Pro Se Chicago's Weblog

May 21, 2016

New Trial Setting Call System replaces Black Line Call in Cook County Courts


Law division cases will now be scheduled for a trial setting date in courtroom 2005 either 15 months or 28 months from the date filed. All litigants will receive postcard notice of such hearings. The new system is explained in the following order from the new Law Division Presiding Judge. This Trial Setting Call system replaces the unconstitutional Black Line Call System.

STATE OF ILLINOIS           )
)  SS
COUNTY OF COOK            )

 

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS LAW DIVISION

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 16-2 TRIAL SETTING CALL

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Effective April  1 , 2016, the Black Line Call currently heard in Courtroom 2006 will be replaced by a Trial Setting Call, that will also be heard in Courtroom 2006.

I.  The following Law Division Black Line Call General Administrative Orders are hereby vacated: 03-1, 04-2, 05-1, 05-2 and 06-1.

II.  Law Division Master Calendar System:

A. Cases included in the Master Calendar System:

  1.   All cases currently assigned to the Motion Calendar Section of the Law Division as designated by the Presiding Judge of the Law Division.

B. Cases excluded from the Master Calendar System:

  1.   All cases currently assigned to the Individual General Calendar Section, Individual Commercial Calendar Section, or the Tax and Miscellaneous Remedies Section of the Law Division, unless designated by specific order.

C.  The Master Calendar System consists of the following:

  1.   Motion Calendars as designated by the Presiding Judge of the Law
  2.   (Courtroom 2006) Trial Setting
  3.   (Courtroom 2005) Trial Call, Trial Setting Status Call, Prove-up Call and Motion Calls.
  4.   Trial Rooms as designated by the Presiding Judge of the Law Division.

Ill.      This General Administrative Order will apply to all cases currently assigned to the Law Divisions Master Calendar System and all cases filed in the future assigned to the Master Calendar System as designated by the Presiding Judge of the Law Division.

IV.     Master Calendar Case Designations:

A.  Category 1 Case Type: All cases assigned to the Master Calendar excluding: Medical Malpractice, Legal Malpractice, Product Liability and Construction

  1.   Trial Setting Date will be approximately 15 months from the filing date of the
  2.   Trial Setting Date: Electronic or postcard notice will be sent by the Clerk of the Circuit Court to all parties of record or pro se litigants approximately twelve (12)months from the filing date of the
  3.   Trial Setting Date will be approximately 90 days from the date electronic or postcard notice is sent out.

B.  Category 2 Case Type: Medical Malpractice, Legal Malpractice, Product Liability  and Construction Injury

  1.   Trial Setting Date will be approximately 28 months from the filing date of the lawsuit.
  2.   Trial Setting Date: Electronic or postcard notice will be sent by the Clerk of the Circuit Court to all parties of record or pro se litigants approximately twenty-four {24) months from the filing date of the Lawsuit.
  3.   Trial Setting Date will be approximately 120 days from the date electronic or postcard notice is sent out.

V.  All cases appearing on the Trial Setting Call will receive Trial All parties should discuss, prior to appearing for Trial Setting, reasonable Trial Dates to suggest to the Court on the Trial Setting Date.

VI.  Motion Procedure for Master Calendar Cases:

A. The assigned Motion Judge will address all discovery issues and hear all motions excluding motions to continue a trial, motions to vacate, alter, modify, or reconsider orders entered in Courtroom 2005 or 2006 and those motions that must be presented to the Presiding Judge of the Law Division by Circuit Court General Order. These excluded motions should be presented on the appropriate Courtroom 2005 Motion Call.

B.  All motions to continue trial on a case assigned to the Master Calendar Section must be presented to the Presiding Judge of the Law Division or his or her designee on the appropriate Courtroom 2005 motion call. Motion Judges may not set or continue a case for trial.

C.  If all discovery is complete and pending motions ruled upon, the assigned Motion Judge shall enter a Trial Certification This order shall be entered prior to any assigned trial date. If the certified case has no assigned trial date, the case shall be placed on the Trial Setting Status Call in Court room 2005, fourteen (l 4) days from the entry date, for the attorneys to appear and receive a trial date. Failure to have a trial certification order entered will not serve as a basis to continue the trial date.

D.  If at any time All Parties Agree that their case is ready for trial they may present a motion in Courtroom 2005 for Immediate Trial Assignment and the case will be assigned by random computer assignment for the trial to begin

VII. The Transition from the Black Line Trial Call to the Trial Setting Call:

A.  Commencing April I , 2016, Master Calendar Cases will no longer enter the Black Line Pool of

B.  Cases will no longer be categorized or re-categorized, removed from the Black Line Pool or re-sequences within the Black Line

C.  The Black Line Call will continue in Courtroom 2006, until all cases currently in the Black Line Pool have been assigned a trial

D. Cases not currently in the Black Line Pool will be identified as Transition

  1.  The Transition Trial Setting Call shall be conducted from May l, 2016 through July 31, 2016, in Courtroom 2006, with the oldest cases appearing first.
  2. The cases identified for transition will begin appearing in Courtroom 2006 at a rate approximately 60 per day for Trial
  3. Electronic or postcard notice will be sent out to attorneys and all pro se litigants to appear in Courtroom 2006 on the Transition Trial Setting Call, at least thirty (30) days prior to the court
  4. Parties shall be assigned a trial date on the Transition Trial Setting Call, and should discuss an agreed upon trial date, prior to their appearance on the Transition Trial Setting
  5. Effective July 31, 2016, the transition process shall be

VIII. Trial Setting Call

A. Effective August 1, 2016, the Trial Setting Call will commence in Courtroom 2006 with up to thirty (30) cases appearing per day, based on case type and filing

IX.  Nothing in this order will limit the inherent power and discretion of any Judge to enter an order the Judge feels is

It is further ordered that this Order be spread upon the records of this Court.

Dated at Chicago, Illinois this 23rd day of March, 20 1 6.

Honorable James P. Flannery Jr.

Presiding Judge Law Division

March 18, 2016

How to get your kids’ school records if divorced


This was recommended by David Bambic and Heather Stern – activists trying to reform family courts and make them follow the law!

Help with getting School records here is the format that is used at any and all schools works in 50 states.
Subject: fepra letter/REQUEST FOR FILES
EXAMPLE XXXXXXXX IL. SCHOOL DISTRICT XXX
PROVEN IT WORKS IN THIS ILLINOIS DISTRICTS
Principal :EMAIL ADDRESS

XXXXXX Middle School
SCHOOL ADDRESS HERE

RE (XXXXXX X XXXXXX) D.O.B. (XX/XX/XXXX) S.S. (ss number)
SEVNTH (seventh )
PARENT NAME
ADDRESS
XXXXXX IL.XXXXX

Dear Principal Please send complete records of the
above student, my (son or daughter), to me at the above
address.

Test results, application forms, cumulative scholastic
records, enrollment records, health records, and any
other information concerning my (son or daughter), are
also requested. Please include grades of all subjects
to date. If the grading system is in the least
unusual, please include an interpretation. Also please
include all “shot” records, vaccination records, and
immunization records, insurance records, counsellor’s
reports, accident reports, incident reports,
enrollment cards and report cards. You are also
requested to include all records of or involving
psychological counseling, testing, etc.

In addition, please send me copies of all
“developmental evaluation”, psychological and
psychiatric evaluations, test results and reports,
Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) reports.
Division of Social Services reports, home studies,
custody evaluations, copies of any and all requests
received from any source concerning (FULL NAME OF CHILD)
as well as any other documents, reports,
correspondence and the like in (FULL NAME OF CHILD)
file. Please send copies of all documents related to
or in connection with any case worker or social worker
investigation, interviews, etc. I, also, request that
I receive copies of all notices and material sent to
the custodial parent.

I also request that copies of all of the
aforementioned type of reports, etc. that become
available as (FULL NAME OF CHILD) progresses through the
(XXXXXXXX Middle School ) be sent to me as they become part of his record or are available to the school. As you are most likely aware, being a professional educator in the teaching and/or school administration profession, Federal Law requires that I be furnished all of the above information. Your attention is directed to The Family Educational Rights and Privacy act (FERPA), Public Law 93-380, Title 20, USCA Section 1232(g), et. seq. and Title 20, USCA Section 93-568 et seq. As you also know, and your local school board lawyer will be glad to confirm and verify this for you, Federal Law requires that this information, files, papers, documents, etc. cannot be kept from me and must be released to either parent if requested. This is a formal written request, pursuant to the above cited FERPA. In the event any of the above requested reports or information is legitimately confidential by law, and not allowed to be released to me, I request that the rest of this request be considered separately, and an itemized list of the reacted items be included. Sincerely, PARENTS FULL NAME
FULL ADDRESS
E-MAIL CONACT: XXXXXXXXXXXXX@XXXXX
PHONE CONTACT :1-XXX-XXX-XXXX

August 25, 2015

Sample appeal – Illinois small claims court – landlord steals items


Small claims court can be frustrating when judges look down on pro se plaintiffs and simply rubber stamp everything the defendant’s lawyer states.  This is a sample appeal of such an unjust ruling where the plaintiff lost due to I believe purposeful misconduct of an attorney and a judge. Read the Appellant’s brief here.

Note that appeals are not like trials. The Appellate Court may ONLY consider information on the record on appeal and in the transcripts. YOU CAN NOT ADD new evidence or information. Therefore, at trial in the local court, make a list and make sure you have all your witnesses and evidence or you won’t be able to add it later.  If the judge refuses to hear a witness or allow you to introduce evidence, then ask the judge to “make an offer of proof” (i.e. to have the  person testify or admit the evidence without it being considered just so that it is on the record). If you anticipate this will be a problem, then file the evidence or affidavit instead of as a motion, label it an “offer of proof” and file it in your case attached to this “offer of proof” where you state you are filing this offer of proof and why you are doing so.

The litigants names and case number were changed so they remain anonymous, except for the name of the corrupt landlord’s corporation and the judge.

Remember, in small claims, Illinois Supreme Court Rules 286(b) allows a small claims court to hear and view all relevant evidence, admit evidence with more relaxed rules of procedure and rules of evidence upon order of the court. This means the court may allow affidavits as evidence and not require the presence of a witness and may allow documents to be admitted without strict rules of authentication.

You must follow strictly all appeal rules, so don’t forget to read Illinois Supreme Court Rules for civil appeals and your local court rules also. Illinois Supreme Court Rules are here. If you don’t follow them, your appeal will be rejected.

Note strict rules such as:

  • 1 1/2 inch margin on left
  • requirement of certification page stating you followed the rules as to page limits
  • you use an appendix and not exhibits
  • the appendix must include an index to the record on appeal and the transcripts (if any), that the page number of testimony of specific witnesses must be indexed and that if you did not have a court reporter and made a “bystander’s report” instead that it is also in index, a copy of the order appealed from, and a copy of the notice of appeal
  • notice of filing and service and filing of record on appeal or record of proceedings (transcripts)
  • don’t forget to include your $50 filing fee or a petition for indigency (see Illinois Supreme Court web site and your local appellate court division’s rules)
  • bind the appeal brief securely on the left side (three staples is OK)

Note that you can not just make conclusory statements (“They ripped me off”).  You must back up all your statements, documents, testimony with evidence (testimony by witnesses, documents and reference to “authorities”), with case law (where a court has interpreted a law and said this is how the rules or statutes work and what they mean), or back it up with reference to other authorities (statutes, supreme court rule, administrative rules – note statutes are sent to administrative rules committee and then an administrative rule is made – many pro se litigants are not aware of this – see here; there are similar administrative rules in federal law and all state laws).

November 28, 2014

Why grand juries and trials so easily fixed and manipulated by attorneys


What is a grand jury, how does it work, and what is it’s purpose?

A grand jury is a group of citizens brought together to consider evidence in order to determine only one thing – Is there probable cause to charge a person with a crime? It is supposed to be a safeguard against the state bringing outrageous charges against innocent people for the purpose of harassment, but it has turned into a joke as the jurors don’t understand what they are doing, what they can do, the purpose of the grand jury, and how grand juries are manipulated which is clearly and in great detail explained in the link to an article available on line in this post.

Probable cause is not proof of innocence or guilt. It is just evidence that may be hearsay or untrue, suggesting a person committed a crime. It has to include all the elements of a crime. (For example: Elements of trespass to state supported land are that a person was told to leave and did not and that their actions interrupted a citizen’s use of services in the state owned building.)

Probable cause evidence is presented to the grand jury solely by the prosecutor in a closed secret hearing. Usually the defendant is not called as a witness nor is he or she aware that a grand jury has been called in their  case and only the most minimal amount of evidence, including hearsay allegations without proof, are presented to the grand jury.

The grand jury has the right to call witnesses and question witnesses, but they never do, as they are urged to work quickly, usually hearing a case in a minute or two at the most and their instructions are rarely explained to them in a clear unhurried fashion.

The defense has no rights in a grand jury, except that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the prosecutor may not strike foul blows by giving knowingly false information or exluding such overwhelming exculpatory evidence that there is no way a grand jury would find probable cause. (Like excluding the video in the Garner case).

There is no double jeopardy with a grand jury.  That means the prosecutor may call a new grand jury and try to get an indictment again, as long as it is within the statute of limitations for the crime.

This article explains in great detail why confirmatory bias taints particularly one-sided presentations like the Brown case to the grand jury, as well as trials if they are not extremely fair, and even if they are “fair.” One of the most striking findings in emotional cases is that the jury remembers what is said first no matter what else is said and may blank out all other testimony. There are psychological reasons for this fact.

This is why grand juries must be given evidence only by special prosecutors when the defendants are people who the state’s attorney interacts with daily – like police & judges. This is why police are almost never successfully indicted. Read it carefully. Think of laws that must be changed in order to firmly control this bias. 

Click here to read article: Memo of Law – Confirmatory Bias

SUMMARY OF ARTICLE

Confirmation bias, also called myside bias, is the tendency to search for, interpret, or prioritize information in a way that confirms one’s beliefs or hypotheses. It is a type of cognitive bias and a systematic error of inductive reasoning. People display this bias when they gather or remember information selectively, or when they interpret it in a biased way. The effect is stronger for emotionally charged issues and for deeply entrenched beliefs. People also tend to interpret ambiguous evidence as supporting their existing position. Biased search, interpretation and memory have been invoked to explain attitude polarization (when a disagreement becomes more extreme even though the different parties are exposed to the same evidence), belief perseverance (when beliefs persist after the evidence for them is shown to be false), the irrational primacy effect (a greater reliance on information encountered early in a series) and illusory correlation (when people falsely perceive an association between two events or situations)

September 25, 2014

1203 Motions to Reconsider within 30 days of judgment

Filed under: Circuit Court of Cook County, Court Procedure, Motions to Reconsider — Linda Shelton @ 11:12 am

NOTE: 1203 is an Illinois statute about motion to reconsider within 30 days of a court order. It does not apply to an appeal or a federal court. You have to look up each court’s rules and state statutes to find how that level of state or federal court requires certain procedures, deadlines, etc., in regard to motions to reconsider.

In Illinois Motions to Reconsider an order filed within 30 days are called 1203 motions. These motions automatically stay the judgment. However, collateral issues will continue to be heard and ruled upon or issues not appealed can still be continued and enforced.

The Illinois Supreme Court Rules on motions, service of pleadings, etc. are fairly clear. If you don’t understand a particular rule or statute, please feel free to ask and explain what part of it you don’t understand. As you probably know, motions generally start with with a request (NOW COMES John Doe, who respectfully requests XXXXX and in support of states as follows:);then a statement of jurisdiction (This is a 1203 motion XXXXX where John Doe requests the Court to reconsider a motion which ordered XXXX on 1/1/2012.); then a statement of the facts; then an argument with each statement backed up by facts and authorities; then a prayer for relief (this is an end statement such as: Wherefore, John Doe requests the court to reconsider the motion dated 1/1/2012 due to the following reasons XXXX, described in detailed in this motion) See- 735 ILCS 5/2-601-623 REMEMBER – IL is a FACT-PLEADING state. If you don’t know what that means, then ask. That is the main reason motions are dismissed. The federal court is not fact pleading.

NOTE: Also pro se’s make errors by not backing up each and every statement with facts and authorities as required by Illinois Motion Statute (case law, statutes, supreme court rules, administrative rules, etc). Just making a conclusory statement is not enough to back up the reason for making a motion.

735 ILCS 5/2-615. Motions with respect to pleadings. (a) All objections to pleadings shall be raised by motion. The motion shall point out specifically the defects complained of, and shall ask for appropriate relief, such as: that a pleading or portion thereof be stricken because substantially insufficient in law, or that the action be dismissed, or that a pleading be made more definite and certain in a specified particular, or that designated immaterial matter be stricken out, or that necessary parties be added, or that designated misjoined parties be dismissed, and so forth.

(b) If a pleading or a division thereof is objected to by a motion to dismiss or for judgment or to strike out the pleading, because it is substantially insufficient in law, the motion must specify wherein the pleading or division thereof is insufficient.

(c) Upon motions based upon defects in pleadings, substantial defects in prior pleadings may be considered.

(d) After rulings on motions, the court may enter appropriate orders either to permit or require pleading over or amending or to terminate the litigation in whole or in part.

(e) Any party may seasonably move for judgment on the pleadings.

______________

ISCR -Rule 104. Service of Pleadings and Other Papers; Filing

(a) Delivery of Copy of Complaint. Every copy of a summons used in making service shall have attached thereto a copy of the complaint, which shall be furnished by plaintiff.

(b) Filing of Papers Documents and Proof of Service. Pleadings subsequent to the complaint, written motions, and other papers documents required to be filed shall be filed with the clerk with a certificate of counsel or other proof that copies have been served on all parties [an affidavit] who have appeared and have not theretofore been found by the court to be in default for failure to plead.

________________

Rule 137. Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Documents—Sanctions

(a) Signature requirement/certification. Every pleading, motion and other document of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other document and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.

_____________

Rule 274. Multiple Final Orders and Postjudgment Motion

A party may make only one postjudgment motion [1203 motion to reconsider] directed at a judgment order that is otherwise final. If a final judgment order is modified pursuant to a postjudgment motion, or if a different final judgment or order is subsequently entered, any party affected by the order may make one postjudgment motion directed at the superseding judgment or order. Until disposed, each timely postjudgment motion shall toll the finality and appealability of the judgment or order at which it is directed. The pendency of a Rule 137 claim does not affect the time in which postjudgment motions directed at final underlying judgments or orders must be filed, but may toll the appealability of the judgment under Rule 303(a)(1). A postjudgment motion directed at a final order on a Rule 137 claim is also subject to this rule.

Adopted October 14, 2005.

__________________

 

The decision of whether to grant a motion to reconsider rests within the discretion of the circuit court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. A.M. Realty Western, LLC v. MSMC Realty, LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 121183, ¶ 38

The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to allow a party to bring to the court’s attention newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, or errors in the court’s previous application of existing law. Compton v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 382 Ill. App. 3d 323, 331 (2008). [emphasis added]

NOTE: The purpose is not to re-argue what you have already argued. There must be new evidence that previously was not discovered, changes in the law, or errors in the court’s previous application of existing law, including the court mis-quoting a brief or making factual errors in their argument that are contradicted by the brief.

The following is a quote from the Illinois Supreme Court explaining about 1203 motions with citations.

*** the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1203 (West 2006)). Section 2–1203 provides as follows:
“Motions after judgment in non-jury cases. (a) In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief. (b) A motion filed in apt time stays enforcement of the judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2–1203 (West 2006).

One purpose of a section 2–1203 postjudgment motion is to alert the circuit court to errors it has made and to afford an opportunity for their correction. See In re Marriage of King, 336 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87 (2002); Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. v. Eichwedel, 266 Ill. App. 3d 88, 98-99 (1994); Regas v. Associated Radiologists, Ltd., 230 Ill. App. 3d 959, 967 (1992). Another recognized purpose of a section 2–1203 motion is to bring to the court’s attention newly discovered evidence which was not available at the time of trial, changes in the law, or errors in the court’s previous application of existing law. See Korogluyan v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 622, 627 (1991); Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 987 (1987). Information cognizable under a section 2–1203 motion includes actions taken by other courts. See, e.g., Federal Kemper Life, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 98-99 (affirming circuit court’s grant of section 2–1203 motion to vacate judgment and consolidate action with another case based on being informed of other judge’s rulings). The motion is addressed to the circuit court’s sound discretion. Whether a trial court has abused its discretion turns on whether the court’s refusal to vacate violates the moving party’s right to fundamental justice and manifests an improper application of discretion. See In re Marriage of King, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 87 (and cases cited therein); Federal Kemper Life, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 98-99 (and cases cited therein). Relevant here, section 2–1203 makes no distinction between those judgments entered before an appeal and those entered after an appeal. [(Il. Supreme Ct. 2007)]

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ILLINOIS STATUTE FOR MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE ORDER:

735 ILCS 5/2-1203. Motions after judgment in non-jury cases. 

(a) In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of Section 413 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, a motion filed in apt time stays enforcement of the judgment except that a judgment granting injunctive or declaratory relief shall be stayed only by a court order that follows a separate application that sets forth just cause for staying the enforcement.

August 1, 2014

Federal Petiton proving corrupt judges, sheriff, & state’s attorney in Cook County


SIC color_edited-1

PLEASE come to court and show support for Shelton at the next court date on Jan 13, 2016, 10am, 2600 S California, Chicago IL, courtroom 506. Write letters to the U.S. Attorney, Sen. Durbin, Sen. Kirk, your senator, Rep. Lipinsky or your representative, and the press. Some addresses are at end of post. Spread the word through social media that Shelton needs public support to continue these blogs and fight unlawful attacks against her in retaliation for them and for helping so many with pro se litigation and defense.

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the federal district court in Chicago. The Cook County Sheriff in retaliation for Shelton filing civil rights suits has been falsely arresting Shelton repeatedly and maliciously prosecuting her for battery to officers. Of NOTE: She is never charged with battering anyone else and has a lifelong history of non-violent pacifism.  For more information go here.  Also read Shelton’s other blogs: http://cookcountyjudges.wordpress.com  http://chicagofbi.wordpress.com   http://cookcountysheriffdeputies.wordpress.com   http://illinoiscorruption.blogspot.com and search them for posts about Madigan in particular. They have beaten her so many times and so viciously that she now has post-traumatic-stress disorder and when aggressively approached by officers goes into a flashback where she cries, screams, tries to protect herself from imagined blows swinging her arms randomly (as she is reliving attacks) and cowers. If she is pushed, carried, or dragged, due to disabilities and severe balance problems she grabs at things to steady herself – all the while being out of touch with reality during these brief PTSD flashbacks. She has been arrested and charged with FELONY battery to an officer with a possible sentence of 3-14 years for “touching an officers ear and pulling her hair until her hand slipped off”. She has been held in jail one year on no bail and only recently released on $300,000 bail. This is unconstitutional excessive bail She has been denied notice, counsel of choice, discovery of evidence, and has been fraudulently accussed of being psychotic and unfit for trial, illegally without notice or jury trial, without any professional saying she was psychotic or unfit, sent to a secure mental health facility who after a few months said in court she was never unfit and is not psychotic and sent her back to jail. As a result of this lawlessness Shelton has now filed at Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Federal District Court asking for relief and presentment of the criminal conduct of judges, sheriff staff, state’s attorney, court clerk, and other corrupt persons to the U.S. Attorney for  prosecution. You can read it here: (download will be 24 pages) fed habeas 6-12-14 final Full Petition with evidence (download will be 400+ pages) Habeas Petition Asst. US Attorney Zachary T. Fardon United States Attorney’s Office Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division 219 S. Dearborn St., 5th Floor Chicago, IL 60604 Phone: (312) 353-5300 ______________________ FBI,Special Agent in Charge – Chicago Robert J. Holley 2111 W. Roosevelt Road Chicago, IL 60608 Phone: (312) 421-6700 Fax: (312) 829-5732/38 E-mail: Chicago@ic.fbi.gov _________________________ Senator Durbin WASHINGTON, D.C. 711 Hart Senate Bldg. Washington, DC 20510 9 am to 6 pm ET (202) 224-2152 – phone (202) 228-0400 – fax ____________________ Senator Kirk Washington, DC 524 Hart Senate Office Building Washington DC, 20510 Phone: 202-224-2854 Fax: 202-228-4611 ___________________ Congressman Lipinsky Washington, D.C. Office 1717 Longworth HOB Washington, DC 20515 P (202) 225 – 5701 P (866) 822 – 5701 F (202) 225 – 1012

July 31, 2014

When opposing counsel lie to the court


You can file a Petition for adjudiction of criminal contempt against the attorney whether the case is in the local court or the appellate court. You should attach an affidavit stating that you have reviewed the transcripts or motion wherein the false statement was made. You should swear that the statement was false and how it was false You can ask the court to hold the attorney in contempt for fraud upon the court and sentence him for criminal contempt after a trial. If the court holds the attorney in contempt for fraud, then you can file with the ARDC and ask for the attorney to be disbarred. ARDC = Attorney Regulatory and Disciplinary Commission.

A petition is written just like a motion, but it is a collateral proceeding and not part of the case. It should be given a separate case number by the clerk.

Opposing counsel is an officer of the court. Attorneys have a code of conduct under IL Supreme Court Rules that prevent them from making false statements. They can be disbarred and should be.

Criminal contempt is when someone makes  false statements or commits fraud upon the court. Criminal contempt cannot be purged. As those charged with crimes have a 5th Amendment right to remain silent they can not be ordered to show cause as in a civil contempt case where someone refuses to obey an order.  Therefore you must file a Petition for Adjudication of Criminal Contempt instead of a Motion for Rule to Show Cause as you would with civil contempt. Criminal contempt is an act that

Civil  contempt is when you disobey an order and you hold the keys to the jail as you can expunge the order to jail you if you comply with the order such as pay child support or perform an act ordered by the judge. This is not an attempt to embarrass the court or bring the court into disrepute.

The following contains extensive important case law relevant to above and your cases.

CONTEMPT OF COURT (CIVIL V CRIMINAL) 

Circle Management, LLC., v. Olivier, 378 Ill.App.3d 601, 317 Ill.Dec. 555, 882 N.E.2d 129 (2007) [Ill.App. 1st Dist]

Major controlling case with amici including Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (LAF), the Lawyer’s Committee for Better housing (LCBH), Cabrini-Green legal Aid (CGLA) and the Northwestern University School of Law Bluhm Legal Clinic (Bluhm Clinic).

         

Courts have inherent authority to punish a party for contempt. See People v. Warren, 173 Ill.2d 348, 370, 219 Ill.Dec. 533, 671 N.E.2d 700 (1996) (“The power to punish for contempt does not depend on constitutional or legislative grant”) [further citations omitted]

“Contempt of court has been defined as any act that is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or that is calculated to lessen its authority or dignity.” Levaccare v. Levaccare, 376 Ill.App.3d 503, 508, 315 Ill.Dec. 280, 876 N.E.2d 280 (2007), quoting People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill.App.3d 433, 438, 266 Ill.Dec. 713, 775 N.E.2d 275 (2002).

Criminal contempt sanctions are punitive in nature and require a finding that the contemptuous conduct was willful. People v. Minor, 281 Ill.App.3d 568, 574, 217 Ill.Dec. 449, 667 N.E.2d 538 (1996); People v. Ernest, 141 Ill.2d 412, 422, 152 Ill.Dec. 544, 566 N.E.2d 231 (1990).

Civil contempt is prospective in nature, and is “designed to compel future compliance with a court order.” Emery, 374 Ill.App.3d at 977, 313 Ill.Dec. 502, 872 N.E.2d 485, quoting In re Marriage of Sharp, 369 Ill.App.3d 271, 279, 307 Ill.Dec. 885, 869 N.E.2d 539 (2006).

Although a court may enforce an order to pay money through contempt, this power is “limited to cases of willful refusal to obey the court’s order.” In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill.2d 266, 285, 82 Ill.Dec. 633, 469 N.E.2d 167 (1984).

“’It is not a contempt of court to fail to pay money which one neither has nor can obtain and which he has not causelessly either put out of his hands or failed to receive.’” Shapiro v. Shapiro, 113 Ill.App.2d 374, 388, 252 N.E.2d 93 (1969), quoting White v. Adolph, 305 Ill.App.76, 79, 26 N.E.2d 993 (1940)

Trial courts have inherent authority to impose sanctions against a party that fails to abide by valid court orders. Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill.2d 48, 67, 209 Ill.Dec. 623, 651 N.E.2d 1071 (1995); Smith v. City of Chicago, 299 Ill.App.3d 1048, 1054, 234 Ill.Dec. 108, 702 N.E.2d 274 (1998).

FRAUD – NOT JUST FALSE STATEMENT, BUT ALSO SUPPRESSION OF THE TRUTH

It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit “fraud upon the court” vitiates the entire proceeding. People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) (“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions.”); Moore v. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) (“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters …”); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) (“It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything.”); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).

Fraud maybe inferred from nature of acts complained of, individual and collective interest of alleged conspirators, situation, intimacy, and relation of parties at time of commission of acts, and generally all circumstances preceding and attending culmination of claimed conspiracy Illinois Rockford Corp. V. Kulp, 1968, 242 N.E. 2d 228, 41 ILL. 2d 215. “The Court has broadly defined fraud as any conduct calculated to deceive, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, by word of mouth, by look, or by gesture. Fraud includes the suppression of the truth, as well as the presentation of false information. (In re Witt (1991) 145 Ill.2d 380, 583 N.E.2d 526, 531, 164 Ill. Dec. 610).” See also In re Frederick Edward Strufe, Disciplinary case no. 93 SH 100 where the Court stated that “Fraud has been broadly defined as anything calculated to deceive.” “Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to “embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.” Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated “a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.”

Fraud does not always divest court of jurisdiction and cause orders to be void. They however would be voidable.

 

Misrepresentation of neglect in petition for wardship did not void jurisdiction.

 

An order is rendered void only by lack of jurisdiction, not by error or impropriety. (p. 377)

 

Only fraud that confers only colorable jurisdiction upon court renders judgment void; fraud that occurs after court’s valid

 

Fraud can render a judgment void, but not all fraud can do so. (Johnson v. Hawkins (1972), 4 Ill.App.3d 29, 32, 280 N.E.2d 291.) There is a difference between fraud that confers only colorable jurisdiction upon the court, and fraud that occurs after the court’s valid acquisition of jurisdiction; only the former type of fraud will render a judgment void. (Schwarz v. Schwarz (1963), 27 Ill.2d 140, 144-45, 188 N.E.2d 673.) The latter type of fraud, fraud that occurs after jurisdiction has been acquired, will render the court’s  order voidable, but not void for lack of jurisdiction. (Vulcan Materials Co.  v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill.2d at 165, 70 Ill.Dec. 465, 449 N.E.2d 812; In re Marriage of Noble (1989), 192 Ill.App.3d 501, 509, 139 Ill.Dec. 133, 548 N.E.2d 518; James v. Chicago Transit Authority (1976), 42 Ill.App.3d 1033, 1034-35, 1 Ill.Dec. 552, 356 N.E.2d 834; Johnson v. Hawkins, 4 Ill.App.3d at 32, 280 N.E.2d 291.) Fraudulent concealment, for example, renders a court’s orders voidable, not void. In re Application of County Treasurer (1990), 194 Ill.App.3d 721, 726, 141 Ill.Dec. 350, 551 N.E.2d 343.

 

Can file civil rights suit against lawyer when they lie to the court and harm you

In ?  Vigus v. O’Bannon, 1886 N.E. 788, 118 Ill. 334; Hazelton v. Carolus, 1907 132 Ill. App. 512; Carter v. Mueller 457 N.E. 2d 1335 Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1983, The Supreme court has held that: “The elements of a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation (sometimes referred to as “(fraud and deceit)”are: (1) False statement of material fact; (2) known or believed to be false by the party making it; (3) intent to induce the other party to act; (4) action by the other party in reliance on the truth of the statement; and (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance. ______________, ____ U.S. _____ (_?_)

_____? citation_______Scott, 377 Mass. 364, 386 N.E. 2d 218, 220 (1979) See Lopez-Alexander, Unreported Order No. 85-279 (Colo. May 3, 1985) (Judge removed for, inter alia, a persistent pattern of abuse of the contempt power. The Mayor of Denver accepted the findings of the Denver County Court Judicial Qualification Commission that the judge’s conduct could not be characterized as mere mistakes or errors of law and that the conduct constituted willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute). Canon Ethics where there is a pattern of disregard or indifference, which warrant discipline.

Section 1983 of U.S.C.S. contemplates the depravation of Civil Rights through the Unconstitutional Application of a Law by conspiracy or otherwise. Mansell v. Saunders (CA 5 F 1A) 372 F 573, especially if the conspiracy was actually carried into effect, where an action is for a conspiracy to interfere with Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1985 (3), or for the depravation of such rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, if the conspiracy was actually carried into effect and plaintiff was thereby deprived of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and Laws, the gist of the action maybe treated as one for the depravation of rights under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, Lewis v. Brautigam (CA 5 F 1a) 227 F 2d 124, 55 ALR 2d 505, John W. Strong, 185, 777-78 (4 th ed. 1992).

Properly alleged facts within an affidavit that are not contradicted by counter affidavit are taken as true, despite the existence of contrary averments in the adverse party’s pleadings. Professional Group Travel, Ltd. v. Professional Seminar Consultants Inc., 136 ILL App 3d 1084, 483 N.E. 2d 1291; Buzzard v. Bolger, 117 ILL App 3d 887, 453 N.E. 2d 1129 et al.

i.e. even if false statements, unless you have affidavits that they are false, the statement is taken as true

FRAUD BY STATE IN CRIMINAL CASE – FALSE STATEMENTS TO CRIMINAL COURT

 

Where the public policy of the State of Illinois is violated, the order is void, Martin-Tregona v. Roderick, 29 Ill.App.3d 553, 331 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1975).

“Fraud upon the court” makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is clear and well-settled law that any attempt to commit “fraud upon the court” vitiates the entire proceeding. People v. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354, 192 N.E. 229 (1934)

To apprehend a person on a sham or pretextual charge is so dangerous to interest of privacy and personal security as to call into play the exclusionary rule … The officer’s subjective intent and beliefs are quite crucial … If sham arrest operating under the impression that an arrest for offense count not stand up – use exclusionary rule …arrest must have a good faith probable cause  Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132, 156, 69 L.Ed. 543, 45 S.Ct 280 (1925); Moss v. Cox, 311 F.Supp. 1245, 1252 (ED VA 1970)

Due Process Defense 97 ALR Fed. 273

Inability to pay child support, court fee, & court-appointed counselor or examiner


A COURT MAY AWARD THE NONCUSTODIAL PARENT CHILD SUPPORT IF THE CUSTODIAL PARENT IS MUCH WEALTHIER THAN NONCUSTODIAL PARENT. THIS IS SO THAT CHILD CAN LIVE SAME LIFESTYLE WITH BOTH PARENTS.

In re Marriage of Turk 2014 IL 116730

 

Appellate citation: 2013 IL App (1st) 122486.

 

      JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

            Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Kilbride, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

      Justice Theis specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Thomas.

 

            The parties to this Cook County child support dispute divorced in 2005 and have two sons, now ages 17 and 15. In 2012, the circuit court entered an agreed order establishing the father as custodial parent and setting up a visitation schedule for the mother under which she had regular visitation with the older boy once a week, for dinner on Wednesdays, and regular visitation with the younger boy, with weekly visits from Monday to Wednesday mornings, plus alternating weekends. This system gave her nearly equal time with him. At this time it was determined that the father earned approximately $150,000 per year and that the mother was earning less than $10,000. The father asked for termination of his obligation to pay support based on his custodial status, but the circuit court’s order required him to pay $600 per month in child support and to fund medical expenses not covered by insurance. The father’s claim that his designation as custodial parent meant that statute precluded requiring him to pay child support to a noncustodial parent was rejected by the circuit court, and the father appealed.

            The appellate court, like the circuit court, rejected the father’s claim of no obligation to pay child support, and it affirmed this aspect of the trial court’s ruling. However, it remanded for an evidentiary hearing for reconsideration as to the support amount. It did not, however, interfere with the circuit court’s ruling as to medical expenses.

            In this decision, the Illinois Supreme Court said that the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act expressly confers on courts the option to order either or both parents to pay an amount that is reasonable and necessary for the support of the child, and, in its discretion, to order payment of various expenses determined to be reasonable, including health needs not covered by insurance. The supreme court explained that a parent who is technically noncustodial may have visitation rights which place the child in that parent’s care for periods of time which involve commensurate cost. This can be problematic if the noncustodial parent has fewer resources to meet the substantial support costs of an extensive visitation schedule. This would not only be unfair, but would leave the poorer parent with insufficient resources to care for the child in a manner even minimally comparable to that of the wealthier parent. A child should not end up living commensurate with the wealthier custodial parent’s income only half the time, when staying with the wealthier custodial parent. This could be detrimental to the child. Therefore, a trial court may order a custodial parent to pay child support where the circumstances and the best interests of the child warrant it.

            While rejecting the custodial father’s claims as to the meaning of the statute, the appellate court had remanded for an evidentiary hearing, with directions for the circuit court to clearly explain the basis for any support awarded. It was correct in this regard, but the supreme court held that, on remand, the circuit court should also revisit with specificity the issue of what portion of uninsured medical expenses the father should be required to pay.

            The appellate court was, thus, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

________________________________________________________________

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT BEFORE A PERSON CAN BE JAILED FOR NONPAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT HE MUST BE GIVEN DUE PROCESS AND IN SOME CASES AN ATTORNEY – IF THE COURT DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT DUE PROCESS AS DEFINED IN THIS CASE

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 180 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2011) [2011 BL 161240]

If incarcerated for failing to pay child support must have been given due process – notice, due process evidentiary hearing where it must be proven that defendant has ability to pay child support, and counsel. In a civil case, due process does not always involve appointment of counsel.

This is true only if there are procedural safeguards:

These include (1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information from him; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for him to respond to statements and questions about his financial status; and (4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay,

and the opposing counsel (parent) is pro se, then the court is not required to appoint counsel.

 

June 17, 2014

Offers of Proof – Preserving barred evidence & testimony for appeal


OFFERS OF PROOF

These are used to preserve evidence or testimony for the record when the court bars its introduction during the trial or during an evidentiary hearing. During a trial, if an offer of proof is formally made, the jury will be excluded and the witness is put on the stand so that the testimony will be on the transcript or the attorney/pro se counsel may put the evidence on the record or state what they expect a witness would have said in detail, just to get it on the record for purposes of appeal.  Anything not on the record cannot be considered for appeal.  If the judge won’t let you do this, you can file an offer of proof with an attached affidavit as to what the witness would have said or attached evidentiary document. This memorandum explains offers of proof a little more clearly. Everything I write uses Illinois and federal case law. 

MEMORADUM OF LAW – OFFERS OF PROOF

NOW COMES, Linda Shelton who respectfully presents to the court this memorandum of law.

  1. The refusal to allow an offer of proof in a trial denies due process and is reason for overturning the verdict. Every defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. People v. Manion, 67 Ill.2d 564, 10 Ill.Dec. 547, 367  N.E.2d 1313 (1977) It is a fundamental error to deny the right to present a defense that requires the verdict be overturned. (Ibid)  Refusing to allow a person to place an offer of proof on the record, de facto denies defendant the right to present a defense.
  2. “When a party claims she has not been given the opportunity to prove her case because the trial court improperly barred certain evidence, she “must provide [the] reviewing court with an adequate offer of proof as to what the excluded evidence would have been.” In re Estate of Romanowski, 329 Ill. App. 3d 769, 773, 771 N.E.2d 966, 970 (2002). An offer of proof serves two primary functions: (1) it discloses to the trial court and opposing counsel the nature of the offered evidence, thus enabling the court to take appropriate action, and (2) it provides the reviewing court with an adequate record to determine whether the trial court’s action was erroneous. People v. Thompkins, 181 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 690 N.E.2d 984, 989 (1998).
  3. The traditional way of making an offer of proof is the “formal” offer, in which counsel offers the proposed evidence or testimony by placing a witness on the stand, outside the jury’s presence, and asking him questions to elicit with particularity what the witness would testify to if permitted to do so. People v. Wallace, 331 Ill. App. 3d 822, 831, 772 N.E.2d 785, 794 (2002); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §103.7, at 22 (8th ed. 2004).
  4. In lieu of a formal offer of proof, counsel may ask the trial court for permission to make representations regarding the proffered testimony. If counsel so requests, the court may–within its discretion–allow counsel to make such an informal offer of proof.
  5. A trial court may deem an informal offer of proof sufficient if counsel informs the court, with particularity, (1) what the offered evidence is or what the expected testimony will be, (2) by whom it will be presented, and (3) its purpose. Kim v. Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., Inc., 353 Ill. App. 3d 444, 451, 818 N.E.2d 713, 719 (2004). However, an informal offer is inadequate if counsel (1) “merely summarizes the witness’ testimony in a conclusory manner” (Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 23, 787 N.E.2d 796, 808 (2003)) or (2) offers unsupported speculation as to what the witness would say (People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 421, 588 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (1992)). In deciding whether to permit an informal offer of proof, the court should ask itself the following questions: (1) Are counsel’s representations accurate and complete? and (2) Would a better record be made by requiring counsel to make a formal offer of proof, even though doing so might be inconvenient and require more time?
  6. In addition, before deciding whether to accept counsel’s representations in lieu of a formal offer, the trial court should ask opposing counsel if he objects to proceeding in that fashion, even though counsel’s response in no way limits the court in exercising its discretion on this matter. If opposing counsel concedes the sufficiency of the offer or has no objection to proceeding by counsel’s representations, then opposing counsel’s client may not later challenge the court’s decision to proceed by counsel’s representations, rather than a formal offer. See In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, 217, 821 N.E.2d 283, 287 (2004) (“Simply stated, a party cannot complain of error which that party induced the court to make or to which that party consented”); In re Marriage of Sobol, 342 Ill. App. 3d 623, 630, 796 N.E.2d 183, 188 (2003) (a party forfeits the right to complain of an alleged error when to do so is inconsistent with the position the party took in the trial court).
  7. We emphasize that a trial court is never required to settle for less than a formal offer of proof, whatever the positions of the parties at trial may be. Whether to do so is left entirely to the court’s discretion. Thus, if the trial court is not satisfied that counsel’s representations alone are sufficient, the court may require counsel to place his witnesses on the stand and make a formal offer of proof.”  Miller v. Miller, 2004 Ill. App. 4th Dist.

 

QUOTED FROM ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION  9 — 35

EVIDENTIARY MOTIONS AT TRIAL §9.48

 

 

  1. “Offers of proof are technically not evidentiary motions but rather serve as a sort of narrative insurance policy for appeal. Offers of proof are designed to preserve the record and guarantee that testimony that is not allowed is at least previewed for the appellate court. The purpose of offers of proof is discussed in Lagestee v. Days Inn Management Co., 303 Ill.App.3d 935, 709 N.E.2d 270, 237 Ill.Dec. 284 (1st Dist. 1999). Lagestee followed previous holdings that offers of proof are made to disclose to opposing counsel and the trial court the substance of excluded evidence and to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the trial court committed error thereon. It should be noted that unlike most of the motions made at trial, a motion to make an offer of proof is not subject to the discretion of the court. It has been held in People v. Richmond, 201 Ill.App.3d 130, 559 N.E.2d 302, 147 Ill.Dec. 302 (4th Dist. 1990), that trial courts are required to permit counsel to make offers of proof. Refusal to permit an offer may constitute error. However, refusal of an offer is not error if the suggested testimony is not relevant.

 

  1. Because offers of proof are essential to make and preserve a viable record, the offers should be as accurate as possible. In Snelson v. Kamm, 319 Ill.App.3d 116, 745 N.E.2d 128, 253 Ill.Dec. 354 (4th Dist. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 204 Ill.2d 1 (2003), an offer was held adequate if it informed the court of the particular answer that would have been given. Note that Snelson also holds that a summary or synopsis will not suffice. The offer must be as accurate as possible.

 

  1. To insure that the offer is as accurate as possible, the author would urge that counsel write out, or at least loosely outline, the offer in advance so that it can be read carefully into the record. Obviously, the offer cannot always be written out; but in most instances, the opponent’s objection and the court’s possible denial can be anticipated. A written statement or an outline helps to ensure that all necessary evidentiary elements are included and clearly and artfully set forth. If the need for an offer has not been anticipated, counsel may ask the court’s indulgence for a short break to gather his or her thoughts and compose or outline the offer. If the evidence has been excluded during the testimony of a witness, the questions and proposed answers should be set so as to show the reviewing court what has been excluded. The traditional or classic method of making the offer involves posing the question and eliciting the answers from the witness. The alternative to the questions-and-answers format is for counsel to read the offer into the record. Presenting an offer of proof by orally reciting the substance of the expected testimony was specifically approved in Wright v. Stokes, 167 Ill.App.3d 887, 522 N.E.2d 308 (5th Dist. 1988). Although it runs counter to the conventional method of putting the witness on the stand, the narrative by counsel is the most effective and safest method. The narrative avoids an inarticulate or nervous witness who is very likely to be shocked and concerned by the exclusion of his or her testimony, insures that the testimony is on point, and should provide the optimum voice in setting forth the reasons why the evidence has been improperly excluded. An offer read into the record by counsel is generally more orderly and better understood.

 

  1. In making the offer, specificity is the goal. Conclusory or summary statements as to what the testimony or evidence would have shown will not preserve the record. Snelson, supra. Any offer of proof should be made out of the presence of the jury, and it is suggested that at the close of the offer counsel renew the request that the testimony be allowed into evidence. Restatement of the request gives continuity to the record, ties up loose ends, and ensures that the offer and the ruling of the court are tied together and understood by the reviewing court.

 

  1. Various texts and cases reflect a further relaxation in the method of making an offer and go as far as to suggest that it is not needed at all when the court clearly understands the objection and the nature of the evidence being offered. See People v. Foster, 81 Ill.App.3d 915, 401 N.E.2d 1221, 37 Ill.Dec. 128 (1st Dist. 1980). Notwithstanding Foster, it is strongly suggested that the offer of proof be made outside the presence of the jury in a formal manner whenever testimony has been circumscribed in whole or in part.

 

  1. From a purely practical standpoint, there is generally little likelihood that the offer of proof will have an immediate impact on the trial court. The fact that the offer is being made is indicative of the trial court’s position. The offer is primarily directed toward compiling and preserving an accurate record for appeal. Since the offer entails the refusal of testimony during the case in chief, it properly should be viewed as a very serious motion deserving careful attention.

 

  1. Thus, the offer of proof satisfies two critical needs in preserving the record on appeal: it demonstrates (1) that an error has been committed in excluding evidence and (2) that that error was harmful to the presentation of counsel’s case in chief. The author believes that the only way the above defects can be lucidly conveyed to an appellate court is through a disciplined, formal recitation on the record, as in the following sample: Your Honor, at this time I would like to make an offer of proof in connection with the testimony of [witness]. [Witness], if allowed to testify under oath in these proceedings, would testify as follows: [foundation establishing background and competency, and then a specific narrative of the substantive testimony that would have been adduced.]

 

  1. Again, the offer of proof should be as specific as possible, at all times avoiding summaries or vague conclusions.” [emphasis added]

 

Dated: April 29, 2014

Respectfully submitted,

 

 

Linda L. Shelton

Pro Se Defendant

 

May 20, 2014

Cook County court clerk misconduct and incompetence – letter to Cook County Board President


Board President Preckwinkle kindly replied and said she is continuing to try to achieve changes, but does not have the authority to change several things or obtain documents owed to me.

April 22, 2014
Madam Tony Preckwinkle
President Cook County Board of Commissioners
118 N. Clark St Rm 537
Chicago, IL 60602

Re: Court & Clerk Systemic and Criminal Violation of Law

Dear Pres. Preckwinkle:

This letter is to inform you of criminal systemic “errors” by the Court Clerk and Judges that need to be corrected as well as systemic fraud upon criminal defendants amounting to stealing hundreds of thousands of dollars – millions over decades, without due process of law.

In criminal cases, when a defendant does not show up in court a BFW (Preliminary Bond Forfeiture, Warrant) is issued. Then the defendant has 30 days to show up and have the preliminary bond forfeiture quashed or it becomes final.

Many defendants have good excuse not to have shown up in court – for example: 1) they are hospitalized; 2) they are in custody and the Sheriff refused to bring them to court – because the sheriff is not aware of other court cases or dates unless the court provides them a mittimus paper; 3) there was a death or birth in the family – its hard to be in court if your wife is in the delivery room; or 4) they are on active duty in the military and are out of the country. Then they bring proof of the above to the court and the judge quashes the BFW.

However, the Clerks systemically make the following errors:

1) Instead of writing “preliminary bond forfeiture” = pBFW, they write that this is a final bond forfeiture = BFW, which is transmitted to the Illinois State Police and FBI criminal databases such as LEADS and are used by prosecutors to argue for high bail due to “flight risk”.

2) The judges although they order the warrant to be quashed, they fail to order the bond forfeiture to be quashed.

3) The Clerk therefore fails to write that the bond forfeiture was quashed.

4) If the defendant doesn’t show up for court the Clerk and judge fail to write that this is a final bond forfeiture.

Therefore, on the State Police rap sheets, all preliminary bond forfeitures, even if quashed and warrant quashed for a good reason, state that the preliminary bond forfeiture is a final bond forfeiture. This forever defames the defendant.

This means that when a judge looks at a rap sheet in order to decide bail on a future case, they set fraudulently high bails as they use these “bond forfeitures” that have been quashed as reason to set an exorbitantly high bail rationalizing that the defendant is a “flight risk”.

For example: because I had four (4) “preliminary bond forfeitures” which had been quashed because I was hospitalized each time listed on rap sheet as final bond forfeiture, Judge Daly at Bridgeview set my bail on a MISDEMEANOR case at $50,000 instead of at $1,000 in 2009. Therefore, I was unconstitutionally jailed because I could not pay the bail.

This means my family had to pay $5,000 to get me out of jail (I later won the case) and the court Clerk kept $500. This was theft of my funds as the bond order was void because it was based on false information. I expect this high bail to be vacated nunc pro tunc and the $500 returned. I would prefer the County to take initiative and correct these things, but I doubt they will.

The rap sheets are providing judges false information and this is costing defendants dearly in excessively high bails and wrongful incarceration. I intend to have all these fraudulent bail orders vacated and the Clerk of your court will then owe me a lot of money.

Please make sure that Clerk Dorothy Brown immediately does something to correct these errors. I had a meeting with Dorothy Brown in Dec. 2009 with an attorney as a witness. I told her about the above and she has failed to correct the errors. This means Clerk Dorothy Brown is knowingly and willingly keeping false and incorrect records, each act of which is a class A misdemeanor crime , as you know. I will be filing court pleadings to have all my dockets corrected to reflect this. The number of incorrect court records is staggering as this has been going on for decades. Nine of my cases have such errors. All of my 35+ criminal cases are false arrests in retaliation for my complaints and whistle blowing activities, as well as for my blogs and assistance to other litigants against the state and their officers and judges.

Also note that technically the Illinois bail bond law is unconstitutional as it ties the fee for a fixed service (processing of bond) to the bail amount. Thus someone who is found not guilty after five years of murder and who paid $100,000 bond to get out owes the County $10,000 for processing one bond, while a guilty drug addict who paid $200 to get out on bond only owes the County $20 for the exact same service (processing of bond). This is fraud and denial of equal protection concerning right to property (money), which cannot be taken without due process of law. This is no different than Medicare fraud when a billing agent for a doctor charge by percentage of the doctor’s income instead of per bill processed. You cannot tie the fee for a fixed service to the value of services, labor, or property provided or owned by others. Many billing agents have been sent to federal prison for Medicare fraud. Isn’t the County unknowingly doing the same thing and harming its citizens?

Please be informed of a very serious criminal act going on by the Clerks at Bridgeview courthouse. The cost of a certified computer docket is $9. Any clerk you go to at any other courthouse will print out the docket and charge $9 as the Court Clerk’s web site states.

I wrote Clerk Brown in 2012 and the following is part of the letter:

“I went to Bridgeview Courthouse on 2/10/12 to the civil clerk and asked for two certified docket printouts on case numbers 10 P 006117 and 11-M5-000940. The Clerk said the charge for this 78 page docket and about 15 page docket was $9.00 PER PAGE or about $702 and $135. As you know, your charge is $9.00 per docket regardless of the length of the docket. $837 is a lot different than $18.

This is an $819 overcharge.

It is likely that some people have been inhibited in filing expungements or appeals due to this continuing practice of gross overcharges. This is doing great harm to litigants.

This is massive extortion. All your other clerks at other courthouses charge $9.00 per docket, not per page. Someone has dropped the ball and is not supervising Bridgeview properly or someone at Bridgeview is stealing this money and pocketing it. You must immediately investigate and take action to correct this.

I confirmed with all the clerks present that they actually have been charging the public $9.00 per page for a certified print-out of a single current case docket, instead of $9.00 per docket regardless of number of pages. I suspect someone is embezzling the money as your auditors or supervisors would have caught such a gross error.

I even asked Mr. Blumberg to call your Chief Counsel and he came back and said he spoke to Ms. Demos and she confirmed that the charge was $9.00 per page!

I paid for just the last page certified of each of the above two dockets. I demand that you immediately send by overnight mail the rest of the docket that I paid for.

Your clerks at the Daley Center and other courthouses are charging the appropriate $9.00 per certified case docket.

Attached is Mr. Blumberg’s signature on your fee schedule where he has yellowed what he said is the fee under:

“For record searching, for each year searched.

For each page of computer printout _______________________$9.00”

Ms. Malis agreed with him despite my protests. She has been there long enough to know the correct fee! These are fees for searching the archive records not for printing out a docket!

As you know this is not the fee for a certified computer docket. The correct fee is listed here and applies to the entire docket regardless of the number of pages. I have circled in in red on the attached fee schedule.

“For each certification or authentication with the seal of office ______$9.00”

This is outrageous and means your staff has been stealing tens of thousands of dollars or more from the public.”

I have informed the Inspector General for the Clerk’s office and as far as I know, nothing has been done. I have seen no arrests discussed in the media. Who is covering this up? What are you going to do about it? Where is the money going?

Please also be informed that Judge Biebel and Judge Wright have de facto suspended habeas corpus for people with misdemeanors and detainees at Cook County Jail who file a petition for writ of habeas corpus from Cook County Jail. By law, the Clerk must file any habeas petition a person brings to her and give it a separate civil case number, then schedule it for hearing before the presiding judge of the division promptly. If incarcerated, the presiding judge should issue orders bringing the defendant into the court.

I have tried to file more than six habeas petitions in misdemeanors in 2012 and they are still pending, by mailing them to an attorney friend who tried to file them. The clerk of 1st municipal division refused to give them a civil case number or a hearing date. She just filed them in the criminal case files. We repeatedly both contacted Judge Wright’s, Judge Evans’ and Clerk Brown’s offices and simply got the run around. I contacted them in writing. I mailed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to the clerk at 2650 S California in August 2013 and the supervising clerk now told me that it was placed in the criminal file, not given a civil case number and sent to Judge Biebel to decide whether it should be filed and heard. It was never given a civil case number or heard and is still pending. This issue is now before the Illinois Supreme Court.

The clerk supervisor shockingly said there are “two kinds of habeas petitions” – as instructed by Biebel’s office – one from those in jail and one when an attorney comes and files them. Apparently this County does not understand the rights of citizens under the U.S. Constitution including due process and equal protection. She gives the attorneys’ petition in these felony cases a civil case habeas number and schedules them for hearing. She sends the detainees petition to Biebel and he deep sixes them! That is criminal to de facto suspend the highest civil right a person has – to petition for writ of habeas corpus under the suspension clause of the United States Constitution. This needs a federal criminal investigation, as when a judge knowingly usurps power he does not have (here is doing the clerk’s duty and impeding purposely these petitions from being heard), then according to Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821) that it is “treason on the constitution” when a judge “usurps [the jurisdiction] that which is not given”. The case against me is totally bogus and has the appearance of retaliation for my complaints.

This is just the tip of the iceberg I have concerning misconduct of the Court Clerk, the judges, the sheriffs, and the State’s Attorney, as well as Public Defender in Cook County. I really would like to sit down with you and a representative from the Illinois Supreme Court and U.S. Attorney’s office with several colleagues and give you all evidence of so much other misconduct, criminal acts, and failure to follow their statutory duty, as well as felony federal funding fraud among players in the courts that you will be gob smacked. You have only witnessed the surface of the iceberg in your dealings with Evans and Alvarez. There is not one aspect of the functioning of the courts that is not in need of major reform. Evans must go! He and D. Brown should be impeached, along with several other senior judges. There is plenty of evidence for Greylord 2.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. I hope you will give me a response as to what you plan to do about this. Judge Evans and Clerk Brown, apparently do not think the above need attention as they have done nothing despite being informed.

Sincerely,

Linda L. Shelton, PhD, MD

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