), and the garnishment has priority in accordance with State law, the Consumer Credit Protection Act permits the additional garnishment for the support of any person of only the difference between 25% and the applicable percentage (50–65%) in the above quoted section 303(b).

(iv) If 25% or more of an individual’s disposable earnings were withheld pursuant to a garnishment for support, and the support garnishment has priority in accordance with State law, the Consumer Credit Protection Act does not permit the withholding of any additional amounts pursuant to an ordinary garnishment which is subject to the restrictions of section 303(a).

December 9, 2011

Time for Fourth branch of government to clean up corrupt Cook County Courts


When the British government acted like dictators and ignored the laws we had the Boston Tea Party and then the revolutionary war.

 

It is time for a new awakening of the Fourth branch of government – this time to clean up the courts. It is past time to talk the talk -we must walk the walk -no fear – just act! When the judge violates the law – file everything possible in state and federal court (complaint for supervisory order; complaint for mandamus; Section 1983 federal civil rights suit for injunctive relief – justices have immunity from suits for monetary damages but not from suits for injunctive relief or mandamus; Attorney Regulatory Commission Complaint; Judicial Inquiry Board Complaint; Judicial Council complaints; complain to the press; complain to officials in charge of the County or State; complain to your representatives and senators; make a request for impeachment to the speaker of the house; complain to the press, put ALL details of your case on the Internet.

The Declaration of Independence states:

      We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. –That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, –That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.

But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

Our right to justice is not something that the judiciary should play with. Our justice system is not a tool of self serving lawyers to use to allow lawyers to take advantage of the misfortunate and victimize them. Our courts are to serve the people and not as a profit center to protect the incomes of lawyers. We the people hereby give notice to the judiciary that you are acting in contempt of the people and that you will refrain from continuing to do so or face the consequences.

For more details see this link: http://www.perkel.com/politics/issues/fourth.htm

October 24, 2008

Void for Vagueness Doctrine – Applied to IL Medicaid Fraud


 I was unlawfully convicted of criminal contempt for telling Dishonorable Judge Kathleen Pantle that she was aiding and abetting the criminal and impeachable conduct of IL Attorney General Lisa Madigan, as well as the fact that she was violating her oath of office by continuing with the criminal case against me although she had no jurisdiction.

 

In order to preserve the issue for appeal and because Dishon. J. Pantle refused to appoint a public defender after de facto removing me as Pro Se Counsel by making a written order that I was NOT ALLOWED to file any pleadings [an unconstitutional act that violates her oath of office], I firmly but politely stated I was leaving and not coming back (because she had no jurisdiction and the case was bogus) and turned around and tried to leave.

 

I was immediately arrested and immediately summarily convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to 30 days in CCDOC. [More about all this later!] This memorandum was given to IL Supreme Court on my direct appeal of this criminal contempt conviction [a petty offense]. The IL Supreme Court denied leave to appeal – [ignored my appeal and made no ruling and refuse to consider it.] This criminal contempt case is presently before the U.S. District Court on a habeas corpus petition, as I have exhausted state remedies. If denied the Circuit Court of C[r]ook County may lift the stay on my sentence and I will have to serve the remaining 13/30 days of the sentence and surrender to the C[r]ook County Sheriff. This would be a gross injustice [see following two posts also]. 

 

As you all should know, under the IL Constitution a citizen has NO RIGHT to an appeal to the IL Supreme Court. Appeals there are by permission and they only take about 5/100 cases, usually if they find it interesting. Only Capital Cases have a right to appeal to IL Supreme Court. Therefore, the IL Appellate Court is ususally the end of the line except you can appeal by means of habeas corpus to Federal District Court AFTER you exhause all state remedies. [Appeal through IL Supreme Court AND file IL habeas corpus petition by means of motion for leave to file it to IL Supreme Court – which takes two to three years in IL – 6 mo to two years in other states].

 You might also want to note the discrimination against Pro Se Defense Counsel and the double standards. In similar cases regarding defense attorneys the judges usually sentence them to $500 fine. I don’t think 30 days for a pro se counsel = $500 for an attorney. This is grossly disproportionate.

No. 105037

______________________________________________________________________________________

 

In the

 SUPREME COURT

Of The State of Illinois

______________________________________________________________________________________

 

)  Petition to Appeal as a Matter of Right

) or in the Alternative Petition for Leave

) to Appeal

                                                                        ) 

LINDA SHELTON                                         )  On Appeal from Appellate Court, First

            Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner            )  District, No. 05-2053

) 

v.                                             )  There Heard on Appeal from Circuit

)   Court of Cook County, County

)   Department, Criminal Division

                                                                        )  

)   No. ACC 050087-01

            )  

STATE OF ILLINOIS                                    )   Honorable Judge Kathleen Pantle,

            Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent               )           Trial Judge

                                                                        )   Order of Trial Court May 10, 2005

)   Order of Appellate Court

)                       June 19, 2007

 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW – VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE

 

            Defendant, Pro Se, respectfully presents to this Honorable Court the following memorandum of law concerning statutes and case law regarding void for vagueness doctrine.

            It is impermissible to prosecute a person, per due process requirements, for a crime if it relies on a vague, ambiguous, or conflicting legal requirement. As the Seventh Circuit Court recently emphasized in Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000), criminal penalties require a “high degree of clarity.” Id. at 908. A year earlier, the Seventh Circuit Court also held:

            The vagueness doctrine holds that a person cannot be held liable for conduct he could not reasonably

            have been expected to know was a violation of law.  It is well-settled that, as a matter of due process, a

            criminal statute that fails to give a     person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated

            conduct is  forbidden by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and

            convictions is void for vagueness. [United States v. Brierton, 165 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (7th Cir. 1999)

            (as amended)]

 

            The Supreme Court has emphasized this same principle on numerous occasions. In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the Court held that:

            The constitutional requirements of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person

            of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated       conduct is forbidden by the statute. The

            underlying principle is that no man shall      be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not

            reasonable understand to be proscribed. [Id.at 617 (citations omitted)]

 

See also Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 229 (1985) (reversing a conviction because “Congress has not spoken with the requisite clarity” and affirming the “‘time-honored interpretive guideline’ that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity’”) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) and United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32 (1812), inner quotations omitted.)

            Even if the Illinois regulation per the Administrative Code is upheld to deny reimbursement for these counseling services to the poor, all defendants in any similar vendor fraud cases indictments and prosecutions cannot be sustained amid the uncertainty and vagueness created by the federal-state conflict. Indictment and prosecution of any defendant under a similar theory to this case of substitute billing run afoul of the Seventh Circuit Court’s holdings in Gresham and Brierton, and the Supreme Court precedents following Harriss.

            “It is well known that ‘no one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.’” United States v. Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897 (E.D. Pa Sept. 5, 2001). *12 (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey,  306 U.S. 451 (1939)). The Ward court then detailed the rigorous threshold test necessary for criminalizing conduct in the regulatory arena:

            Especially where a regulation subjects a private party to criminal sanctions, ‘a regulation cannot be

            construed to mean what an agency intended but did not adequately express.’ 

            Diamond Roofing Co.,Inc. v OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 649      (5th Cir 1976). As

             Bethlehem Steel made clear, ‘if the language the Secretary has the means and obligation to

             amend.’ [Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS    15897, *19 – *19 (quoting

            Bethlehem Steel v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 573 F.2d 157, 161

            (3rd Cir. 1978)).]

 

            The Ward Court cited a legion of precedents requiring dismissal of the indictment, which likewise require dismissal of the indictment in the vendor fraud case against Plaintiffs. “[I]t is our view that courts should not defer to an agency’s informal interpretation of an ambiguous statute or regulation in a criminal case.” Ward, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15897, *22. See United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987),

            In the criminal context, courts have traditionally required greater clarity in  draftsmanship than in civil     

           contexts, commensurate with the bedrock principle that in a free country citizens who are potentially

           subject to criminal sanctions should have clear notice of the behavior that may cause sanctions to be

           visited upon them.[;]

 

See also United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc.,  132 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of indictment because the conduct was not clearly forbidden by the regulations); United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 (2nd Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245 (1994) (in criminal cases, “a court will not be persuaded by cases urging broad interpretation of a regulation in the civil-penalty context”). See also, United States v. Whiteside, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4610, *18 – *19 (11th Cir. Mar. 22, 2002) (“The government cannot meet its burden in this case because, despite its contention to the contrary, no Medicare regulation, administrative ruling, or judicial decision exists that clearly “proscribes defendants’ conduct.)

            The indictments in the vendor fraud case against defendant and all defendants in similar cases fail to cite violation of any binding federal rule. Accordingly, the indictments directly contravene Supreme Court teaching in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), and over 150 decisions that have relied on it. Defendant and similarly situated defendants in other cases administered much-needed services to the poor under the federally funded Medicaid program, in full compliance with all applicable federal laws and formal regulations. It is contrary to Christensen and its progeny to sustain Defendant’s and similarly situated defendants’ indictments for conduct that did not violate any clear and binding rules.

            The Medicaid program has been recognized to constitute one of the most complex and intractable regulatory systems in our country. See Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265 (1982) Burger, J., dissenting) (observing that ‘the Medicaid program is a morass of bureaucratic complexity.”) Medicaid generally provides the lowest level of reimbursement, and requires treatment of the most ill and difficult patients. Physicians who participate in the low-paying Medicaid program should not be imprisoned based on a game of “gotcha”. See United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d at 1132 (“If the obligation . . . is sufficiently in doubt, willfulness is impossible as a matter of law, and the ‘defendant’s actual intent is irrelevant.’”) (citing Garber, 607 F.2d at 98, quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974)). Indictment and/or conviction of Medicaid physicians based on regulatory gamesmanship is both unjust to defendants and catastrophic to the needy patients, because it drives small practitioners out of Medicaid.  Courts are increasingly dismissing these types of fraud charges against physicians, and dismissal is appropriate in the vendor fraud case against Plaintiffs. See, e.g State v. Vainio, 2001 MT 220, 35 P.3d 948 (Mont. 2001) (reversing a Medicaid conviction because it was based on an improperly promulgated state regulation); Siddiqi v. United States, 98 F.3d 1427, 1429 (2nd Cir. 1996) (reversing Medicare fraud convictions for “claim[s] for services rendered by somebody else”); id. at 1438 (“It takes no great flash of genius to conclude that something is wrong somewhere.”)

            The vendor fraud case against Defendant and similarly situated defendants is void for vagueness, similar to the Siddiqu and the Vainio cases as explained in the precedent setting and controlling cases such as Harriss, Gresham, and Brierton. “Void for vagueness” means criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. Chandler, 66 F. 3d 1460 (8th Cir. 1995) The vendor fraud case against Defendant and similarly situated defendants clearly falls under the void for vagueness doctrine and should have been dismissed ab initio.

 

Dated August 12, 2007.

                                                            Respectfully Submitted,

 

                                                                                _____________________________

                                                                                Linda L. Shelton

Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner Pro Se

 

 

Prepared By:

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.

Vigorous Defense is NOT Contempt – Intent Must be Shown


 

I was unlawfully convicted of criminal contempt for telling Dishonorable Judge Kathleen Pantle that she was aiding and abetting the criminal and impeachable conduct of IL Attorney General Lisa Madigan, as well as the fact that she was violating her oath of office by continuing with the criminal case against me although she had no jurisdiction.

 

In order to preserve the issue for appeal and because Dishon. J. Pantle refused to appoint a public defender after de facto removing me as Pro Se Counsel by making a written order that I was NOT ALLOWED to file any pleadings [an unconstitutional act that violates her oath of office], I firmly but politely stated I was leaving and not coming back (because she had no jurisdiction and the case was bogus) and turned around and tried to leave.

 

I was immediately arrested and immediately summarily convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to 30 days in CCDOC. [More about all this later!] This memorandum was given to IL Supreme Court on my direct appeal of this criminal contempt conviction [a petty offense]. The IL Supreme Court denied leave to appeal – [ignored my appeal and made no ruling and refuse to consider it.] This criminal contempt case is presently before the U.S. District Court on a habeas corpus petition, as I have exhausted state remedies. If denied the Circuit Court of C[r]ook County may lift the stay on my sentence and I will have to serve the remaining 13/30 days of the sentence and surrender to the C[r]ook County Sheriff. This would be a gross injustice [see next post also]. 

 

As you all should know, under the IL Constitution a citizen has NO RIGHT to an appeal to the IL Supreme Court. Appeals there are by permission and they only take about 5/100 cases, usually if they find it interesting. Only Capital Cases have a right to appeal to IL Supreme Court. Therefore, the IL Appellate Court is ususally the end of the line except you can appeal by means of habeas corpus to Federal District Court AFTER you exhause all state remedies. [Appeal through IL Supreme Court AND file IL habeas corpus petition by means of motion for leave to file it to IL Supreme Court – which takes two to three years in IL – 6 mo to two years in other states].

 You might also want to note the discrimination against Pro Se Defense Counsel and the double standards. In similar cases regarding defense attorneys the judges usually sentence them to $500 fine. I don’t think 30 days for a pro se counsel = $500 for an attorney. This is grossly disproportionate.

 

No. 105037

 

 

 

 

______________________________________________________________________________________

 

In the

 SUPREME COURT

Of The State of Illinois

______________________________________________________________________________________

 

)  Petition to Appeal as a Matter of Right

) or in the Alternative Petition for Leave

) to Appeal

                                                                        ) 

LINDA SHELTON                                         )  On Appeal from Appellate Court, First

            Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner             )  District, No. 05-2053

) 

v.                                             )  There Heard on Appeal from Circuit

)   Court of Cook County, County

)   Department, Criminal Division

                                                                        )  

)   No. ACC 050087-01

            )  

STATE OF ILLINOIS                                    )   Honorable Judge Kathleen Pantle,

            Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent              )           Trial Judge

                                                                        )   Order of Trial Court May 10, 2005

)   Order of Appellate Court

)                       June 19, 2007

 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW – VIGOROUS DEFENSE IS

NOT CONTEMPT

 

            Defendant, Pro Se, respectfully presents to this Honorable Court the following memorandum of law concerning statutes and case law regarding a vigorous defense and criminal contempt.

            “We will reverse a finding of direct criminal contempt if the contemnor can show that his conduct was a good-faith attempt to represent his client without hindering the court’s functions or dignity.” In re Marriage of Bartlett, 305 Ill.App.3d 28 (1999).

            In People v. Coulter, 228 Ill.App.3d 1014 (1992), “trial court’s remarks, taken as a whole, exhibit hostility toward the defense”. The courts have stated that overzealous, inappropriately sarcastic, and lack of civility in language of counsel during a vigorous defense does not automatically constitute contempt. Intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and provocation in the underlying proceedings may be considered in determining intent.

 “In attempting to obtain a favorable ruling on their motion for reconsideration, contemnors could have made better use of the English lexicon to further their client’s cause, and the cause of professional civility, but we conclude that the language employed was not, in itself, sufficient to prove intent to embarrass or hinder the court beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Griffith, 247 Ill.App.3d 21 (1993)

 

Search for essential elements of crime of contempt must be made with full appreciation of contentious role of trial counsel and attorney’s duty to zealously represent client’s interests, if conduct complained of is that of attorney engaged in representation of litigant; vigorous, independent bar is indispensable to system of justice. Griffith, id.

 

Even though defense counsel may have been overzealous or improperly sarcastic at times, record disclosed that his conduct in courtroom constituted good faith attempt to represent his client’s without hindering court’s functions or dignity and therefore did not constitute direct contempt of court. People v. Miller, 51 Ill.2d 76, 21 N.E.2d 292 (1972)

           

            Although provocation is not a defense, the circumstances of the underlying proceedings may be weighed to determine whether the offense of criminal contempt was proved   beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Marriage of Bartlett, 305     Ill.App.3d 28 (1999); People v. Pearson, 98 Ill.App.2d 203, 240 N.E.2d 337 (1968)

 

In determining whether direct criminal contempt has occurred, the reviewing court may consider provocation by the trial court and erroneous trial court rulings that may have triggered the contemnor’s comments. Bartlett, id

 

Courts should not confuse a vigorous defense with contempt.  Intent must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for contempt. Without intent, a criminal contempt conviction must be reversed.

 

Dated August 12, 2007.

                                                            Respectfully Submitted,

 

                                                                                _____________________________

                                                                                Linda L. Shelton

Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner Pro Se

 

 

Prepared By:

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.

 

Cook County Good Time Jail Credit – Memorandum of Law


I was unlawfully convicted of criminal contempt for telling Dishonorable Judge Kathleen Pantle that she was aiding and abetting the criminal and impeachable conduct of IL Attorney General Lisa Madigan, as well as the fact that she was violating her oath of office by continuing with the criminal case against me although she had no jurisdiction.

 

In order to preserve the issue for appeal and because Dishon. J. Pantle refused to appoint a public defender after de facto removing me as Pro Se Counsel by making a written order that I was NOT ALLOWED to file any pleadings [an unconstitutional act that violates her oath of office], I firmly but politely stated I was leaving and not coming back (because she had no jurisdiction and the case was bogus) and turned around and tried to leave.

 

I was immediately arrested and immediately summarily convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to 30 days in CCDOC. [More about all this later!] This memorandum was given to IL Supreme Court on my direct appeal of this criminal contempt conviction [a petty offense]. The IL Supreme Court denied leave to appeal – [ignored my appeal and made no ruling and refuse to consider it.]

 

As you all should know, under the IL Constitution a citizen has NO RIGHT to an appeal to the IL Supreme Court. Appeals there are by permission and they only take about 5/100 cases, usually if they find it interesting. Only Capital Cases have a right to appeal to IL Supreme Court. Therefore, the IL Appellate Court is ususally the end of the line except you can appeal by means of habeas corpus to Federal District Court AFTER you exhause all state remedies. [Appeal through IL Supreme Court AND file IL habeas corpus petition by means of motion for leave to file it to IL Supreme Court – which takes two to three years in IL – 6 mo to two years in other states].

 

No. 105037

______________________________________________________________________________________

 

In the

 SUPREME COURT

Of The State of Illinois

______________________________________________________________________________________

 

)  Petition to Appeal as a Matter of Right

) or in the Alternative Petition for Leave

) to Appeal

                                                                        ) 

LINDA SHELTON                                         )  On Appeal from Appellate Court, First

            Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner            )  District, No. 05-2053

) 

v.                                             )  There Heard on Appeal from Circuit

)   Court of Cook County, County

)   Department, Criminal Division

                                                                        )  

)   No. ACC 050087-01

            )  

STATE OF ILLINOIS                                    )   Honorable Judge Kathleen Pantle,

            Plaintiff-Appellee-Respondent              )           Trial Judge

                                                                        )   Order of Trial Court May 10, 2005

)   Order of Appellate Court

)                       June 19, 2007

 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW – GOOD TIME JAIL CREDIT

 

            Defendant, Pro Se, respectfully presents to this Honorable Court the following memorandum of law concerning statutes and case law regarding good time county jail credit.

            Under the Illinois County Jail Good Behavior Act, 730 ILCS 130, good time credit is automatic unless an administrative due process hearing initiated by the sheriff revokes the good time credit. The Circuit Court of Cook County and Illinois Appellate Courts have no legal authority in regard to revoking good time credit, as they are bound by statute, which authorizes the administrative hearings at the jail to provide the due process hearing, which by statute, must precede any revocation of good time credit.

            Silence on the record on appeal, regarding this issue, is therefore mandated to be in favor of the defendant.   Unless the State can prove that a due process administrative hearing was held revoking good time credit automatically granted to defendant, this court is legally bound to order that good time credit is granted. As the granting of credit is automatic, it is the burden of the state to prove it has been revoked by a due process administrative hearing, which it failed to do. To put the burden on the defendant violates statutes, due process, and legal precedent.

            The Fifth District Appellate Court, in People ex rel. Yoder v. Hardy, 116 Ill. App. 3d 489, 45 N.E.2d 965, 71 Ill.Dec. 811 (1983), citing the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), stated that a prisoner has a constitutional liberty interest to due process that binds a department of corrections to follow its own regulations in revoking good time credit. When statutorily required procedures (an administrative hearing) for revoking good time credit are absent from the record, then good time credit must be presumed to stand.

            The fact that the good time credit is statutorily automatic, relieves the defendant from the burden of proving he/she applied for it and was granted it (no application is required by statute.)  It is an error of law for the Appellate Court to state, by fiat, that the defendant must prove that he/she earned good time credit or that the correctional facility employees must determine that his/her behavior was good before granting good time credit.

            The Appellate Court ruled erroneously in case at bar that a silent record in this regard is decided against the defendant. The opposite is true in the case of an automatic awarding of good time credit when the record does not support ANY evidence of an administrative hearing revoking good time credit.  The absence of an administrative order removing good time credit from the record proves that good time jail credit applies and was not revoked.

                It is inappropriate for the Appellate Court to sue sponte revoke good time credit by fiat, as it did in the case at bar (SCA B9-10, 12). The Appellate Court is legally bound to uphold the law and follow higher court precedent.

           

Dated August 11, 2007.

                                                            Respectfully Submitted,

 

                                                                                _____________________________

                                                                                Linda L. Shelton

Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner Pro Se

 

October 14, 2008

Indigent Petition Illegal Denial in Cook County


In Cook County Illinois, the presiding judge of the law division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Judge William D. Maddux, routinely violates statutes and denies indigent petitions. He particularly denies them if you are a whistle blower against County Government, if you have filed more than one suit as an indigent person, or if you are “too” well dressed.

He violates law by not granting indigent status when one is on Medicaid, food stamps or SSI, as well as if one is living at an income less than the poverty level.

He fails to specifically state the reason he denies the petition and fails to order a payment schedule or a date certain by which to pay the fee.

He tells his staff to not tell the indigent person their names or their positions to make it harder for the person to appeal his decision. He has his staff routinely write on these petitions: “cannot maintain action in good faith.” This is not a legally valid reason to deny a petition.

Judge Maddux is committing conspiracy to violate rights under color of law, and violation of rights under color of law knowingly and willingly which are both federal felony crimes under the Federal Code. He is violating his oath of office to uphold the law and denying the indigent person their civil rights to redress of grievances, equal protection under the law, and due process. He should be removed from the bench.  I have filed the following Complaint for Mandamus against him in this regard in the Illinois Supreme Court today. I encourage all who are similarly situated to do the same. Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Timothy Evans, is failing to supervise him or his staff and is therefore aiding and abetting  this crime.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

 

 

Linda L. Shelton                                             )

                        Plaintiff                                     )

                                                                        )      Case No. ______________

v.                                                                                                                              )

)

The Honorable William H. Maddux,            )

in his official capacity as executive director     )

of the Law Division of the Cook County      )

Circuit Court and its Presiding Judge           )

                                                                        )

and                                                                  )

                                                                        )

Dorothy Brown in her official capacity             )

as the Cook County Circuit Court Clerk       )

                                                                        )

                        Defendants                               )

 

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

 

            Plaintiff Linda L. Shelton, complains of Defendant as follows:

 

INTRODUCTION

 

1.      This complaint asks this Court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the Presiding Judge of the Law Division, County Department, of the Circuit Court of Cook County (“CCCC”) and the Clerk of the CCCC to comply with the nondiscretionary mandates of the portion of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure governing how courts process and evaluate request by litigant to proceed in forma pauperis.

THE PARTIES

2.      Plaintiff Linda L. Shelton is a resident of Cook County and the State of Illinois.

3.      Defendant the Honorable William H. Maddux (“Judge”) is the duly appointed presiding judge of the Law Division of the County Department of the CCCC. He was appointed the presiding judge of the Law Division by order of the Chief Judge of the CCCC, the Honorable Timothy Evans, and as such is authorized to make administrative decisions for the functioning of the Law Division of the CCCC, per rules of the CCCC, consistent with the laws of the State of Illinois and the Illinois Supreme Court Rules.

4.      Defendant Dorothy Brown is the duly elected Clerk of the CCCC (“Clerk”) under the laws of the State of Illinois.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ARGUMENT

5.      The Judge has by fiat decided that all petitions for in forma pauperis status in the Law Division of the CCCC will be heard by him ONLY at 11:30 a.m. each morning the court is open. If the plaintiff appears in his courtroom after noon he absolutely refuses to hear the plaintiff’s petition that day. He does not hear the petitions in open court, but requires that the petition be given to his law clerk and the decision on the petition is done without the presence or further input of the Plaintiff. At his discretion, the Judge may come into the courtroom and question the Plaintiff, which on information and belief in practice is almost never done. This procedure is NOT published or posted anywhere and Plaintiffs must discover it by accident or by asking the Clerk or the Judge’s courtroom clerk or law clerks.

6.      On information and belief Plaintiff has discovered that the Judge routinely denies petition to sue as an indigent person in violation of Illinois Statutes and has violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional statutory rights as follows:

735 ILCS 5/5‑105

             Leave to sue or defend as an indigent person.
                         (a) As used in this Section:
                                     (1) “Fees, costs, and charges” means payments

imposed on a party in connection with the prosecution or defense of a civil action, . . . .

(2) “Indigent person” means any person who meets one or more of the following criteria:

(i) He or she is receiving assistance under one or more of the following public benefits programs: Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Food Stamps, General Assistance, State Transitional Assistance, or State Children and Family Assistance.

(ii) His or her available income is 125% or less of the current poverty level as established by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, unless the applicant’s assets that are not exempt under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of this Code are of a nature and value that the court determines that the applicant is able to pay the fees, costs, and charges.

(iii) He or she is, in the discretion of the court, unable to proceed in an action without payment of fees, costs, and charges and whose payment of those fees, costs, and charges would result in substantial hardship to the person or his or her family.

(iv) He or she is an indigent person pursuant to Section 5‑105.5 of this Code.

(b) On the application of any person, before, or after the commencement

of an action, a court, on finding that the applicant is an indigent person, shall grant the applicant leave to sue or defend the action without payment of the fees, costs, and charges of the action.

(c) An application for leave to sue or defend an action as an indigent

person shall be in writing and supported by the affidavit of the applicant or, if the applicant is a minor or an incompetent adult, by the affidavit of another person having knowledge of the facts. The contents of the affidavit shall be established by Supreme Court Rule. . . . The clerk of the court shall post in a conspicuous place in the courthouse a notice no smaller than 8.5 x 11 inches, using no smaller than 30‑point typeface printed in English and in Spanish, advising the public that they may ask the court for permission to sue or defend a civil action without payment of fees, costs, and charges. The notice shall be substantially as follows:
        “If you are unable to pay the fees, costs, and charges of an action you may ask the court to allow you to proceed without paying them. Ask the clerk of the court for forms.”

(d) The court shall rule on applications under this Section in a timely manner based on information contained in the application unless the court, in its discretion, requires the applicant to personally appear to explain or clarify information contained in the application. If the court finds that the applicant is an indigent person, the court shall enter an order permitting the applicant to sue or defend without payment of fees, costs, or charges. If the application is denied, the court shall enter an order to that effect stating the specific reasons for the denial. The clerk of the court shall promptly mail or deliver a copy of the order to the applicant.
            (e) The clerk of the court shall not refuse to accept and file any complaint, appearance, or other paper presented by the applicant if accompanied by an application to sue or defend in forma pauperis, and those papers shall be considered filed on the date the application is presented. If the application is denied, the order shall state a date certain by which the necessary fees, costs, and charges must be paid. The court, for good cause shown, may allow an applicant whose application is denied to defer payment of fees, costs, and charges, make installment payments, or make payment upon reasonable terms and conditions stated in the order. The court may dismiss the claims or defenses of any party failing to pay the fees, costs, or charges within the time and in the manner ordered by the court. A determination concerning an application to sue or defend in forma pauperis shall not be construed as a ruling on the merits.
             (f) The court may order an indigent person to pay all or a portion of the fees, costs, or charges waived pursuant to this Section out of moneys recovered by the indigent person pursuant to a judgment or settlement resulting from the civil action. However, nothing is this Section shall be construed to limit the authority of a court to order another party to the action to pay the fees, costs, or charges of the action.

 

The Judge wrote on the order that the Plaintiff is denied in forma pauperis status despite the fact that the Plaintiff is “indigent” as provided by the above statute. He wrote as the reason on the order in the handwriting of his law clerk: “cannot maintain action in good faith.” (Exhibit A) There is NO provision in this statute for the Judge determining whether or not the Plaintiff can maintain the action in good faith. It is mandatory that the Judge grant the petition if the Plaintiff meets the qualifications for indigent status as defined in Statute, 735 ILCS 5/5-105(a)(2) & (b). The Judge failed to issue an order as to when the filing fee must be paid to prevent dismissal and fails to consider payment plans, which is an issue he is required to decide and write in his order per statute, 737 ILCS 5/5-105(e). These omissions of the Judge are violations of the First and Fifth Amendments rights to redress of grievances (access to the courts) and due process.

7.      The Clerk oversees the office of the Clerk of the CCCC. She and her staff are responsible for filing and maintaining a record of all civil cases filed and heard in the CCCC. The Clerk is responsible, in her official capacity, for the actions of her staff as alleged herein. The only information a plaintiff obtains from the Clerk on her website in regards to in forma pauperis petitions is that they must be heard by a judge.  The Clerk’s authority to file complaints is determined by the rules of the CCCC and Illinois Statutes:

CCCC Rule 0.3.1 Clerk of Court

(a) The Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County shall perform the duties usually performed by the Clerk as provided in “An Act to revise the law in relation to clerks of courts,” Chapter 25, Illinois Revised Statutes.

 

705 ILCS 105/10
The principal clerk shall, in all cases, be responsible for the acts of his or her deputies.


705 ILCS 105/13
The clerks shall attend the sessions of their respective courts, preserve all the files and papers thereof, make, keep and preserve complete records of all the proceedings and determinations thereof, except in cases otherwise provided by law, and do and perform all other duties pertaining to their offices, as may be required by law or the rules and orders of their courts respectively.

 

8.      The Clerk of the CCCC, on information and belief, refuses to accept a complaint for filing unless the Plaintiff pays the filing fee or presents to the Clerk a copy of an order from the Judge granting in forma pauperis status.

9.      The statutes of the State of Illinois, 735 ILCS 5/5-105, state:

The clerk of the court shall not refuse to accept any complaint, appearance, or other paper presented by the applicant if accompanied by an application to sue or defend in forma pauperis, and those papers shall be considered filed on the date the application is presented.

 

This is a non-discretionary act of the Clerk of the CCCC.

10.  Plaintiff of October 2, 2008 arrived in the courtroom of the Judge at 10:30 a.m. and waited until the call was ending to hand the courtroom clerk a Petition to Sue as an Indigent Person (Exhibit B) and a tort Complaint (Exhibit C).

11.  At approximately noon the court proceedings had ended, the Judge had retired to his chambers, and the courtroom clerk took the Plaintiff’s documents and documents from other similarly situated persons to the Judge’s chambers.

12.  Approximately an hour later, the Judge’s staff came out and gave all the papers and orders to an employee of the Clerk’s office, who told Plaintiff and other similarly situated persons to follow him to the Clerk’s office on the 8th floor of the Daley Center, Room 801.

13.  In room 801 in the line for filing complaints each in succession after a period of waiting the Clerk’s staff called Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals up to the counter.

14.  Plaintiff was informed that the Judge denied the Petition. Plaintiff asked why? The Clerk’s staff stated “You can’t sue in good faith.” The Clerk’s staff demanded payment of the filing fee of $381 in order to file the complaint.

15.  Plaintiff stated she could not pay the fee. The Clerk’s staff refused to file the complaint without the fee, so Plaintiff demanded her papers back. The Clerk’s staff withheld the order from Plaintiff and gave back the complaint and blank copies of the proposed order.

16.  Plaintiff immediately went back to the Judge’s courtroom and requested to have her case (Petition) recalled to the courtroom Sheriff’s deputy, who was the only person in the courtroom at that time. She sat quietly with her walker on a bench in the gallery.

17.  The Sheriff’s deputy went to the Judge’s chamber and came back and told Plaintiff her situation was being reviewed.

18.  A secretary or law clerk who refused to reveal her name or position came out and told Plaintiff she would not be heard. Plaintiff told her that she did not receive a copy of the order and this woman went in the back and eventually came back with a copy of the order that said the Petition was denied because “cannot maintain action in good faith.” Plaintiff stated to this lady that this order was legally insufficient and void and she wanted to make an instanter motion to reconsider. The lady stated she would not give legal advice, when none was asked for.

19.  The lady stated that the Judge was gone. Plaintiff stated she would wait until he returned. The lady stated that Plaintiff would have to come back another day at 9:30 for motions. Plaintiff stated that she needed a case number and that the Clerk had failed to write one on the order. The lady stated she would give no legal advice. Plaintiff stated that she wanted to know the administrative procedure for appealing the decision. The lady stated she would give no legal advice.

20.  Plaintiff stated she needed the lady’s name so that she could appeal the ruling and that she would come back the next day with a motion to reconsider. The lady refused to give her name and left.

21.  The courtroom deputy refused to give the lady’s name or the nature of her position in the court.

22.  Plaintiff stated she would go in the back to the chambers and ask the law clerk to identify the lady, as she had the same standing as a pro se counsel as an attorney to request information from the secretary and law clerk in the chambers. The courtroom deputy stated he would not allow Plaintiff to go to the chambers.

23.  Plaintiff then got out her cell phone and called the CCCC Chief Judge Evan’s office. Rosemary answered the phone and Plaintiff politely requested the name of the secretary and law clerks for the Judge. Rosemary stated she didn’t give out that information, not even first names. She demanded the name of the caller and Plaintiff stated Linda. She demanded Plaintiff’s last name and Plaintiff stated, “when you give me your last name, I’ll give you mine.”  Plaintiff asked Rosemary how to make a complaint to the Chief Judge and Rosemary said to write a letter and gave the address.

24.  During this time, two Sheriff’s Sergeants and several Officers arrived in the courtroom. As Plaintiff was talking on the phone, the deputies ordered her to leave the courtroom and the oriental Sgt. known to others as “Q” threatened Plaintiff with an unlawful arrest for “trespass to state supported land.” Plaintiff demanded their names and the name of the lady. They refused to give their names and said “read it off my badge”, but were too far for Plaintiff to read the names, except for two deputies, Woods badge 11223 and Erman. Plaintiff stated she wasn’t leaving until she had the name of the lady so she could write a proper appeal identifying all the actors in the situation. The deputies then ordered Plaintiff to stand and submit to arrest. They grabbed her papers and her walker away from her and Plaintiff stood up. The deputies ordered Plaintiff to walk to the door and Plaintiff replied: “that’s impossible because you took my walker.”

25.  The deputies surrounded Plaintiff and returned the walker and Plaintiff walked out of the courtroom door surrounded by the deputies and led by Sgt. Q. They did not arrest Plaintiff, but a deputy pulled the walker too fast causing Plaintiff to lose her grip. Then Deputy Woods pushed Plaintiff, Plaintiff lost her balance and had to grab Woods’ shoulder to keep from falling. Plaintiff loudly complained: “stop assaulting me.” The deputies then gave back the walker and backed off a bit.

26.  Plaintiff then proceeded to the Clerk’s satellite office next to the Judge’s courtroom and went up to the counter and asked the name of the lady and the Judge’s law clerks, two of whom came into the room while Plaintiff was talking.  The two clerk’s assistants and the two law clerks refused to identify the lady or themselves. Plaintiff called a friend on her cell phone and was told one of the law clerk’s names was “Donald”. Plaintiff then left the building.

27.  The next day Plaintiff was granted food stamps by the Illinois Department of Human Services (“IL Medicaid”).

28.  Plaintiff has a clear right to have either her Indigency Petition approved or to receive a written order stating the specific reasons for the denial. The Judge had a clear duty to approve the Indigency Application or to issue a written order stating the specific reasons for denial. Now that Plaintiff has been granted food stamps, the Judge has an absolute duty to approve the Indigency Petition. The Clerk had a clear duty to file the Complaint.

29.  By refusing to perform their statutory duties, the Clerk and the Judge violated Plaintiff’s right to due process, her right to equal protection of the laws and her right to petition the government for a redress of grievances as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Illinois.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff, Linda L. Shelton respectfully

requests that this Honorable Court:

a.         issue a writ of mandamus requiring

1.                  that Dorothy Brown, the Clerk, accept the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint nunc pro tunc to October 2, 2008; and

2.                  that the Honorable Judge Maddux, grant Plaintiff’s Indigency Petition;

3.                  that Judge Maddux’s staff must identify themselves and state their positions when asked by a citizen;

4.                  that Judge Maddux’s staff will cease and desist using Sheriff’s deputies to harass citizens seeking grants of Indigency Petitions, will stop in so doing obstructing justice, and will stop violating constitutional and statutory rights of such citizens;

b.         issue an order requiring Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff for the costs associated with bringing this action including but not limited to parking fees and Xeroxing costs;

c.         grant such other relief as this Court deems appropriate including but not limited to reprimanding the Judge for violation of his oath of office.

 

Under penalties as provided by law pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/109-1 I certify that the statements set forth herein are true and correct.

 

____________________________                           

October 9, 2008                                              Linda L. Shelton

 

 

Linda Lorincz Shelton, Ph.D., M.D.

Plaintiff Pro Se

 

 

 

 

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