A Teachable Moment and Freedom of Speech

Further explanation of Constitutional law that applies to the case of Harvard Prof. Gates’ arrest last week that prove that the arrest by Sgt. Crowley was illegal is explained by law school Prof. and constitutional scholar Amar at:

http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/amar/20090731.html

He explains that since Sgt. Crowley admitted in his report that Prof. Gate’s words that he considered “disorderly” occurred after he had concluded that no burglary had occurred (the investigation was over so there was no obstruction of justice), whatever Prof. Gates said was protected by the First Amendment right to free speech per the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Houston v. Hill two decades ago. Justice Brennan in that case stated “Speech is often provocative and challenging…[But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.” Therefore, Prof. Gates comments were  protected by the First Amendment and were not “disorderly.” That clearly is a reason why the charges were dropped. Constitutional rights always trump State law.

The vague disorderly conduct laws cannot negate a person’s right to free speech unless there is a “clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil” , like yelling “fire” in a crowded movie theatre or interfering with a police investigation of a crime.

I believe the arrest had nothing to do with race but everything to do with ego. Sgt. Crowley was annoyed by Prof. Gates’ words and didn’t want to appear weak as a Sgt. in front of the other officers. He therefore acted more like the top dog in a dog pack and bit Prof. Gates’ who was alledgedly acting like an uppity overeducated and arrogant nerd who did not show the proper “respect” to an officer. The “teachable moment” should be in regards to constitutional rights and the fact that it is unlawful to arrest someone simply because they are insulting an officer.

Yes the public doesn’t always give officers the respect they deserve for putting their lives on the line every day and yes racial profiling still exists, however, I don’t believe these two issues have much to do with this case. Talk about these topics appear to me simply to be red herrings that the media are using to sensationalize this case, at the expense of the real teachable moment..

Sample Appeal of Wrongful Conviction

I have now filed my Illinois Appellate Court appeal of my wrongful conviction for aggravated battery of a correctional officer. Sgt. Anthony Salemi had attacked me, falsified his records, committed perjury, and with the help of Nifong-like prosecutorial misconduct of ASAs Andrew Dalkin and John Maher and extreme judicial misconduct by Judge Joseph Kazmierski, I was convicted and sentenced to two years in the Illinois Dept. of Corrections plus one year of mandatory supervised release.

I served the minimum 6 months and the full supervised release and was not able to appeal due to illegal conduct of staff at the Cook County Dept. of Corrections and Illinois Dept. of Corrections where I was held and due to damage to my health requiring several hospitalizations within the last year since my release on March 27, 2008 from prison. The damage to my health was a result of torture at the CCDOC and IDOC by ignorant, sociopathic, poorly trained officers and incompetent medical staff (with the exception of Dr. Baker). The social workers even told me they purposely were told not to allow me to use the law library. My medications were withheld in illegal acts of willful indifference to medical needs.

I have informed the FBI and asked them to prosecute for felony conspiracy to violate rights under color of law, etc.

I will never forget the comment to me at CCDOC by Sgt. Molevetti “We got you on one made charge so I can write anything I want and get you on another.” Officer Levy said the same thing. It appears that falsification of records is common practice at CCDOC. We need to take him down and jail him too!

As soon as I win this one, the mother of all civil rights suits will be filed against these creeps. Any officer who has aided and abetted this wrongful conviction is a target in my book to be arrested, removed as an officer, and jailed for felony conspiracy to violate rights under color of law under federal law.

I strongly suggest that ANY officer or CCDOC staff who has knowledge about this wrongful conviction march over to the FBI on Roosevelt Road, ask for a duty agent and confess and turn in the corupt officers and sergeants. The time is NOW to clean up the CCDOC and get rid of decayed and dead wood! If you don’t turn them in, you are part of the corruption and are condoning it! I have no sympathy for you!

You can read my appeal and the evidence of innocence and Sgt. Salemi’s guilt along with the incomptence of Inv. Sofus, as well as the prosecutorial misconduct at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/16301520/Appeal-of-Wrongful-Conviction-Battery-Shelton-Illinois-2009

Note that the appeal exceeds the 50 pages allowed by the Appellate Court. I have written a motion for leave to file this 82 page appeal due to the extreme prosecutorial and judicial misconduct resulting in 18 different issues justifying appeal and overturning verdict.

Note that the appendix has case law on spoilation of or failure to produce critical evidence, self-representation, and insufficient indictments – all what I have already posted on this site elsewhere.

Black Line Trial Call – Judge Maddux’s Illegal Scheme to Quash Suits

Judge Maddux Violates Constitutional Rights – Dismisses Torts with Dual Court Assignment for Same Case – hidden “Black Line Trial Call” WITHOUT Notice to Litigant – RICO Violation?

 In the Circuit Court of Cook County Law Division Presiding Judge William D. Maddux has devised a system that has been in place for several years that serves to quash cases primarily of pro se and indigent plaintiffs  by “dismissing for want of prosecution” (“DWP”) without notice in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rules. Judge Maddux appears to suffer from arrogance, a controlling obsessive-compulsive character where he must micro-manage as many aspects of all cases in his division as possible, narcissism in that he must be involved in every case and grandiose delusions in that he must boost his self-esteem by controlling others in all cases – even to the point of denying civil rights and the law.

 This scheme involves assigning each case to two parallel courts. The first is the motion judge and then trial judge. The second is the “Black Line Trial Call.” Litigants are not informed or given notice about the “Black Line Trial Call.”  The second parallel court hearings are used to cause DWP without notice.

 This scheme that he devised purportedly to move cases along faster, but which actually denies the First Amendment right to redress of grievances, amounts to a RICO violation. Judge Maddux is enriching the courts and clerk’s office or County of Cook by taking money for filing fees and then illegally quashing the cases by DWP in clear violation of law. This makes the Cook County Circuit Court Law Division and the Cook County Circuit Court Clerk’s Office a criminal enterprise used by Judge Maddux, with approval of Chief Judge Timothy Evans and Cook County Circuit Court Clerk Dorothy Brown, essentially influencing this criminal enterprise by influencing through racketeering the outcome of every case in the Law Division. The crimes are fraud in that the Circuit Court appears to permit a person redress of grievances and accepts their filing fee, but instead DWP without notice in an unconstitutional scheme. This is also felony violation of civil rights under color of law and conspiracy to violate civil rights under color of law. As the mails are used in this scheme to inform the plaintiffs that their cases have been dismissed this is also mail fraud. Finally, this is also theft of honest services, as courts are supposed to uphold the constitution, not purposely violate it.

 The scheme or conspiracy to wholesale deny civil rights under color of law goes as follows:

 The plaintiff files a lawsuit (tort) for damages and pays the filing fee thinking that they will obtain redress of grievances and have a just chance to present their case to court and be made whole by awarding of damages.

 The case is assigned by a random system to a motion judge. If it finishes all pre-trial matters, it is then assigned to a different judge for trial. (The ABA recently advised that a case should stay with the same judge from pre-trial through trial as a matter of best practice. The present system is a mess as the motion judges are often changed in the middle of cases and then the judge is totally unfamiliar with the previous motion judge’s rulings and time is wasted and rulings become unfair and confusing because of ignorance of the judge. The trial judges are then also unable to make appropriate rulings through ignorance of previous rulings and this impairs a fair hearing.)

 The case is also assigned to an 18 month or 24 month pre-trial “discovery” schedule for purposes of the “Black Line Call.” The plaintiff is NEVER told that the “Black Line Call” system exists and only find out about it by word of mouth, if they read the Circuit Court of Cook County web site in detail, or if they read the Cook County Circuit Court Clerk web site in detail, which contains a link to the Court web site and contains the “Black Line Case Docket”.  The majority of pro se litigants who are novices therefore do not know about this second court “system,” to which their case is also assigned.

 When the case reaches the 18 mo or 24 mo discovery schedule date, it is assigned to the last number on the “Black Line Call”, a list of cases. The cases are heard about thirty a day without any notice except publication in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin and the case being listed on the Court Clerk’s “Black Line” computer docket. A specific date is NOT given for the hearing, but rather the litigants must guess at the date that the case will move from the end of the line of about 300 cases to the first thirty cases (“above the Black Line”), or read the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin or court computer docket every day after 4:00 p.m.

 The plaintiff must appear on that date at 9:00 a.m. or the case is DWP. No continuances of any kind are allowed. No accommodations are made for the disabled or pro se litigants of any kind. Then when the case is DWP, the plaintiff receives a postcard in the mail from the court that their case has been dismissed and the motion judge will refuse to hear it any or receive any motions. The litigant will have to make a motion to vacate the DWP before Judge Maddux within 30 days or make a 1401 petition before Judge Maddux for the case to be re-instated. Judge Maddux refuses to re-instate cases for unknown reasons.

 For Judge Maddux’s Law Division rules and orders related to the “Black Line Trial Call: see:

 http://www.cookcountycourt.org/divisions/index.html

 Illinois Supreme Court Rules 104 and 105 require proper notice be given to a litigant before a motion, including a motion of the court under the “Black Line Trial System,” can be heard by the court. Therefore, since all orders for DWP by Judge Maddux or his designee judge were done without proper notice to the litigant, these orders are all null and void. The court fails to make a motion or affidavit or order to hear the case in a hearing before a judge other than the judge assigned for the case and fails to specify that this hearing is ordered by the court, for the purpose of setting a trial date and ordering discovery be finished or closed or extended. A case cannot constitutionally be DWP for failure to appear at a “Black Line” hearing when the plaintiff was not legally notified of the hearing per the following Supreme Court Rules and Illinois Statutes:

 “Rule 104. Service of Pleadings and Other Papers; Filing

(a) Delivery of Copy of Complaint. Every copy of a summons used in making service shall have attached thereto a copy of the complaint, which shall be furnished by plaintiff.

(b) Filing of Papers and Proof of Service. Pleadings subsequent to the complaint, written motions, and other papers required to be filed shall be filed with the clerk with a certificate of counsel or other proof that copies have been served on all parties who have appeared and have not theretofore been found by the court to be in default for failure to plead.

(c) Excusing Service. For good cause shown on ex parte application, the court or any judge thereof may excuse the delivery or service of any complaint, pleading, or written motion or part thereof on any party, but the attorney filing it shall furnish a copy promptly and without charge to any party requesting it.

(d) Failure to Serve Copies. Failure to deliver or serve copies as required by this rule does not in any way impair the jurisdiction of the court over the person of any party, but the aggrieved party may obtain a copy from the clerk and the court shall order the offending party to reimburse the aggrieved party for the expense thereof.

Rule 105. Additional Relief Against Parties in Default–Notice

(a) Notice–Form and Contents. If new or additional relief, whether by amendment, counterclaim, or otherwise, is sought against a party not entitled to notice under Rule 104, notice shall be given him as herein provided. The notice shall be captioned with the case name and number and shall be directed to the party. It shall state that a pleading seeking new or additional relief against him has been filed and that a judgment by default may be taken against him for the new or additional relief unless he files an answer or otherwise files an appearance in the office of the clerk of the court within 30 days after service, receipt by certified or registered mail, or the first publication of the notice, as the case may be, exclusive of the day of service, receipt or first publication. Except in case of publication, a copy of the new or amended pleading shall be attached to the notice, unless excused by the court for good cause shown on ex parte application.

(b) Service. The notice may be served by any of the following methods:

(1) By any method provided by law for service of summons, either within or without this State. Service may be made by an officer or by any person over 18 years of age not a party to the action. Proof of service by an officer may be made by return as in the case of a summons. Otherwise proof of service shall be made by affidavit of the server, stating the time, manner, and place of service. The court may consider the affidavit and any other competent proofs in determining whether service has been properly made.

(2) By prepaid certified or registered mail addressed to the party, return receipt requested, showing to whom delivered and the date and address of delivery. The notice shall be sent “restricted delivery” when service is directed to a natural person. Service is not complete until the notice is received by the defendant, and the registry receipt is prima facie evidence thereof.

(3) By publication, upon the filing of an affidavit as required for publication of notice of pendency of the action in the manner of but limited to the cases provided for, and with like effect as, publication of notice of pendency of the action.”

This “Black Line Trial Call” invented and administrated by Judge Maddux in violation of Supreme Court Rules and due process therefore amounts simply to a scheme to quash as many cases as possible without due process by having a dual court system, of which the litigant is not informed about, nor is given notice of hearings. In my opinion this amounts to a RICO violation, in that Judge Maddux with the agreement of Chief Judge Evans, Clerk Dorothy Brown, and Sheriff Dart use the Circuit Court of Cook County and its arm the Clerk’s office as a criminal enterprise to enrich the Clerk’s Office and the Sheriff’s Office by violating laws and depriving pro se, primarily indigent plaintiffs of their constitutional right to redress of grievances and due process. The laws violated are:

1)                  Constitutional right to redress of grievances;

2)                  Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments;

3)                  Violation of Civil Rights Under Color of Law;

4)                  Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights Under Color of Law;

5)                  Theft of Honest Services by Judge Maddux and Clerk Dorothy Brown (Acting as a judge yet denying due process and violating constitutional rights, collecting fees knowing that due process will be denied and mailing a postcard verifying that due process was denied);

6)                  Obstruction of Justice (interfering with First Amendment rights to redress of grievances);

7)                  Mail Fraud (mailing a postcard to litigant that the case is dismissed [yet the dismissal is void as due process is denied]);

8)                  Extortion (of original filing fee and fees for service to Sheriff with no intention to actually give plaintiff due process);

9)                  Extorting money by denying due process in order to enrich a criminal enterprise including the Circuit Court of Cook County through the Office of the Clerk of the Court – filing fees; and through the Office of the Cook County Sheriff – service fees (all fees fraudulently obtained as the “Black Line Trial Call” system or scheme sets up the majority of pro se plaintiffs to have their cases dismissed without notice or due process).

The FBI and United States Attorney should be investigating this, should prosecute the offenders, and should restore constitutional rights to redress of grievances and due process to the citizens of Cook County.

Illinois Appellate Judge Sheila O’Brien Brings Court into Disrepute

I have an appeal pending before the Illinois Appellate Court on the following issue:

My case is a conviction for aggravated battery of a correctional officer. In fact, I had been assaulted and battered by Cook County Department of Corrections Sergeant Anthony Salemi on May 16, 2005. He falsified his records, and he knowingly wrongfully filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff falsely alleging I attacked him, in retaliation for me complaining about the Cook County Department of Corrections violating my civil rights. (Denying Constitutional and statutory rights to medical care, access to courts, free brief phone call to family and attorney)

 

I was in jail for a 30 day sentence for criminal contempt because I told Judge Kathleen Pantle that she was violating the law in the pending fraudulent case involving a fraudulent charge of Medicaid vendor fraud (trial scheduled for February 17, 2009  rm 207 criminal court building 26th and California – all are invited) and had no jurisdiction and then said I was leaving to preserve the issue for appeal and she found me in contempt when I turned around and attempted to leave the courtroom quietly.

 

Sgt. Salemi stated that when he entered my cell, after sending away the female unit officer (in violation of rules that male officers may not enter female cells alone except in emergency), I attacked him while in a wheelchair and forcing my way through the door by ramming him with my wheelchair “skinning his shins” and then after this knocked him down and he stood up, “kicking him in the chest with my RIGHT leg.” This is despite the fact that I have a partial right hemiparesis with impairment of my RIGHT leg so that I can not kick it with force above the waist, the wheelchair was broken and difficult to move, I have congenital injury to the spine causing life-long weak arms and shoulders making it difficult to move the wheelchair forcefully, and I was on the sixth day of a dry hunger strike (protesting denial of access to courts and denial of medical care), intensely dehydrated and unable to stand for more than a few moments due to weakness from the dehydration. My physicians gave unrebutted testimony affirming these facts. The state had no expert witnesses or physician witnesses.

Sgt. Salemi lunged in, grabbed  my neck choking me, then flung me out of the wheel chair while pulling the wheelchair from under me causing large contusions to the back and inner thighs (3 X 5 and 4 X 6 inches) as well as bruises on my arm in the form of his fingers, contused knee upon which I landed, and a severely contused toe that got caught in the wheelchair. All of this was documented and the jury ignored it.

 

I was wrongfully convicted because of a biased jury. The jury became biased because of extreme Nifong-like prosecutorial misconduct by Assistant States Attorneys Andrew Dalkin and John Maher, and by outrageous denial of due process and abuse of judicial discretion by Judge Joseph Kazmierski, all of which grossly denied me a fair trial.

 

I was illegally sentenced to prison instead of probation, in violation of Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), and the Statutes of the State of Illinois. 

 

At CCDOC and IDOC I was illegally abused and punished for refusing to walk (IDOC staff falsely claiming I was faking my multiple medical conditions and physical handicap) during the reception process, including a life-threatening assault on me with an ammonia inhalant (purportedly given to prove I was faking a collapse and asthma attack, but which was NOT documented in records at IDOC), but which exacerbated the attack, caused brief unconsciousness and is contraindicated in asthma, as well as denial of medical care. The IDOC staff are attempting to conceal the documents about Plaintiff’s reception events at IDOC in order to cover-up their official misconduct and ADA violations, in refusing to release the reception summary to me.

 

The habeas petition contains all the details of the perjured testimony by Sgt. Salemi and other Sheriff officers as well as the proof of my innocence and their falsification of records. My habeas petition contains all pertinent references to the transcripts and record on appeal and all issues on appeal. 

http://www.scribd.com/doc/10325794/Shelton-Federal-Petition-for-Writ-of-Habeas-Corpus-Aggravated-Battery-2009 

The Illinois Appellate Court 1st District has now four times denied my motions to compel the court reporters to prepare a free set of transcripts and file them with the court so that my appeal can move forward. The court reporters have refused this direct order of both the trial court and appellate courts. Judge Sheila O’Brien denied another such motion on 2-5-09. This is unconstitutional and a violation of her oath of office that amounts to felony theft of honest services and conspiracy to violate my civil rights under color of law.

Judge O’Brien is OBLIGATED by U.S. Supreme Court previous rulings (stare decisis) to ensure that I am NOT prevented from filing transcripts for my appeal. Failure to enforce her court’s and the trial courts orders is a dereliction of duty and her oath of office that amounts to the federal crime of theft of honest services.  It also is a deliberate attempt to impede my appeal which is a Constitutional right. This amounts to the federal felony crime of violation of civil rights under color of law and conspiracy to violate civil rights under color of law.

Judge O’Brien has brought the court into disrepute because of her incompetent, and/or purposeful, and/or malicious in violation of the Constitution’s mandate that convicted persons have a right to an appeal. She should be impeached.

Federal Judge Coar agrees with this in general because he has ruled that the actions of the Illinois Appellate Court amount to a State willful waiver of their right to insist that I exhaust state remedies (appeals) before proceeding with a Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to overturn this wrongful conviction based on actual innocence, as well as grotesque prosecutorial and judicial misconduct.

Please consider assisting me with donations to my legal fund and showing up for trial on 2-17-09 on the last charge I am defending. Judges tend to follow the law more and make less unconstitutional rulings when they have an audience. That is why I promote the concept of court watchers. Juries tend to have less bias against the Defendant when they see family and others showing the defendant support by filling the gallery.

Unfortunately my family is small, ill, and distant and no one can come to court. Any support in any fashion in my legal, political, and personal health struggles is appreciated.

Prosecutorial Misconduct-Coping Strategies

Possible courses of action if you are
experiencing prosecutorial abuse or misconduct.

See excellent review at: http://caught.net/nwsltr/candef.htm

At this site you will also find if you click on the topics information on the following:

Advanced Trial Handbook Index

• Trial Organization
• Jury Selection
• Opening Statement
• Study on Objections
• Prosecutorial Misconduct
• Documentary Foundations
• Demonstrative Evidence
• Direct Examination
• Cross-Examination
• Trial By Ambush
• Closing Argument
• Post Trial Motions

Attorney and Prosecutorial Misconduct – Tricks of the Trade

For an excellent discussion of this issue see: http://caught.net/nwsltr/candef.htm

How to Sue a Judge

The Judicial Doctrine of Immunity:
 ”Immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.” — United States Supreme Court 
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 554, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 286, 287, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991).

The following is an excerpt from an excellent post on how to sue a judge that I found on the web site http://caught.net/

By David C. Grossack, Constitutional Attorney
Common Law Copyright © 1994   All Rights Reserved

“Has a judge violated your constitutional rights? Have you been discriminated against by being treated differently than other people in similar situations by reason of race, religion, national origin, gender, sexual preference or political opinion?  Have you lost certain rights without a meaningful hearing or even an opportunity to be heard?

Have you been deprived of any other constitutional protection? Have you been subject to Court action for the purpose of intimidating you from exercising an opinion, or practicing your faith? Don’t let them get away with it.

Although it is almost impossible to recover monetary damages from a judge (unless you can prove he or she acted ultra-vires beyond his or her legal jurisdiction) it is in fact possible to obtain relief in equity against a judge through civil rights actions. Equitable relief includes:

• declaratory relief – (rulings by another judge in the form of opinions establishing the constitutionality or lack of constitutionality of another judges actions.)
• injunctive relief – a command or order to do something or refrain from doing so.

As a general rule, however, judges cannot be held liable for money damages for acts done in the exercise of his judicial function, within the limits of his jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous, illegal or malicious his acts may be. (48A Corpus Juris Secundum §86) A minority of decisions have held that if an inferior judge acts maliciously or corruptly he may incur liability. Kalb v. Luce, 291 N.W. 841, 234, WISC 509.”

For full post see: http://caught.net/prose/suejud.htm

Note that judges have absolute judicial immunity against suits for damages as long as they act as judges. If they have no subject-matter or personal jurisdiction however, you can sue them.

This is a rare instance as judges usually can find a way to prove they have either subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.

One instance, which I am presently testing in the courts is when a judge has absolutely no jurisdiction when a fraudulent charge in violation of the Supremacy Clause is brought against a person by a state prosecutor who is prosecuting without any legal or constitutional authority.  This is presently before the Federal District Court of the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division – Case Number 06 C 4259. 

Judges can be prosecuted in criminal courts by the local or federal prosecutor for criminal acts. Judicial immunity does not extend to criminal acts.

For an outstanding discussion of judicial misconduct during trials and judicial discipline see. http://caught.net/nwsltr/candef.htm

Also see my post on this web site concerning legally insufficient indictment.

Right to Participate in Voir Dire, Side Bars, and Faretta Rules about Self-Representation – Rhode Island Judge Violates Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Faretta – RI Supreme Court Upholds Decision

 

Legal, Judicial And Prosecutorial Misconduct And Ethics And Civil Rights Violations Experienced By Christopher Thornton In Rhode Island Courts.

Below you will find a published dissenting decision by Rhode Island Supreme Court Justice Flanders that states the Rhode Island Superior Court violated Christopher Thornton’s Sixth Amendment rights in 3 specific ways. 

“RI Supreme Court #99-376-CA, 98-263-CA (W1/96-595A)  Flanders, Justice, dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion. I believe that the Superior Court violated this pro se defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights in three specific ways.

First, both state and federal precedent required the Superior Court to conduct at least some type of a Faretta³¹’ inquiry with this indigent defendant after it allowed his first attorney to withdraw, appointed another attorney to represent him, and told him it would not entertain a similar motion to remove his second attorney if he could not get along with that lawyer. This error — which resulted in the defendant’s representing himself at trial against capital felony charges — cannot be rendered harmless by seizing upon this unrepresented defendant’s later admissions and using them to conclude that, notwithstanding the court’s error in failing to undertake a Faretta inquiry, he must be deemed to have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.   See related section.

Second, the trial justice violated the defendant’s constitutionally protected right to participate in juror voir dire, including sidebars during which the court conducted individual juror voir dire, by effectively precluding him from being present when this voir dire occurred.    See related section.

Third, the trial justice violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights when he barred him from participating in various substantive chambers conferences that occurred throughout the trial. In my judgment, these errors constituted significant constitutional violations that require this Court to vacate the defendant’s conviction and remand this case for a new trial in the Superior Court.   See related section.”

For full dissenting opinion see: http://caught.net/cases/thornton.htm

Fitness Exams = BCX (Behavioral Clinical Exam) to Stand Trial and for Self-Representation

MEMORANDUM OF LAW CONCERNING FITNESS EXAMS

Non-Attorney and physician/scientist/civil rights activist/expert, Dr. Linda Shelton, respectfully offers to the court the following information:

1.    Court determinations of fitness are made by a court hearing and not by the forensic examiner. The examiners report is merely evidence.

2.     Fitness by statute and case law is determined by the judge, if jury is waved, or the jury in a fitness hearing per 725 ILCS 5/104-11(c):

 

 

(c) When a bonafide doubt of the defendant’s fitness has been raised, the burden of proving that the defendant is fit by a preponderance of the evidence and the burden of going forward with the evidence are on the State. However, the court may call its own witnesses and conduct its own inquiry.[emphasis added]

 

3.  A fitness order is NOT evidence of a bonafide doubt per the First District Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Hill, 345 Ill.App.3d 620, 803 N.E. 2d 138 (2003).

[W]e find that the trial court’s decision to appoint an expert to examine a defendant has no bearing on the court’s ultimate conclusion as to whether a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’ fitness to stand trial has been raised.

 

4.    A Court may order a fitness exam if there is a bonafide doubt of defendant’s fitness per 725 ILCS 5/104‑11. This doubt must be specific and not a general statement and must be expressed in open court on the record. It is not sufficient for a judge to state that a defendant’s behavior or writings suggest a fitness exam is needed. The judge must specify the nature of the behavior or the details in the writings that suggest fitness is absent.

5.      725 ILCS 5/104‑14(c) mandates that the Court inform the Defendant that he has a statutory right to refuse to answer questions at the BCX exam:

 

Use of Statements Made During Examination or Treatment.

(c) The court shall advise the defendant of the limitations on the use of any statements made or information gathered in the course of the fitness examination or subsequent treatment as provided in this Section. It shall also advise him that he may refuse to cooperate with the person conducting the examination, but that his refusal may be admissible into evidence on the issue of his mental or physical condition. [emphasis added]

 

6.      725 ILCS 5/104‑13(d) mandates that the Court MAY not revoke bail if the Defendant is ordered to undergo a BCX exam in order to accomplish the exam:

Fitness Examination.

      (d) Release on bail or on recognizance shall not be revoked and an application therefor shall not be denied on the grounds that an examination has been ordered.

 

7.      Therefore, defendants have a statutory right to refuse to answer questions at a BCX exam and this act does not permit the Court to revoke or alter bail for violation of the condition of bail to appear at a BCX exam and answer questions.

8.      The report of the fitness examination ordered from Forensic Clinical Services is due within 30 days of the date of the order per 725 ILCS 5/104‑15.

9.       The fitness hearing must be held within 45 days of receiving the report of the fitness exam, regardless of the results of the report per 725 ILCS 5/104‑16:

       (a) The court shall conduct a hearing to determine the issue of the defendant’s fitness

       within 45 days of receipt of the final written report of the person or persons     

       conducting the examination or upon conclusion of the matter then pending before

       it

 

10.       This Court must therefore schedule a fitness hearing in this case no later than 45 days after receipt of the report of the fitness exam received by the Court on November 25, 2008 (January 9, 2008).

11.      The details of the forensic examiner’s report have no bearing on scheduling the fitness hearing. A judge may not continue to re-order the BCX until he obtains a report of fitness or no fitness, in order to delay a hearing. The hearing is a statutory right.

12.     A defendant has a statutory right to continue to refuse to answer questions. In general if a defendant refuses to answer questions, it is futile to re-order the fitness exam. The result is that there will be no forensic examiner’s recommendation as to whether or not the defendant is fit. The fitness hearing will have to proceed without professional opinion based solely on other witnesses called by the court, which may include the transcript of statements made by the defendant and pleadings written by the defendant.

 

[T]he trial court’s decision to appoint an expert to examine a defendant has no bearing on the court’s ultimate conclusion as to whether a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s fitness to stand trial has been raised. Hill 803 N.E. 2d 138, at 145.

 

13.      Courts may still determine fitness even though the forensic psychiatry examiner is unable to determine fitness based on defendant’s unwillingness to cooperate:

 

Courts determine fitness based on three factors: the defendant’s irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on the defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Hill 803 N.E. 2d 138, at 145.

 

Although the . . . [the expert] was not able to “come to [a] definitive opinion in regards to defendant’s fitness to stand trial,” this failure was due to defendant’s lack of cooperation. Hill 803 N.E. 2d 138, at 145.

 

The ultimate decision as to a defendant’s fitness must be made by the trial court, not the experts. People v. Bilyew, 73 Ill.2d 294, 302 (1978) [emphasis added]

 

In Hill case the court concluded that the defendant was fit to stand trial. A previous, though not contemporously timely exam had determined defendant was mentally ill but fit to stand trial and the judge’s observations in court led him to conclude the defendant understood the players in the court and the charges against him.

 

While these reports provide some evidence of mental illness, they are insufficient to counter the several indications in the record that defendant understood and participated at trial . . . . [and] exhibited no irrational behavior.  Hill 803 N.E. 2d 138, at 146

 

14.    The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when determining whether a bona fide doubt of defendant’s fitness exists, courts should consider the following factors: the defendant’s irrational behavior, the defendant’s demeanor at trial and any prior medical opinion on the defendant’s competence to stand trial. People v. Harris, 206 Ill.2d 293, 304, 276 Ill.Dec. 286, 794 N.E.2d 181, 190 (2002).

15.  Evidence presented at the fitness hearing may include a report from forensic clinical services, or from private psychiatrists and psychologists retained by either side. The report may state that the defendant is fit or unfit for trial and the examiners detailed reasoning and clinical judgment as to why he came to that conclusion, or may simply be a statement that the examiner was unable to make this determination at the exam because the defendant was unable or unwilling to cooperate with questions.

16.  Although the Cook County Court’s Forensic Clinical Services Department has made a policy that all BCX exams will be performed without video or audio recordings, or witnesses, there is NO absolute bar to recordings or witnesses (assuming they say nothing and merely observe) according to the ethical standards of the American Academy of Psychiatry or the American Academy of psychiatry and the law. In fact, despite the statements of Cook County Forensic Clinical Services in the past that witnesses interfere with the exam, it is known in psychiatry that silent witnesses may be helpful in order to gain the defendant’s cooperation with confused, mentally retarded, or unusually intelligent and court savvy individuals to permit recordings or witnesses in individual circumstances.

17.  The United States Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) went beyond Faretta and stated that even if a defendant is mentally fit to stand trial, the State may deny the defendant the right to self-representation on grounds that he is mentally not competent to represent himself to the point he would be denied a fair trial. They stated that mental illness is not a unitary or static concept and that the trial judge must carefully consider this issue. Yet they set NO guidelines as to the definition of mental competency to self-representation and specifically rejected Indiana’s blanket bar on self-representation if the court finds the defendant cannot “communicate coherently.”

18.  This poses a dilemma for the court as the court must itself determine mental competency for self-representation without any guidelines at present.

19.  I recommend that the court question the defendant on the record and determine: 1) if the defendant is able to formulate questions logically that address specific issues related to his case, 2) if the defendant understands the role of the players in the court as well as the charges against him and the possible sentence, 3) if the defendant is oriented as to time, place, and situation, 4) if the defendant expresses basic understanding of the concept of legal research and the significance of statutes, codes, and case law, and 5) if the defendant is able to control his behavior and emotions so that he can effectively listen, take notes, and formulate questions including questions to a stand-by counsel regarding courtroom procedure. If all of these issues are answered in the affirmative then the defendant should be considered mentally competent for purposes of self-representation.

20.  Unfortunately, courts are left to formulate criteria for mental competence for self-representation with the United States Supreme Court holding in abeyance further decisions upon the criteria for mental competence for self-representation until further cases reach the Court.

21.  Finally, I recommend that with very intelligent and legally savvy defendants who refuse too answer questions at a fitness exam because they feel, despite the Court’s dicta in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), that the defendant has no constitutional fifth amendment right to have a witness present during a fitness exam or a recording of the fitness exam, the Court should ask basic fitness questions on the record to prove the defendant has the mental understanding and lack of confusion necessary to stand trial including: 1) the date, time, place, and situation, 2) the role of the players in the court, 3) the nature of the charges against him, and 4) the possible sentence if convicted, as well as 5) the meaning of being convicted and sentenced.

22.  The answers to these questions can then be utilized by the court in lieu of a professional’s fitness exam report to determine the issue of fitness, but not the issue of mental illness. A professional forensic psychiatric exam is not really necessary to determine fitness, but is necessary to determine if the defendant suffers from mental illness.

 

Dismissal due to Discovery Violations

DISMISSAL DUE TO DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS/DUE PROCESS GROUNDS

 

The duties to disclose and preserve impeachment/exculpatory evidence are grounded in the due process right to a fair trial. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 at 87 (1963) . Thus, the withholding or destruction of evidence violates a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights only if, as a result of the withholding or destruction of evidence the criminal defendant is denied a fair trial. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.

In People v. Walker, 257 Ill.App.3d 332, 628 N.E.2d 971 (1st Dist. 3d Div.
 1993) the court found that: “When police destroy material evidence, defendant’s clothing where he was  claiming misidentification … defendant’s due process rights violated and not an abuse of judicial discretion to dismiss the indictment.”

In People v. Madison, 264 Ill.App. 481, 637 N.E.2d 1074 (1st Dist., 4th Div.
 1994) the court found that: “Police destruction of evidence, heroin prior to trial, requires dismissal.”

            In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), the court held that police did not deny the defendant due process by inadvertently destroying evidence that might have aided him.

      In People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 815 N.E.2d 980 (2d Dist. 2004) the court

discussed bad faith and its relationship to destruction of evidence and the issue of whether the evidence had only speculative value or was essential to the case.

“We have applied Newberry to uphold dismissals on due process grounds where the State destroyed evidence that was essential or outcome determinative. In People v. Crowder, 323 Ill. App. 3d 710, 753 N.E.2d 1165, 257 Ill. Dec. 539 (2001), the defendant was charged with two weapons offenses. After receiving a discovery request for the gun on which the charges were based, the State lost the gun. The trial court dismissed the charges. We affirmed, observing that the key issue was whether the gun was actually a firearm and not, e.g., a toy or inoperable replica. Crowder, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 712. Thus, the gun was essential to the case, and the defendant had no realistic hope of exonerating himself unless his experts could examine it. Crowder, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 712; see also People v. Coleman, 307 Ill. App. 3d 930, 934, 718 N.E.2d 1074, 241 Ill. Dec. 220 (1999) (dismissal proper after State inadvertently lost or destroyed alleged controlled substance that defendant had sought in discovery [in a timely fashion, even in the absence of bad faith].” People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 815 N.E.2d 980 (2d Dist. 2004)

 

“The court distinguished Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), which held that police did not deny the defendant due process by inadvertently destroying evidence that might have aided him. The Newberry court observed first that, in Youngblood, the Court required a showing of bad faith because the evidence that was destroyed had no more than speculative value to either the State or the defendant. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 315; see Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 289, 109 S. Ct. at 337. The court observed second that in the case before it, unlike in Youngblood, the evidence was destroyed after the defendant had requested it in discovery. Thus, the State had been on notice that it needed to preserve the evidence. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 317.”  People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 815 N.E.2d 980 (2d Dist. 2004)

 

“[I]n Newberry, the police seized what appeared to be cocaine from the defendant. After the substance tested negative, the defendant was charged with possessing a look-alike substance. However, a second drug test was positive. The State then indicted the defendant for possessing cocaine and several closely related offenses and dismissed the look-alike substance charge. After the defendant filed a general discovery request, he learned that the police had mistakenly destroyed the alleged cocaine. On the defendant’s motion, the trial court dismissed the indictments. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 312-13.

The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that, even absent bad faith, trying the defendant would deny him due process because the destroyed evidence was “essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case.” Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 315. That was because the defendant could not be convicted of the possession charges without proof of the content of the substance and, conversely, could not hope to exonerate himself without a chance to have his own experts examine the substance. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 315.” People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 815 N.E.2d 980 (2d Dist. 2004)

 

“Aside from relying on due process, the supreme court upheld the dismissal of the charge as a proper sanction for the State’s discovery violation. …[U]nder Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 415(g)(i), a trial court may impose appropriate sanctions where the State fails to meet its discovery obligations, even absent bad faith. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 317-18. Because the evidence that was destroyed was “pivotal,  the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 318.” People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 815 N.E.2d 980 (2d Dist. 2004)

 

            Courts have ruled that if the police destroy evidence, “even absent bad faith” that is “essential and determinative of the outcome of the case” then the Defendant would be denied due process, as the defendant “could not hope to exonerate himself without a chance to have his own experts examine the substance [evidence forming basis of case].”  People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 261, 815 N.E.2d 980, 984 (2d Dist. 2004)

The court in Camp (id.) reasoned that if the charges were dependent on the destroyed evidence then the defendant would be deprived of due process if convicted. Therefore, they concluded that the case must be dismissed under such circumstances.

The trial court in Camp (id.) suggested that when the destroyed evidence is not essential or outcome determinative, the court has the power to impose lesser sanctions than dismissal.

“[T]he court could impose a sanction short of dismissal, such as instructing the jury that it could “take the disappearance of evidence in a manner disadvantageous to the prosecution.” People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 815 N.E.2d 980 (2d Dist. 2004)

 

 “This is primarily a question for the trial court, which has broad discretion to impose sanctions that are proportionate to the magnitude of the discovery violation. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d at 317-18; People v. Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d 306, 314, 627 N.E.2d 388, 194 Ill. Dec. 272 (1993)…. [T]he trial court may consider a variety of less drastic options [than dismissal]. These include instructing the jury that the absence of the videotape requires an inference that the tape’s contents are favorable to defendant. See Thorne v. Department of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331-32 (Alaska 1989) (imposing similar remedy on remand to hearing officer in DUI case). On remand, the trial court is to consider the appropriate sanction under Rule 415(g)(i) for the State’s discovery violation.” People v. Camp, 352 Ill. App. 3d 257, 815 N.E.2d 980 (2d Dist. 2004)